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Reverse engineering binary executable code is gaining more interest in the research
community. Agencies as diverse as anti-virus companies, security consultants, code
forensics consultants, law-enforcement agencies and national security agencies routinely
try to understand binary code. Engineers also often need to debug, optimize or instrument
binary code during the software development process.
In this dissertation, we present novel techniques to extendhe capabilities of ex-
isting binary analysis and rewriting tools to be more scalable, handling a larger set of
stripped binaries with better and more understandable outputs as well as ensuring cor-
rect recovered intermediate representation (IR) from binaries such that any modified or
rewritten binaries compiled from this representation workcorrectly.
In the first part of the dissertation, we present techniques to recover accurate func-
tion boundaries from stripped executables. Our techniquesas opposed to current tech-
niques ensure complete live executable code coverage, highquality recovered code, and
functional behavior for most application binaries. We use static and dynamic based tech-
niques to remove as much spurious code as possible in a safe manner that does not hurt
code coverage or IR correctness. Next, we present static techniques to recover correct
prototypes for the recovered functions. The recovered prototypes include the complete
set of all arguments and returns. Our techniques ensure corrct behavior of rewritten
binaries for both internal and external functions.
Finally, we present scalable and precise techniques to recover l cal variables for
every function obtained as well as global and heap variables. Different techniques are
represented for floating point stack allocated variables and memory allocated variables.
Data type recovery techniques are presented to declare meaningful data types for the de-
tected variables. Our data type recovery techniques can recover integer, pointer, structural
and recursive data types. We discuss the correctness of the recovered representation.
The evaluation of all the methods proposed is conducted on SecondWrite, a binary
rewriting framework developed by our research group. An important metric in the evalu-
ation is to be able to recompile the IR with the recovered information and run it producing
the same answer that is produced when running the original executable. Another metric
is the analysis time. Some other metrics are proposed to measure the quality of the IR
with respect to the IR with source code information available.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There has been tremendous amount of ongoing work on program an lysis and un-
derstanding on the source code level. Many tools as well as resea ch efforts have taken
place to analyze source code programs for variety of reasons. Many advanced tools ex-
ist for source level bug detection, vulnerabilities detection, model checking, verification,
memory analysis, debugging and code optimization.
In practice, often times users need to apply the above analyses on the executable
level instead of applying them on the source code level. There are good reasons for this.
Most of the applications used on a daily basis are IP protected with no access to the
source code. In other cases, applications utilize third party software and components with
no access to their source code. Sometimes, the software thatneeds to be analyzed is a
legacy software system with no available source code. In allthese scenarios and others,
users are left only with executables to analyze.
Even if the source code of software applications is available, it is usually not a good
representative of what actually happens during the binary execution. There is a well-
known phenomenon called:What You See Is Not What You Execute (WYSINWYX)[7].
Compilers translating source code into binaries often do modifications on the source code
by introducing new variables, defining a memory layout for the program and doing whole
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program transformations. These changes can cause some vulnerabi ities not existing in
source code to start appearing in binary executables. In fact, researchers started realizing
that some compiler optimizations might not be safe and mightcause security breaches to
come up in the optimized code [72].
Sometimes, the binaries do not represent source code because of modifications that
happen after the compilation process took place. For example, dynamic instrumentation
might be inserted into the binary after being compiled to monitor certain program behav-
ior. Another example is bad code injection and malware.
Even if all of the above scenarios do not happen, source code analysis might be
difficult. One reason is because of having a code base writtenin more than one source
language each with different syntax and semantics.
Reverse engineering executable code is also becoming extremely i portant in the
cyber security domain. Recently, the rate of cyber-attacks on vulnerable application code
increased significantly. In 2010, the federal government observed an average of 15,000
attacks per day [27]. Most of the attacks were utilizing vulnerabilities in application code.
Because of all the above, analyzing executable code is very essential and it is com-
monplace today. Agencies as diverse as anti-virus companies, security consultants, code
forensics consultants, law-enforcement agencies and national security agencies routinely
try to understand binary code.
Unfortunately, current tools and research for handling executables is not going at
the same pace as the development of source level analysis tools. The executable analysis
is usually harder because of the limited amount of information available in executables
compared to source code. This also results in less precise results of the same analyses
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done on binary executables compared to source code.
In this dissertation, we aim at converting executables to anintermediate representa-
tion (IR) similar to the IR obtained from source code. By doing this, we directly enable
the reuse of all current advanced source level tools for analyzing executables without the
need to develop new custom tools for this purpose.
To make the maximum benefit of the source level analyses running on the IR re-
covered from executables, we identify four main propertiesthat should exist in any tool
recovering IR from executables. Our goal in this dissertation is to have all the four prop-
erties in our system. Unfortunately, current existing executable level tools converting
binaries to IR cannot achieve all combined four properties.The four properties are:
1. Functionality The recovered IR should fully represent all aspects of the input bi-
nary. For this to happen, we define the functionality property of the IR to be the
ability to recompile the IR producing a rewritten binary that resembles the input
binary for all input data sets. This is a strong guarantee of IR correctness. This also
makes it easier for applications like binary debugging where users can update the
IR with print statements, addition, or removal of code and examining the effect of
that on the binary behavior. In general, code updates are possible only if the IR is
functional. Any kind of compiler passes and static/dynamicor even hybrid analy-
ses can run on the recovered IR and the results of such passes are guaranteed to be
correct if the IR is functional.
2. Quality The IR should be of a high quality. We will use the term high-level IR to
refer to the IR quality as well during the course of this dissertation. The IR quality
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here means that the IR contains the same kind of information that are available in
source code. For example, the IR should have functions, function APIs, variables
and data types. The more features the IR has, the higher quality the IR is. This
enables better code understanding by users as well as betterou puts from source
code compiler passes that might be run on the recovered IR.
3. PrecisionThe recovered information about the binary that is represent d i the IR
should be precise. The conversion to IR process should recover the same informa-
tion that is presented in the original source code of the binary without missing some
information or adding extra too many false positives. As an example, if a function
takes only two arguments in the original binary, we should recov r only two argu-
ments. If we recover less than that, we might fall into a functionality issue since
the recovered IR might not work in all cases. On the other side, if we recover six
arguments, the IR will probably be working fine, but we will have a less precise IR
that is harder to analyze and understand. The added false positive arguments might
introduce fake side effects and data flow edges that might make any analysis run-
ning on the IR less accurate and effective. Users will have less r adable recovered
code from the IR.
4. Analysis Scalability The analyses used to recover information from the IR should
be scalable. The system should support arbitrary large binaries without taking too
long time to analyze those. This makes the system practical to use.
Achieving all of the above four goals is very hard if we want tohandle any ex-
ecutable in the world. In this dissertation, we show that formost of the compiled ap-
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plication code that is used now, all these properties combined can be achieved. We do
this by laying out specific assumptions and developing techniques that can always work
for binaries satisfying these assumptions. These assumptions are usually valid in most
application code as we show in the dissertation.
This dissertation discusses various techniques that are necessary for any system re-
covering IR from binaries. We discuss the recovery of functions, function boundaries,
function APIs, variables, and data types from executables.This dissertation is not claim-
ing to discuss all aspects of the IR recovery process. There ar some aspects and chal-
lenges that this dissertation does not present solutions toand are presented in other dis-
sertations and published work.
In the next few sections we describe briefly the challenges while recovering these
specific IR aspects mentioned above and present why the stateof he art techniques before
ours fail to achieve all the four properties stated above. Wedo not present a complete
literature review in this chapter. Every chapter will be followed by a detailed literature
review related to the topic of that chapter.
1.1 Functions Recovery
Current binary analysis and rewriting tools cannot combine the four properties de-
scribed above while recovering functions from stripped executables (those without any
relocation, symbolic or debugging information). This is because of the challenging trade-
offs the analyses face.
In binaries, distinguishing code from data buried inside thcode section, such as
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literal constants, jump tables, and literal tables, is difficult. Techniques such as recursive
traversal [62, 67] that track direct control flow paths from the binary entry point fail to
detect all possible code sequences in a binary because of theexist nce of indirect control
flow paths.
Other techniques like [31] [30] [55] heuristically detect only some code entry points
by observing certain function prologue patterns which leads to non-guaranteed code cov-
erage. We call such techniquesbest effort techniques.
Speculative disassemblywas proposed to achieve completeness by disassembling
all portions of the binary including portions that could be eith r code or data. The cost of
that is sacrificingaccuracyby having extra recovered spurious code. The outputfunction-
ality is also sacrificed since disassembling all possible code mayresult in having conflict-
ing code sequences. In addition, the existence of many spurious functions has two more
negative consequences: (i) it is difficult to manually comprehend a spurious code; and (ii)
it makes code analysis inaccurate since spurious code introduces non-existent dataflow
relations and side effects.
In chapter 2, we present techniques that can recover accurate f nction boundaries
from executables with guaranteed code coverage. We presentnovel techniques that iden-
tify likely spurious functions not only based on their prologue patterns ‘like most of the
related work’, but also based on what these functions do in practice ‘their semantics’.
We also present dynamic based techniques to further enhancethe spurious code detection
process.
Our function recovery methods are based on speculative disassembly. Instead of
disassembling the executable from every possible byte offst, we only disassemble from
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code addresses that appear as constants in any of the executabl segments. This will cover
all functions and all executable code in the binary providedthat the binary does not use
computed addresses. We keep all conflicting code around, anduse function inlining to
merge split functions together. We identify likely spurious f nctions by examining the
semantics of such functions and identifying invalid behaviors like accessing out of bound
memory or using conditional flags in an inconsistent way. Such identified functions are
hidden from the user, but they are included in the rewritten binaries for safety since they
cannot be proven not to execute at run time.
Our techniques prove to be very effective in practice. We areabl to identify func-
tion boundaries with almost 100% detection accuracy. We detct almost 96% of the spu-
rious functions in the IR. We never miss any actual function that can be executed in the
binary during our recovery process. None of our identified spurious functions gets exe-
cuted at run time which proves that our techniques are robustand reliable.
1.2 Function API Recovery
Recovering function APIs usually mean recovering argumentsa d returns as well
as the function calling convention. In this dissertation wefocus on recovering register
allocated arguments and returns of our recovered functions. We also describe how exist-
ing techniques to recover memory arguments and returns are affected by having possible
inaccurate function boundaries from our function boundaries ecovery techniques.
The first challenge behind identifying accurate and yet complete register arguments
information is that callee-saves registers should not be counted as being arguments or
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returns only because they have been saved and then restored back in a function. Stat-
ically tracking which registers are used as callee-saves isnot trivial. Some techniques
identify callee-saves based on dynamic analyses [10]. The problem with such techniques
is that they might miss arguments if the input data set is suchthat these arguments are
not accessed. In this dissertation, we present a static technique that can recover such
callee-saves accurately without missing any of them.
To recover an accurate set of register arguments and returns, we accurately and
completely identify callee-saved registers. We define a callee saved register to be a reg-
ister saved to a certain memory stack offset and then restored back from the same stack
offset. The save operation should dominate the restore operation and the stack memory
location used for the save operation should not be read or written to inside a certain func-
tion. We use a modified version of the value set analysis technique by Balakrishnan and
Reps [5] to accurately track the memory stack.
The second challenge is recovering external function APIs and ensuring their cor-
rect execution while passing all needed arguments. Apart from standard libraries which
have a known prototype, external function prototypes are not k wn to the static analyzer
and needs special handling. We present a static technique that nsures that for any ex-
ternal function following a known compiler calling convention, all arguments are passed
correctly and the execution of the recompiled IR is correct.We use a trampoline function
that gets executed at run time and passes all needed arguments. This trampoline function
adjusts the memory stack such that it appears to the called ext rnal function the same way
it appears in the original input binary.
Finally, having possible inaccurate function boundaries present in the IR makes
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current memory allocated argument recovery techniques notcompletely functional. Such
techniques usually assume there is a return address on top ofthe stack of a function which
is not always true if function boundaries are inaccurate. For example, if a single binary
function is split into two parts in the IR (because of inaccurate boundaries), this makes
the second part of this function in the IR having no return address on top of the stack.
Current published memory allocated arguments recovery techniques have to account for
these situations. We present the necessary changes to thesetechniques to account for the
inaccurate function boundaries problem. The return address is always abstracted in the
recovered stack array in the recovered IR such that this problem is avoided.
1.3 Variables and Data Types Recovery
Current tools recovering variables and data types from executables cannot have all
the combined four propertiesfunctionality, scalability, precisionandquality. Some of
them have very high precision at the cost of no scalability [4]. Others are scalable but
with low precision [31]. Many of the current tools cannot recover functional IR while
recovering variables and data types.
Existing tools recovering variables from executables often miss the special types of
variables like the ones allocated on the x86 floating point stack. Such variables are very
important to recover and will render the IR incomplete if notrecovered. IDA Pro [31]
is the only tool known to us that can recover x86 floating pointvariables in some cases
with some sort of a heuristic that might fail and hence the recov red code is not always
functional.
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In chapter 4 of this dissertation, we present a sound technique to recover all vari-
ables allocated on the floating point stack in x86 architectur s. The techniques presented
build a linear system of equations based on the low level operations done on the binary
level to determine the floating point stack height at all program points including program
points located after indirect control transfer instructions whose targets are usually not
known statically.
For memory and register allocated variables, current toolsrecovering such variables
are either imprecise [31] or recover precise information with noscalability. For example,
DIVINE [4], the most precise variable identification tool pro osed in the literature spends
two hours while analyzing programs of the order of 55,000 assembly instructions.
Current work on type analysis from binaries has the preciseness problem. Many
type recovery tools cannot track data flow through memory which limits their type recov-
ery capabilities especially for multi-level pointers and recursive data structures. [51] [22]
[68].
Precise type analyses that can detect multi-level pointershave a scalability problem.
TIE [43] is the state of the art type recovery technique from binaries which is very precise,
unfortunately it is built on top of DIVINE [4] which has a well-known scalability issue.
In chapter 5 of this dissertation, we present novel techniques that can recover vari-
ables with data types 352X faster than current techniques with almost the same precision.
The techniques presented are also completely functional. The basic intuition of the tech-
niques presented is to use a non-sound pointer analysis thati very fast while maintaining
the memory layout of the original binary in the recovered IR to maintain correctness. We
show that a non-sound pointer analysis gives almost the sameprecision as a sound one
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while achieving linear scalability and not sacrificing the output correctness.
1.4 SecondWrite
Figure 1.1 presents an overview of SecondWrite [63], [23], [3]; the executables
analysis and rewriting framework we use to implement the techniques presented in this
dissertation. SecondWrite translates the input x86 binary code to the intermediate format
of the LLVM compiler [46]. The disassembler along with the binary reader translate every
x86 instruction to an equivalent LLVM instruction.
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Figure 1.1: SecondWrite Flow
The disassembler implements the function boundaries recovery techniques pre-
sented in this dissertation. These techniques are essential for the whole system to recover
high-level LLVM IR from stripped executables.
Once the initial LLVM IR is obtained, it is passed to SecondWrite internal passes to
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recover more information about the binary and enhance the quality of the IR. One of these
internal passes is our function APIs recovery techniques. Another internal pass recovers
variables and data types and emit them into the IR. Some other internal passes exist and
not discussed in this dissertation including physical to abstract stack conversion [3], call
translation, call back handlers [63] and others.
The recovered LLVM IR is then fed to the LLVM compiler core. The IR can be
further optimized or analyzed. Finally, the backend of LLVMis used to generate either
an output rewritten binary, or an output C code using the C backend of LLVM. The IR
could be used in tools like Klee [11] to do symbolic executionanalyses.
Without the techniques of this dissertation, SecondWrite cannot work correctly. If
the earlier published techniques to be used (like the techniques present in IDAPro and
other tools), the functionality and quality objectives of our system will be sacrificed. This
is because existing tools like IDA Pro cannot guarantee complete code coverage and re-
cover less precise information.
Our techniques can still be used by any other binary analysisand rewriting frame-
work. They do not need to run on SecondWrite to be effective. The ideas presented in
this dissertation can be applied directly while analyzing ay binary (using IDA Pro tool
for example). Our techniques will automatically give the functionality guarantees if ap-
plied. Hex-Rays for example can use our variables and data type recovery techniques
while recovering C code from binaries.
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1.5 Comparison with previous work in the SecondWrite project
The techniques presented in this thesis represent an essential component of Sec-
ondWrite [3, 23, 63]. As we discussed in the previous section,SecondWrite is a binary
analysis and rewriting system that translates the input x86stripped binary code to the high
level intermediate format of the LLVM compiler [46]. The resulting IR can be used in
program analyses and understanding purposes. It can also beused in many other analy-
ses like symbolic analysis, automatic parallelization andsymbolic execution. The LLVM
backend can be used later to compile the resulting IR back into a rewritten binary which
aids applications like binary translation and binary debuggin .
SecondWrite uses the techniques described in our previous WCRE paper [63] to
distinguish code from data during binary rewriting. Our previous WCRE paper presents
code translation mechanisms for translating code addresses in ide the rewritten binary
and keeps a copy of the original binary segment in the rewritten binary to guarantee
correct data accesses. The WCRE paper describes the binary characterization technique
as a means to find an inclusive set of entry point code addresses in ide the binary. The
results presented in the WCRE paper are only related to the overheads of the translation
mechanisms. There is no discussion about obtaining accurate function boundaries and
eliminating spurious functions from the IR. The IR quality and correctness in the presence
of functions that might be of inaccurate boundaries is not discussed in that paper.
The techniques we present in chapter 2 of this thesis completes the picture by show-
ing that binary characterization by itself produces code with large number of spurious
functions (up to 40% of the IR functions are spurious using the methods in the WCRE
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paper). In chapter 2, we show novel techniques that reduces the amount of IR spuri-
ous functions to less than 2%. This is essential for a high quality and readable IR. The
techniques in chapter 2 has been submitted for publication in TOPLAS [25].
In this dissertation, there is no comparison with our previous EuroSys [3] tech-
niques because they are solving a different problem in the system and because the tech-
niques presented in this dissertation are essential for them o run correctly. The techniques
presented in our EuroSys paper [3] transforms the physical stack present in the binary into
an abstract stack array in the IR for every function. It also presents how symbols can be
extracted from the recovered abstract stack. In chapter 3 ofthis dissertation, we relax one
of the assumptions in our EuroSys paper [3] to enable handling spurious functions and
functions with inaccurate boundaries correctly if they areev r executed in the rewritten
binary. This relaxation is also part of our TOPLAS submission [25].
The remaining chapters of this dissertation build on the functio s identified using
the techniques presented in Chapter 2 to identify source codeartifacts from binaries and
represent them in the recovered IR correctly. The basic recovery of floating point stack
variables with all indirect jumps are resolved, discovering all function arguments, returns,
variables and data types was published in our PLDI 2013 paper[23]. We extended this
work later to include discovering floating point stack variables with unresolved indirect
jumps, rewriting external functions with unknown prototypes correctly, and detecting ad-
vanced data types like recursive data structures. These extensions to the work were sub-
mitted for publication to TOPLAS [24]. There is no previous work in the SecondWrite
project that is concerned with solving these research problems other than our PLDI 2013
paper [23] and our submitted TOPLAS paper [24].
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1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is composed of the following chapters:
• Chapter 2 presents methods to recover functions with accurate boundaries from
executables
• Chapter 3 presents methods to recover register arguments andreturns and hence
function APIs
• Chapter 4 presents methods to recover the floating point stackallocated variables
• Chapter 5 presents our methods to recover memory allocated variables and data
types and
• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis
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Chapter 2: Recovering Functions with Accurate Boundaries
2.1 Introduction
The first step in any binary analysis and rewriting system that recovers IR from
executables is to locate where the code exists and divide thecod into procedures for
higher quality IR.
Executables only have their entry point address visible andknown in the file for-
mat. Other than that, it is up to every tool to analyze the binary and know exactly where
all functions are located. This problem becomes trivial in simple executables where all
control transfer instructions (CTI) like calls and jumps aredir ct ones. By direct we mean
their target is known by examining the instruction itself. Indirect control transfers through
registers or memory make the code discovery problem very challenging since an indirect
call or jump can theoretically jump to any arbitrary location n the binary code.
In our work, as we mentioned in the introduction chapter, we want to achieve four
properties in any IR we recover:functionality, quality, accuracyandscalability. For an
IR to be functional, it has to fully represent all code in the binary which means that any
disassembler we use has to have a 100% complete code coverage.
Achieving complete code coverage along with high quality IRand accurate func-
tion boundaries is very hard. The price paid while recovering all possible executable code
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is usually a large number of spurious functions (up to 40% according to the best tech-
nique recovering 100% live executable code by Smithson et al. [63]). We present novel
techniques that reduce the number of spurious functions up to 2% which greatly enhances
the readability and the quality of the recovered IR. Moreover, all our identified spurious
functions are true spurious ones that never execute at run time which shows the strength
of our techniques.
The main contributions achieved by the techniques presented i this chapter are as
follows:
• Accurate Function Boundaries: We present disassembly techniques that can re-
cover function boundaries that are as accurate as what is there in the debugging
information of the input binary (debugging information is only used in testing)
without sacrificing complete code coverage, thus aiding analysis precision and code
readability.
• Pruning Spurious Functions: We present safe and sound hybrid static/dynamic
techniques that can identify and delete spurious functions, aiding analysis precision
and readability.
• Marking Likely Spurious Functions: We also present novel techniques that can
identify functions that are spurious with high probabilitybased on their semantics
and move them to a separate file, thus further aiding human readability. Our results
indicate that none of these functions gets executed in the rewritt n binaries. In
other words, for our input binaries compiled from source programs totaling over
one million instructions, we never mis-identified a legitimate function as spurious
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(although the opposite, which is much less harmful, did happen in a few rare cases.)
Our techniques in this chapter represent an essential component of the Second-
Write [3, 23, 63] system we use. The techniques presented in this chapter are imple-
mented as part of the front end component of SecondWrite whichreads the input binary
and translates it into a working IR with accurate function boundaries.
Function information is needed in all our work presented in the following chapters.
The techniques in the following chapters need function information to define function
APIs and declare local variables. In addition, the high-leve IR recovery techniques like
the one by Anand et al. [3] need function information to detect memory arguments and
be able to do interprocedural symbolic analysis.
Our techniques can still be used by any other binary analysisand rewriting frame-
work. They do not need to run on SecondWrite to be effective. Thideas presented in this
chapter can be applied directly while disassembling any binary (using IDA Pro tool for
example). They will automatically give the complete code coverage guarantees if applied.
We tested our methods inside SecondWrite on the SPEC 2006 benchmark suite
compiled using two different compilers (GCC and Visual Studio) on two different plat-
forms (Linux and Windows). All rewritten binaries work correctly and give the same
results as the original binaries. We show in the results section of this chapter that the
recovered IR procedures using our techniques are 99% accurate compared to the original
binary procedures. The 1% inaccurate procedures do not sacrifice the IR correctness. We
show detailed results about SecondWrite relevant to this chapter including IR procedures
accuracy and readability metrics, disassembler scalability, and the performance of some
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of our individual heuristics in the overall procedures recovery process.
We recognize that recovering source-level function information is impossible in
many cases.We stress that this is not our target in this chapter. We are trying to recover
the same function information as what is in the debugging information of the input binary
to our system;not in the original source code (we never use, and do not need, debugging
information in our analysis). Source code functions can be significantly changed during
compilation using compiler transformations like functionnlining or CPS transformations
in functional languages compilers. When we refer to the accuracy of the recovered func-
tions in this chapter, we compare what we recover to functionb undaries in the function
symbol table of the original binary (in a control binary withdebug information; the ac-
tual binary we rewrite does not have such a function table). We do not compare with the
original source code.
2.2 Background and Motivating Example
The problem of recovering accurate function information from binaries and ensur-
ing their correctness is challenging. Binaries are composedf code and data segments.
Data can be embedded into the code segment and it is not known what portions of the code
segment might contain this embedded data. This results in non-valid recovered code if
such embedded data is disassembled or rewritten by mistake.Even among the code, since
the targets of indirect calls and branches are generally notknown, the structure of the code
is hard to determine especially with variable length instructions (like in x86) where mul-
tiple overlapping instruction sequences are possible for the same code, depending upon
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which byte we disassemble from.
The first attempt to discover code was recursive traversal dissembly [62, 67], in
which disassembly starts from the entry point of the binary (which is known according
to the binary format). To recover a code portion, there has tobe a direct control flow
path (through direct calls and jumps) from the entry point tohat portion. This leaves
large portions of the binary that we cannot prove is code. As an example, let us assume
the code example in Figure 2.1 is only reachable using indirect calls (through function
pointers). Recursive traversal will not be able to discover any portion of this code.
Improving on that, some best-effort techniques [31,55] addmore entry points to the
recursive traversal by examining known function entry prologue patterns like allocating
stack, initializing the frame pointer or saving registers.The problem with such techniques
is that they cannot guarantee completeness. As shown in Figure 2.1, the code example




 0x100 : dd 05 10 43 45 08  fldl 0x8454310 
0x106: dd 05 14 43 45 08  fldl 0x8454314 
0x10b: 83 e8 55           sub  $0x55,%eax 
 0x10d :       55           push %ebp 
0x10e: d8 c9              fmul %st(1),%st 











sub  $0x55,%eax 
call Func_0x10e  
ret 
Func_0x10d:  
 push %ebp 





je   BB_0x129 
…… 
 





sub  $0x55,%eax 
fmul %st(1),%st 




 push %ebp 
fmul %st(1),%st 







Speculative disassembly [33] was proposed to tackle this problem. It assumes that
anything in the code segment can potentially be code. In thiscase, every byte offset can
be a potential entry point. This results in two main problems: 1) Code explosions due to
20
many possible assembly listings. In the code example in Figure 2.1 we have 23 different
entry points. Few of them will lead to illegal instructions,but we will still be left with
a large number (up to 23) possible listings of which all but one are spurious. 2) Given
variable-length x86 instructions, some of the possible disassembled listings may conflict
with other listings because of unaligned and variable length instructions. As an example,
The listing starting at 0x100 conflicts with the one startingat 0x10d since 0x10d starts
in the middle of the instruction at 0x10b. Thus both sequences cannot be correct, but we
cannot statically determine which one. Speculative techniques solve these two problems
by removing conflicting code sequences to avoid code explosions. This sacrifices the
complete code coverage as well as the functionality.
Recently, we proposed the⁀binary characterization technique to greatly reduce the
number of entry points (and thus spurious code) [63]. It aimsto compute a super-set of all
possible targets of indirect control transfers in the program. Its intuition is that under the
conditions we will list later, all local control transfer instructions (CTIs) target addresses
have to appear somewhere in the binary. The technique is summarized in section 2.3.
In the example in Figure 2.1, this technique reduces the entry points to only the two
addresses 0x100 and 0x10d.
Binary characterization partially solves the code explosion problem (around 40%
of the code is still spurious, but that is better than the other sp culative techniques). In
this chapter, we complete the big picture for the whole system by proposing how we deal
with the problem of having conflicting code sequences and obtaining accurate function
boundaries out of the disassembled listings.
We have five main components to our techniques. They are presented next using an
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example.
Disassembly We disassemble the binary starting from each binary characteriza ion entry
point as well as from the binary entry point. During this, we keep conflicting code around.
In the example in Figure 2.1 we will create two functions for bth binary characterization
addresses 0x100 and 0x10d as shown in Figure 2.2 and solve theconflict by creating a
third function for the fall-through address from both functions (which is address 0x10e
in this case). The fall through appears because both code sequences fall to the same
instruction later. This step achieves complete code coverage while keeping conflicting
code around. It does not solve the function boundaries and functionality problems.
Improving Function Boundaries The first step to solve the function boundaries prob-
lem is to use inlining. After our disassembly, functions exist but they are split into parts
because of the spurious entry points and code conflicts. Inlining merges the splits back
into one function. In this example, we inline the fall-through function into both parent
functions. This guarantees that at least one of the functions will have the correct bound-
aries. The function at the fall-through address (0x10e) canbe deleted in this case as shown
in Figure 2.3. Section 2.4.2 includes guarantees on when it is safe to prune such spurious
functions. This step achieves better function boundaries,but some spurious functions still
exist (which are not safe to remove).
Marking Likely Spurious Functions We identify spurious functions based on their se-
mantics. In this example,Func_0x10d uses the zero flag in a conditional jump without
setting it. Such behavior is unlikely to happen in a valid code since such flags are most
commonly used as local variables. We identifyFunc_0x10d as a potential spurious
function and move it away into a separate file to enhance code readability. The function
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still exists since we cannot prove statically it cannot be called at runtime.
Pruning Spurious Functions Based on Dynamic TechniquesWe present novel tech-
niques to safely prune spurious code based on dynamic information collected from the
execution of the original binaries. For example, if we monitr that the instruction at
0x10b in figure 2.1 is executed at runtime, we can safely delete the function starting at
0x10d since its entry point instruction starts in the middleof the other executed instruc-
tion at 0x10b. This pruning is safe for all data sets, not justthose used in the dynamic
run(s). This is because if a portion of the code segment is found to be code for one input
data set, it must be code for all input data sets. There are other ways of using dynamic
information to have high quality code that we explore in thischapter.
High Level IR Functionality The last problem this chapter addresses is to guarantee
correct behavior of detected functions if ever executed. Inthis particular example, we
make sure that any caller to function 0x10d passes the value of the zero flag to the func-
tion. This is done by modifying the call translator functiondescribed in [63] to have such
arguments. Detailed discussion about this can be found in section 2.7.
2.3 Binary Characterization and Code Coverage
Binary characterization’s intuition was given above; here we formalize it. Binary
characterization scans all the executable segments at every single byte and come up with
a list of all constants that might be potential code addresses. A potential code addressx
satisfies the following condition:Li ≤ x ≤ Ui, whereLi is the lower bound address of
code segmenti andUi is its upper bound address.
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Binary characterization is based on two assumptions which are usually valid in
most application code: 1) Code addresses used in indirect control transfer instructions
(CTIs) are not computed at run time. 2) No self-modifying codeexists in the binary.
The first assumption is valid in all compiled code which is neith r position independent
nor obfuscated. The second assumption is a limitation of allst tic executable analysis
techniques. Section 2.10 discusses how these assumptions can be relaxed in our system.
The first assumption does not exclude binaries having indirect jumps with jump
tables embedded in the code or the data segment. These indirect jumps will calculate the
addresses of the jump table entries, not the target addresses themselves. The target code
addresses are still non-computed constants present in the code or the data segment. They
are loaded and then used in the jumps.
The first assumption implies that CTI local target addresses must appear somewhere
in the executable segments. They can either appear as operands to i structions in the code
segments, or initial values of global variables in the data segments.
When we talk about binary code coverage in this dissertation,we refer to covering
instructions that can be executed in any dynamic run of the binary. We call such instruc-
tions thelive code. There are parts of the binary that can never be executed under the
assumptions above which we calldead code. Examples of dead code include functions
that are inserted in the binary and are never reachable usingany kind of control transfer
instructions (either direct or indirect).
We formulate the fact that under the previous assumptions weachieve complete
live code coverage in the next property. We write it as a property to easily refer to it
throughout the dissertation.
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Property 2.1 Let B be the binary characterization list of addresses and letx be a
code address within the executable reachable indirectly. Addressx must appear inB.
Static recursive traversal disassembly starting from every such addressx ∈ B as well
as from any externally visible function address in the binary guarantees the complete
coverage of live binary code.
Proof The first part of the property falls directly from the binary characterization
definition above. To prove the second part of the property, weuse contradiction. Assum-
ing that we start recursive disassembly from every addressx ∈ B as well as from the
binary entry point and from externally visible functions (visible in export address tables
for example) and we still do not achieve complete live code coverage. This implies that
there is some part of the code that is reachable using some sort of control flow and yet
is not covered by static disassembly. This code can be only reachable using direct con-
trol transfers, indirect control transfers from within thebinary or from outside the binary.
We prove each case individually. For code that is reachable from within the binary, if it
is reachable indirectly, then it has to start with a binary characterization address which
means it is covered by the static recursive traversal. If it is reachable directly, then recur-
sive traversal will be able to follow it and hence it is also covered. For externally visible
parts of the code within the binary, in order for them to be reachable by other external bi-
naries, their entry addresses have to be externally visibleto the outside code (for example
in export tables, relocation tables, ... etc.). We already start tatic disassembly from such
addresses and hence we cover such code as well.
The fact that there is some portion of the binary code that might be dead and hence
not covered by our static disassembler means that we might have cases when our recov-
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ered IR after disassembly is smaller in size than the input binaries. We discuss this more
in the results section and show this detailed effect on all benchmarks.
The two assumptions stated at the start of this section mightseem to limit the ap-
plicability of this work especially in the security domain.This is not right because of two
reasons:
1. These assumptions are only needed if we want a functional rewritten binary and
100% live code coverage. They can be easily relaxed if only biary analysis (but not
rewriting) is to be performed like in many security applicatons, such as analyzing
malware or discovering vulnerabilities in legitimate binary code. The price paid in
this case is an IR which is not guaranteed to work correctly ifrecompiled.
2. The effect of code obfuscation does not limit the applicability of this work to the
security domain. IDA Pro and Hex-Rays are well-known tools that do not present
special handling to obfuscated binaries and they are still used by many security
analysts to understand binaries. Our tool can be used the samw y. As we show
later, we have much higher precision than IDA Pro and other tools. In addition,
existing de-obfuscation approaches such as [40], [42] can be used prior to our tool,
to allow our tool to be used on obfuscated code.
We discuss the issue of how to relax the assumptions further in section 2.10.
2.4 Disassembly Methods
In this section, we describe our custom disassembler that overc mes the prob-
lems described in the previous section. We explain first the basic rules that create non-
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conflicting functions and attain complete code coverage possibly with less accurate func-
tion boundaries, and then we describe our techniques to improve the function boundaries.
2.4.1 Disassembly Rules
While disassembling the binary, a single code addressx i reachable if it is one of
the following: 1) A speculative entry point (like being a binary characterization address).
2) A target of a call. 3) A direct branch target. 4) An indirectbranch target embedded
in a jump table. and 5) A sequential address to a previously diassembled address. We
start the disassembly process from the entry points of the binary as well as from every
speculative entry point. We apply the rules in Figure 2.4 while d sassembly.
For direct calls and jumps, we create a new function only in the case of call in-
structions, or in the case of jumps when they cross function boundaries. This latter case is
needed because calls are sometimes implemented by a push of the return address followed
by a jump. Indirect calls will be replaced by a call to the transl tor function explained
in [63].
Indirect jumps are analyzed using a modified version of the well-known jump table
recovery heuristics by Cifuentes and Emmerik [14]. We modifiethe heuristics to ensure
that they can run across function boundaries. For simplicity, all recovered addresses from
these heuristics will be initially considered as function entry points and annotated for later
inlining. Even if the heuristics fail, all such addresses would have been recognized using
binary characterization as function entry points. We use the heuristics as hints for better
function boundaries accuracy because jump table targets arusually not function entry
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Instruction Rules 
call x      //Direct call 
x is a constant address 
If x is disassembled as part of function foo 
Split foo at x 
Insert a call to foo_split (starting at x) 
Else   Insert a call to a function starting at x 
call *x   //Indirect call 
x is a register or a 
memory location 
Replace with a call to the general call translator 
jump x      //Direct jump 
x is a constant address 
If x is within the current function OR not disassembled yet 
Create a basic block at x inside current function 
Insert a branch to basic block x 
Else   Let foo = parent (x) 
Split foo at x 
Insert a call to the foo_split (starting at x) 
Annotate foo_split with JUMP_TARGET 
jump *x   //Indirect 
jump 
x is a register or a 
memory location 
Run jump table identification heuristic 
Annotate every target discovered with 
INDIRECT_JUMP_TARGET 
Create a new function for every discovered target address 
Replace with a call to the general call translator 
Other sequentials from 
address x to  address y 
where: 
x: instruction 1 
y: instruction 2 
and y = x + sizeof 
(instruction 1) 
Let foo be the current function, foo = parent (x) 
If y is not disassembled yet 
Disassemble y as part of foo 
Else   If y marks a start of a function bar 
Insert a direct call to bar 
Annotate bar with SEQ_TARGET 
Else if parent (y) = bar, bar != foo 
Split bar at y 
Insert a call to bar_split (starting at y) 
Mark bar_split as a SEQ_TARGET 
Else    //parent(y) = foo 
Create a basic block starting at y 
Insert a direct jump to basic block y 
 
Figure 2.4: Disassembly Rules
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points.
The rule for sequential addresses will create a new functionif the sequential fall-
through address is a function entry point, or if it crosses the boundaries of the current
function. Such functions will be annotated as being sequential.
The disassembly rules in figure 2.4 do not describe when to enda function. We stop
the disassembly process inside a function in three cases: 1)If another function begins. 2)
If there is a one way control transfer instruction (CTI) redircting control to a different
function (like a jump instruction). 3) If a return instruction is detected. For call instruc-
tions, we keep disassembling the sequential address after the call. This is okay since even
if the call instruction does not return back to the same call site, the disassembled extra
code will never get executed which does not harm functionality.
After finishing this disassembly stage, a complete disassembly of the IR is obtained
and according to property 2.1 it will cover 100 % of the input live binary code. There are
two major problems in the IR after this stage: 1) There will bemany function splits as
shown in the example in figure 2.2. 2) Some functions might misakenly appear as parts
of other bigger functions if such functions are only reachable using direct jumps (which
is the case for tail calls). The next section describes how todeal with these two problems.
2.4.2 Improving Function Boundaries
In order to do more improvements to the function boundaries,we perform three
main tasks: 1) Use heuristics such as known function prologues and external stubs pattern
matching. 2) Merge indirect branch targets into their parent fu ctions. 3) Merge as many
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splits together as possible.
Even though this section will present some heuristics that give higher quality and
more accurate IR from binaries, this does not sacrifice any corre tness of the system.
Whenever our heuristics fail, we still achieve our 100% live code coverage and IR cor-
rectness. We never delete IR code unless it is safe to do so. Wenever delete live IR code.
Even if we have non-accurate function boundaries, our techniques presented in section 2.7
will make sure the flow of variables and arguments still happen to such false functions.
The first thing we do is to recognize known function prologue patterns. In our
implementation, we rely on two main prologue patterns: 1) Initializing the frame pointer
with the value of the stack pointer. 2) Indirect jumps to relocation entries which are used
to form external function stubs in some binaries. Many more techniques and heuristics
can be integrated in this step easily such as existing machine learning techniques for
recovering function entry points [55].
The second improvement we do is related to merging as many splits as possible.
For this, we define anactualfunction as any recovered function having at least one of the
following four properties: 1) It is called directly. 2)It isnon-speculative (reachable from
the executable entry point). 3) It has a well-known functionprologue. 4) Its entry is a
binary characterization address not annotated as being sequential or a jump target. For
every nonactual function, we search all the callers up the call graph until wefind a set
of actual function parents. We then inline the nonactual function into all its parents. To
avoid code size explosions, we set a limit on the number of inlines per IR function; we
call this limit the inlining threshold.
Algorithm 1 shows how anactual function can be identified as well as parents for
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Algorithm 1 isActualFunction algorithm - detecting actual functions ad parents of non-
functions
Input: x : an address of a suspect functionfu c x in the IR
Input: analyzed: a set of already analyzed caller addresses (for handling recursion)
Output: isActualFunction: false ifx is not considered a function entry point
Output: parents: a set of all possible parent functions to the basic block starting atx
1: if x ∈ analyzedthen
2: return withisActualFunciton= false
3: end if
4: SetisEntryIF (x is the entry point function)
5: SetisDirectlyCalledIF (x is reachable using at least one direct call)
6: SetNonSpeculativeIF (x exists in the function symbol table of the binary)
7: SetIsBinCharAddrIF (x is a binary characterization address)
8: SetIsJumpAddrIF (function atx is marked as JUMPTARGET)
9: SetIsSeqAddrIF (function atx is marked as SEQTARGET)
10: SetIsKnownPrologueIF (function has a known prologue pattern)
11: if (IsKnownPrologue OR isEntry OR isDirectlyCalled OR NonSpeculative
OR (IsBinCharAddr AND NOT(IsJumpTable) AND NOT(IsSeqAddr) AND
NOT(IsJumpAddr)) ) then
12: return withisActualFunciton= true
13: end if
31
14: insertx into analyzedlist
15: Let C be the set of all functions callingfunc x in the IR
16: for all parentn∈ C do
17: (callerIsFunction, callerParents) = isActualFunction( AddressOf(parentn), an-
alyzed)
18: insert callerParents into parents
19: if callerIsFunctionthen
20: insert AddressOf(parentn) into parents
21: end if
22: end for
23: return withisActualFunciton= false
non-actual functions. Lines 4-13 check foractual function attributes described above. If
the function is non-actual, lines 16-22 traverse the call grph up (from callees to callers)
and gets allactualparent functions.
There are many reasons why algorithm 1 can return more than one parent function
for a certain input address. One reason is CFG conflicts. As we hav already seen in the
code example in figure 2.2, the function starting at 0x10e will not be considered an actual
function and it will have two parents. Ideally, a single address should be part of only one
function, but because of CFG conflicts and splits, we might endup having many parent
functions.
It is important to notice that algorithm 1 is a heuristic which means it is not guar-
anteed to give accurate information. The results section quantifies how often this algo-
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rithm is accurate. The algorithm gives accurate information in most cases since suspect
functions that are only reachable using direct jumps or as sequential addresses to other
instructions are usually non-functions. The reasons falsepositives might happen where
non-functions are considered functions by mistake are:
• If the jump table heuristic fails to identify some indirect branch addresses. These
addresses will be considered function entry points.
• If a binary characterization address appears in the middle of a dead function which
is not reachable in any run of the code. This kind of address will be considered a
function.
In some other rare cases, algorithm 1 might give false negatives where it tells that an
actual function in the binary is not a function and is part of another bigger function. This
only happens because of tail calls which use direct jump instructions. If some function
is only reachable using tail calls, and is not having any knowfunction prologue, then
algorithm 1 will mistakenly consider it as part of all parents (up to the constant threshold).
The results show that this happens in less than 1% of the time.
After merging functions with their parents, some IR functions can be safely deleted.
The following property states the conditions under which this can happen and proves that
the IR will still be complete after such a code cleanup.
Property 2.2 Let B be the binary characterization address list. For every IR func-
tion foo starting at addressx in the original binary wherex is not externally visible in
the original binary, if oo has been inlined with all parents, andx 6∈ B, thenfoo can be
safely removed from the IR.
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Proof Functionfoo is either reachable using a direct call/jump, or through an
indirect call/jump. For direct calls and jumps,foo has already been inlined into all the
parents, which means there is no more direct calls/jumps tofoo. For indirect calls and
jumps, suppose addressx is reachable using indirect calls and jumps, then accordingto
property 2.1, it has to appear in the binary characterization list B which is not the case.
For calls from outside the binary,x has to be externally visible in the original binary
which is not the case.
To illustrate the previous rule, figure 2.3 shows the code example in figure 2.1 after
merging and deleting the function at 0x10e.
2.5 Marking Likely Spurious Code
In this section, we discuss semantic based techniques to identify likely spurious
functions. The recovered functions from the previous techniques should do something
meaningful. If they are doing something illogical, then probably they are not actual func-
tions. We partition the recovered set of functions in the executable from the previous
techniques into two sets according to theirxecution probability. 1) The set of functions
that are unlikely to be executed at run time. We call them spurious functions. 2) All the
other functions which are likely to be executed. Identified spurious functions are inserted
in a separate file which the user can ignore reading. Our techniques will aim to minimize
the percentage of spurious functions present in the main IR recovery file.
It is important to mention that the techniques described in this section are heuristics
aiming to optimize the code for readability. We do not removeth identified spurious
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functions from the IR and they can still be executed (less likely). We discuss how to
maintain correct execution of such functions in section 2.7. As we show in the results
section, these heuristics prove to be very effective in reducing the spurious functions in
the main IR recovery file down to 2% of all IR functions presentin that file. None of the
identified likely spurious functions using these heuristics executes in all of the tests we
have done.
Even if our heuristics fail in identifying spurious code, oridentifies valid code as
being spurious, this does not impact the correctness of the recovered code by any means.
We still keep this code around, and make sure the data flows correctly to this code if
ever executed. The heuristics are used for better IR qualityfor manual analysis and code
readability and do not impact the correctness and the code coverage by any means. The
user may decide to delete the spurious file which automatically enhances the precision
of any automated analyses running on the IR especially if theIR spurious functions have
side effects (which is usually the case). In all our expirements, we never monitored any
of the identified spurious functions got executed at run timewhich gives users of our tool
more confidence to delete the spurious file.
2.5.1 Inlined Functions
In the last section, we mention that we inline allnon-actualfunctions into their
parents (if parents exist) up to a certain inlining threshold. Some of thesenon-actual
functions get removed using property (2.2) above.
For the non-actual functions that did not get removed using property (2.2), if they
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got inlined to all the parents without hitting the inlining threshold, we mark such functions
as being spurious. The reason behind this is that since they are already inlined to all
parents, it is unlikely they will be executed as stand alone functions. In most cases,
such inlined functions will get called (or branched to) fromtheir parents. The only case
they might get called as stand alone functions is when such inlined functions are actual
functions in the input binary that are only called indirectly. This is very unlikely as we
show later in our expirements.
Such non-removed non-actual inlined functions are usuallysp it parts of bigger
functions because of the existence of binary characterization address in the middle of
their actual parent functions.
2.5.2 Identifying Actual Parent Function
In most binaries, a certain code region is usually part of only e function. We use
this intuition to mark more spurious functions as follows.
Many of our inlined functions mentioned above have more thanone parent function
because of code conflicts. Algorithm 1 returns a set of parentfunctions for a specific
inlined function. Only one of them is the correct parent and all the others are spurious.
We examine all parent functions and check how many properties for actual func-
tions they have. Usually we find that only one function has higher properties than the
others (for example, in most of our experiments, one parent only would have a known
prologue pattern). If we have only one parent function having a higher number of func-
tion properties, we mark it as non-spurious and mark all the ot rs as being spurious.
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Properties for actual functions are checked in algorithm 1 (lines 4-13). We have different
weights for each property. For example, the known prologue pattern is a stronger indica-
tor than being a directly called function for example (sincedir ctly called functions might
be called from spurious ones).
2.5.3 Memory Analysis
This readability optimization examines the operations done the global memory
as well as the memory stack. It moves a function to the spurious file if any of the following
is true: 1) A memory access to a constant address not within the executable segments
and not to a memory-mapped I/O location is detected in the functio . 2) Very large
number of memory arguments are passed to the function. This is tunable by the user.
3) A function accesses stack variables that are never detected to be allocated. 4) The
function is accessing the memory stack using the frame pointer without initializing it
first. (The frame pointer is usually a callee saved register). 5) The code is accessing the
return address. Given that we currently do not rewrite position independent code (PIC),
it is very unlikely that a function will access its return address. Handling PIC code is a
future work as elaborated in section 2.10.
2.5.4 ISA Analysis
This readability optimization detects the binary instruction sequences that are less
likely to be executed and move their parent functions into the spurious file. One optimiza-
tion we do is that we move functions having instructions thataccess I/O ports –like x86
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instructionsin andout to the spurious files. We also move code that is doing software
interrupts into the spurious file. These kinds of instructions and behaviors are not com-
mon in application code and more common in kernel code and drivers. User has a choice
to turn this optimization off when rewriting kernel code anddevice drivers.
Another readability optimization moves functions that usesynchronization primi-
tives from the main file into the spurious file only if the binary is single threaded. To
detect that, we assume that the binary has to do some library call(s) to create or manip-
ulate threads. To determine that, we examine the dynamic relo ation table of the binary
looking for any known multithreaded library such that pthreads, OpenMP and MPI.
2.5.5 Empty Functions Detection
We let the LLVM optimizer run on the recovered functions and then detect if any of
the recovered functions becomes empty without any code. This is usually an indication
that the function is really not doing anything useful and have no side effects. Still as per
property (2.2) such functions are not safe to remove, so we keep them but in the spurious
file.
2.5.6 Conditional Handling
This readability optimization relies on the common practice in binaries where con-
ditional flags are usually set and used in one single function. We are not aware of any
calling convention that sets a conditional flag in a function, a d then uses it in another
function. In some rare cases, some compiler intrinsics emulating some floating point be-
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haviors return conditional flags. If this ever happens, the techniques presented later in
section 2.7 will guarantee the correctness of the rewrittenbinary.
Every function is analyzed with respect to all definitions and uses of conditional
flags. A function can be moved to the spurious file if it has a useof a conditional flag
without any definition. As an example, figure 2.3 shows the functio s recovered from the
code in figure 2.1. In functionFunc_0x10d, the zero flag is used without being defined.
We can move this function to the set of likely spurious functions since it is highly probable
it is not an actual function.
2.6 Static Function Identification Based on Dynamic Information
In this section, we discuss novel dynamically assisted static techniques that can be
used to assist the previously discussed static techniques in pruning out more spurious
code in a safe manner. During the dynamic run of the binary, weonly measure the char-
acteristics of the binary, but do not modify it. The collected dynamic information is then
provided as feedback to a subsequent static analysis, thereby allowing the static analysis
to improve. Even though the dynamic information is collected on particular data sets, the
subsequent static methods we present are correct for all datsets, not just the ones seen.
The techniques presented here are optional and are not necessary for the whole system
to work. They prove to be effective in practice in reducing the amount of spurious code,
reducing the total IR size for the spurious code, and making the s atic disassembly run
faster.
This section is divided into the following parts: first we present the exact problem
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we are solving including a big picture of the dynamic component of our system with its
inputs and outputs, then we proceed to discuss the technicaldet ils of how we imple-
ment this static analyses that use the collected dynamic information. Then we discuss the
correctness of the dynamically assisted analyses in the sense that the IR is still complete
regardless of the fact that dynamic information used might not be complete. Finally, we
discuss how dynamic information from different runs can be unified in our framework.
2.6.1 Disassembler based on dynamic information - The big picture
In the previous sections, we show some techniques and heuristics that can remove
some spurious functions altogether, or at least hide them fro users if they are likely not
to be executed. These techniques were based on static analyses only.
In this section, we extend the effectiveness of our previoustechniques by letting
them use some dynamic information collected from the input binary’s execution. We let
the input binary run for some input data set, then collect executed instruction traces and
other information about locations and targets of control transfer instructions. We then use
this information to safely remove spurious functions from the IR altogether.
The main challenge in the techniques presented in this section is that whatever
information we collect from a certain binary’s execution with a specific input data set
must be valid for all possible input data sets to the binary. Byother means, we have to
prove that a function that we remove from the IR based on some dynamic information is
















Figure 2.5: The disassembler with the dynamically assistedcomponent inserted
As shown in figure 2.5, the dynamic component of the disassembler exists in the
front end of the system and is used before the static disassembler component. First,
the binary characterizer reads the binary and identifies a lit of binary characterization
addresses that are considered entry points to functions in our system. Instead of feeding
this directly to the static disassembler (that is discussedin the previous sections), we feed
that to our dynamic component which prunes out some of these addresses. The dynamic
component produces a list of pruned binary characterization ddresses as well as a list of
potential binary characterization addresses. The static disassembler uses both to create
the IR functions as we show in the next section.
The dynamic component of the system has indirect effects on the whole disassem-
bly process. Since it reduces the amount of IR to be analyzed,th static disassembly time
is reduced. The IR size is also reduced because of the same reason. We show detailed
results related to these effects later in the results section.
2.6.2 Function Pruning using Dynamic Information
The dynamic information used in the techniques presented inthis section are used to
prune spurious functions by eliminating their starting addresses from being considered as
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valid entry points. We prune binary characterization addresses and hence achieve higher
quality IR with less spurious code. We do not create spuriousfunctions in the first place
which is different from the previous static disassembly techniques which create functions
and then prune them.
There are three main techniques we use to achieve this entry-points pruning. The
first technique removes binary characterization addressesthat conflict with other executed
addresses. Recall that binary characterization described earlier in section 2.3 produces a
superset of all possible function entry points. It does so bycollecting all constant code
addresses in all code and data segments inside the binary.
The second technique prunes out binary characterization addresses that are ob-
served to be reachable only directly in the execution. The third technique relies on ex-
amining the stack memory at function entry points. All the techniques are presented next
and their results are unified to produce the final binary characte ization list of addresses
that is supplied to the static disassembler.
2.6.2.1 Pruning conflicting addresses
In order to produce the list of pruned binary characterization addresses, we run the
input binary once. We collect all instruction addresses that have been executed along with
their length. We remove an address from the binary characteriza ion list of addresses if
it starts in the middle of an already executed instruction. The assumption here is that the
binary does not contain overlapped instructions which are vlid instructions starting in
the middle of other valid instructions.
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In a more formal way the following property clarifies when it is safe to remove an
addressx from the list of binary characterization addresses.
Property 2.3: let T be a list of pairs(i, l) wherei represents the starting address
of an executed instruction,l represents the corresponding instruction length. A binary
characterization addressx is an invalid address and can be pruned out if the following is
true:
∃(i, l) ∈ T, x = i+ n, n ∈ N, 0 < n < l (2.1)
2.6.2.2 Pruning directly reachable addresses
The binary characterization list of addresses should contain the code addresses that
are only reachable indirectly. If a certain code address is only reachable using direct
control transfers, then it can be safely removed from the binary characterization list of
addresses since recursive traversal can follow the direct control transfer to that function.
If a function is reachable using both direct and indirect control transfers, it might not
always be safe to remove such function from the binary characterization list of addresses.
To see why, consider the code example shown in figure 2.6. In this code example, function
foo is reachable indirectly frommain, and they reachable directly fromfoo itself (as a
recursive call). If the address offoo is removed from the binary characterization list of
addresses, the recursive traversal will not reach out tofoo starting frommain and hence
it is not safe to remove such address.
For this pruning, we collect all indirectly reachable addresses from the execution
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main () { 
 … 
call *eax  //indirect call that targets foo at runtime 
 … 
} 
foo () { 
 … 
 call  foo  //Direct call to foo 
 … 
} 
Figure 2.6: Code example illustrating pruning directly reachable addresses
trace. These addresses include targets of indirect calls and indirect jumps. All such
addresses are populated in a set of addresses calledIT (indirect targets).
To prune a binary characterization address, we notice if it is only reachable us-
ing direct control transfers. If the address is contained inIT , then it cannot be pruned.
Otherwise, it can be pruned if executed. We formalize this inthe following property.
Property 2.4: Let IT be the set of addresses that are reachable indirectly duringa
certain binary execution. An addressx can be removed from the binary characterization
address list if the instruction atx was executed andx /∈ IT .
To prove this property, we state the following property and then use it to prove
property 2.4.
Property 2.5: Static recursive traversal starting from binary characterization entry
points after removing all addresses that are only reachabledirectly will always cover all
instructions that got executed while collecting the corresponding dynamic trace.
Proof: The execution trace is composed of some direct and indirect CTIs. For
direct CTIs, static recursive traversal can follow them trivially. For indirect CTIs, their
targets will never be pruned and hence they will still exist in he binary characterization
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addresses and will be followed because of that.
Proof of property 2.4: By contradiction: assume it is not safe to prune an address
x that is executed during runtime and is not observed to be an indirect CTI target. This
means that all code starting at instructionx will not be covered by recursive traversal in
this case. This contradicts property 2.5 above since at least th t execution trace will be
covered using recursive traversal.
2.6.2.3 Pruning jump table target addresses
From the discussion in section 2.3, binary characterization addresses are either in-
direct function call targets, or indirect branch targets. Indirect call targets are always
considered function entry points. Some indirect branch targets are also considered func-
tion entry points (like tail calls), but many of them are justcase statement entry points
represented as jump tables in the binaries.
We use the dynamic component to differentiate between indirect jump targets that
are function entry points and the other non-function entry points. The intuition here is
that for instruction set architectures where the return address is memory allocated (like
the x86 architecture we currently support), the return address has to be stored in a specific
memory location known to a function at its entry point such that t e function can return
back to some call site. This is only valid for non-obfuscatedbinaries which follow any
compilation model. Obfuscated binaries in which return addresses are calculated and
pushed on the stack at any arbitrary program point are not currently completely supported.
We discuss later in section 2.10 how they can be supported using our framework.
45
We build a stackS of return addresses at the run time of the original binary by
monitoring call instructions and what addresses they push on t e memory stack. We also
monitor return instructions and what addresses they pop from the memory stack. At every
branch target, we monitor the stack pointer value before executing the first instruction at
the branch target and check if it contains the last-insertedreturn address on the stackS
(i.e. TOP)(S)). If the value at the stack pointer is not equal toTOP(S), then we insert this
address into setP which represents addresses that are not function entry points according
to our assumptions. This set of addressesP i the set of potential binary characterization
addresses shown in figure 2.5. These are usually not functionaddresses but rather jump
table target addresses that are reachable indirectly.
Given that the initial set of binary characterization addresses isC, we calculate the
setC ′ = C − P and start static disassembly from every address inC ′. C ′ represents the
set of binary characterization addresses that may be function entry points.
If we only disassemble from every address inC ′, we cannot have complete code
coverage. To see why, consider thatP contains all executed indirect jump table targets
(representing case statements in the original source code). Such jump table targets will
not have a valid return address on top of the stack since they are not function entry points.
Yet they are removed from the binary characterization address list. If such addresses are
only reachable indirectly, they will never get disassembled statically in this case. We
usually identify such addresses using jump table heuristics when possible.
To solve the above problem, we finish all static disassembly starting from the ad-
dresses inC ′. After all is done, we start the static disassembly again from any address
x that is a binary characterization address and was monitoredas being executed with no
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valid return address on top of the stack at its entry only ifx has never been disassem-
bled. This means that we start static disassembly again fromany entry point addressx
satisfying the following three conditions:
x ∈ C (2.2a)
x ∈ P (2.2b)
x was never disassembled statically in the first round of static disassembly (2.2c)
For every such addressx satisfying the previous conditions, it can be determined
which function this addressx belongs to by monitoring the function from which the jump
originated. Addressx can be then disassembled and inserted into that function in the IR.
We clarify here that the jump table targets pruning technique presented in this sec-
tion only works for instruction set architectures having a memory allocated return address.
The x86 architecture is one example of such an architecture where a function is called us-
ing thecall instruction which pushes the return address on top of the stack. The return is
done through theret instruction which pops the return address from the memory stack.
Other instruction set architectures like MIPS and ARM have a rgister-allocated return
address that is accessible through regular instructions like branch and link and regular
moves. The advanced pruning technique presented here is notcurrently supported for
such architectures and should be turned off.
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2.6.3 The dynamically assisted analyses code coverage guarantees
In this section, we discuss why the techniques presented earlier re sound and safe
even though it might be coming from a limited input data set.
The first technique represented by property 2.3 excludes addresses that are in the
middle of some actual valid instruction that got executed. It is evident that if the bi-
nary does not contain overlapping instructions, instructions starting in the middle of valid
executed instructions cannot be valid.
The second technique represented by property 2.4 removes a binary characterization
address if it is executed but is never monitored to be a targetof an indirect control transfer
instruction (CTI). This means that a normal recursive traversal is enough to reach out to
that function and it is not necessary to include its address in the binary characterization
list of addresses.
In the third technique when we remove jump table target addresses from the binary
characterization list of addresses, we already add back anyjump table target address that
was never disassembled during the static run after pruning.Hence, we will never miss
any parts of the code and still guarantee complete code coverage in this case.
2.6.4 Unification of dynamic information
In this section we discuss how we can unify information from multiple input binary
runs with different input data sets. We present unification rules and discuss why they are
correct.
The three techniques presented in the previous sections canbe ll applied one after
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the other to produce a final binary characterization list of addresses that is given as an
input to the static disassembly. There are no restrictions on which order they are applied
or which ones can be combined together. The final pruned list of binary characterization
addresses is the one shown in figure 2.5. The potential binarycharacterization addresses
shown in the same figure represent the jump table target addresses detected using the third
technique above (represented by the setP ).
For the first technique represented in property 2.3, the unificat on rule is simply
the union of allx accross all dynamic runs satisfying equation 2.1. This is because such
addresses are always false and this fact is not dependent on ay i put set.
For the second technique represented in property 2.4, the sam property can be
applied to dynamic information collected from different executions if all disassembled
instructions are unioned and allIT sets are unioned as well. This can be verified by
following the proof of the property in the previous section while applying the unification
rules presented here.
For the third technique, if we have multiple runs with multipleP sets (which repre-
sent addresses of jump table targets that are non functions), we do a simple set union and
apply the same technique. This is true under the assumption that in any execution of the
binary, a function entry has to have a return address on top ofits stack. As we mentioned
before, this assumption is valid in all instruction set architectures (ISA) having memory
allocated return addresses and in non-obfuscated binaries.
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2.7 High Level IR Functionality
In this section, we go over some of the aspects of high level IRrecovery and binary
rewriting techniques used in SecondWrite and not discussed lat r in this dissertation and
present the necessary modifications –if required– to support rew iting spurious functions
correctly as well. The high level IR aspects we review in thissection include call trans-
lation and conditionals. We present these below. Effects ofhaving inaccurate function
boundaries and spurious functions on other IR recovery aspect discussed later in this
dissertation like identifying correct register arguments, memory arguments, variables and
data types will be presented in the next few chapters.
2.7.1 Call Translation
In our previous work as well as this work, we assume there exists a translator func-
tion that is inserted at every indirect call and branch to redirect the execution at run time
to the correct IR function. The translator function is a statically inserted function with a
gigantic if statement that checks for the value of the targetaddress and calls the corre-
sponding function. The details of the translation mechanisms is discussed in our previous
WCRE work [63].
Our previously published call translation mechanism will st work correctly for
the IR with spurious code only if the spurious functions are added as extra entries in the
translator table. This ensures correct control flow redirection in the rewritten binaries
from the indirect call and branch sites to IR functions.
50
2.7.2 Conditional Handling
The conditionals are presented in the IR as variables that get assigned at condi-
tional generation instructions (like arithmetic operations for example), and then get used
at conditional use instructions (like conditional branches).
Splitting functions will cause some conditional flags to be defined in one function
and used in another one. To guarantee the correctness of conditional flag uses, we iterate
over all the functions in the IR and check if there is a use of a flag without a dominating
definition. If there exists a functionfoo that satisfies this condition, we do the following
three steps: 1) At every direct call/jump tof o from within the IR, we pass all the used
flag values as extra arguments tof o. 2) If foo can be called indirectly (its address is a
binary characterization address as stated in property (2.1)), then at every indirect call and
indirect branch site in the IR, we pass all the used flag values as extra arguments to the
translator function and hence tofoo. 3) foo as well as the translator function have to
return the latest version of the modified flags back to all the call sites offoo and the call
translator.
The above three steps will guarantee the data flow of conditioal flags between
definition points and use points across function boundariesin all cases.
2.8 Results
This section discusses all the experiments done to test the methods described in this
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Figure 2.7: Recent related work results summary
Although some existing tools aim to detect function boundaries, unlike our method,
(i) they do not maintain correctness in all cases (e.g., by discarding conflicting sequences);
(ii) most do not guarantee complete code coverage; and (iii)they do not mark likely
spurious functions, hurting readability.
The table in Figure 2.7 summarizes all our proposed featuresagainst the other tools.
The F measure is an accuracy measure. We show the exact definition of hat metric later
in this section. The tables shows that our method to detect fun ion boundaries is the first
in the literature to ensure that the output is functional, while maintaining an accuracy that
is comparable or better than existing techniques.
Speculative techniques like the one by Harris et al. [33] remove code conflicts alto-
gether which is not suitable for our target of obtaining a complete set of functions in the
IR. This is demonstrated by the fact that 12.5% of the recovered disassembled binaries
using their techniques cannot run correctly. In our case, 100% of the binaries run correctly
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if recompiled from the recovered IR.
Despite the fact that current tools are incomparable to us asthey are solving a partial
problem of what we are solving, we compare our accuracy to them to show that we did not
sacrifice the function boundaries accuracy while maintaining functionality and complete
coverage. We also show more results on the amount of spuriousfunctions we are able
to eliminate which is a readability metric that none of the relat d work on speculative
disassembly shows.
We show more detailed results on the SPEC2006 benchmarks compiled using two
compilers. Table 2.8 shows the complete list of binaries compiled using the GCC 4.3
compiler along with their size (in assembly instructions and li es of code (SLOC)) and
the number of functions each benchmark contains. Table 2.9 shows our visual studio
binaries. Some GCC binaries in the first table are not shown in the VS table because
visual studio does not compile Fortran code and some C and C++ SPEC benchmarks.
The charts used here in this section are all based on optimized binaries because
these are the challenging ones where function boundaries are harder to recover. Non
optimized binaries usually have standard prologue patterns and almost no tail calls which
makes identifying the boundaries much easier. Optimized binaries are also more common
among deployed binaries.
To collect dynamic information traces to apply the techniques in section 2.6, we
use the PIN tool by Intel to run the input binaries and collectall he required instruction
traces and other information as per the discussion in section 2.6. We noticed from our
experiments that the sensitivity of the results obtained tothe input data set is very low.
The results almost did not change by having different input data sets with different sizes.
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Application  Lang  Inst Funcs  SLOC Type Version
specrand  C 290 5 49 SPEC2006 2006
mcf  C 3,357 26 2,685 SPEC2006 2006
lbm  C 7,740 22 1,155 SPEC2006 2006
astar  C++ 12,677 155 5,842 SPEC2006 2006
libquantum  C 13,800 121 4,357 SPEC2006 2006
bwaves  F 19,002 9 918 SPEC2006 2006
bzip2  C 21,408 105 8,293 SPEC2006 2006
sjeng  C 32,238 146 13,847 SPEC2006 2006
milc  C 34,183 237 9,784 SPEC2006 2006
sphinx  C 41,669 373 13,683 SPEC2006 2006
leslie3d  F 43,432 23 3,807 SPEC2006 2006
hmmer  C 85,981 541 35,992 SPEC2006 2006
namd  C++ 103,365 154 3,188 SPEC2006 2006
soplex  C++ 116,743 1,593 28,592 SPEC2006 2006
zeusmp  F 118,429 79 19,068 SPEC2006 2006
omnetpp  C++ 148,453 2,770 20,393 SPEC2006 2006
h264ref  C 170,684 593 51,578 SPEC2006 2006
gobmk  C 196,230 2,683 157,883 SPEC2006 2006
cactusADM  C 218,896 1,395 60,452 SPEC2006 2006
povray  C++ 288,957 2,098 108,339 SPEC2006 2006
perlbench  C 313,036 1,872 126,367 SPEC2006 2006
gromacs  C/F 396,450 3,872 65,182 SPEC2006 2006
calculix  C/F 506,725 1,386 105,683 SPEC2006 2006
dealII  C++ 766,555 18,779 96,382 SPEC2006 2006
gcc  C 934,292 5,627 236,269 SPEC2006 2006
xalancbmk  C++ 965,001 30,062 267,318 SPEC2006 2006
tonto  F 1,303,359 4,086 108,330 SPEC2006 2006
Figure 2.8: Application Table (GCC-compiled binaries)
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Application  Lang  Inst Funcs  SLOC Type Version
specrand  C 302 5 49 SPEC2006 2006
mcf  C 2,149 26 2,685 SPEC2006 2006
lbm  C 2,174 22 1,155 SPEC2006 2006
astar  C++ 6,681 155 5,842 SPEC2006 2006
bzip2  C 10,785 105 8,293 SPEC2006 2006
sjeng  C 20,838 146 13,847 SPEC2006 2006
milc  C 26,987 237 9,784 SPEC2006 2006
sphinx  C 37,901 373 13,683 SPEC2006 2006
hmmer  C 60,737 541 35,992 SPEC2006 2006
namd  C++ 72,517 154 3,188 SPEC2006 2006
omnetpp  C++ 101,480 2,770 20,393 SPEC2006 2006
h264ref  C 113,550 593 51,578 SPEC2006 2006
gobmk  C 179,612 2,683 157,883 SPEC2006 2006
perlbench  C 222,994 1,872 126,367 SPEC2006 2006
gcc  C 702,755 5,627 236,269 SPEC2006 2006
Figure 2.9: Application Table (VS-compiled binaries)
Because of that, we only present dynamic information based results in this section for the
combined traces from the test and the ref data sets of the SPEC2006 benchmarks suite.
All benchmarks are rewritten successfully and the recovered high level IR (with
functions, arguments and variables) is recompiled using LLVM’s backend. The rewritten
binaries produce the correct answers which shows the outputfunc ionality and the com-
plete coverage we achieve. To the best of our knowledge, no static rewriter can produce a
correct rewritten binary with accurate function boundaries from binaries exceeding a mil-
lion instructions. We do not show numbers on the run time of the rewritten binaries since
this is mostly affected by the SecondWrite framework itself (with its internal passes) and
not by our techniques. The effects of SecondWrite on the rewritten binaries runtime can
be found in [3]. Next, we show that we do not sacrifice the accura y of the recovered
function boundaries. We also show the amount of spurious code we were able to identify
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as well as the time spent during the disassembly process. We also show the effect of the
individual heuristics in identifying spurious functions.We show how these results change
with the dynamic information present and used.
2.8.1 Comparison with best-effort techniques
We compare against the machine learning technique by Rosenblum et. al. [55]
which aims to solve a much simpler problem than what we are trying to solve. They only
recover function entry points. Unlike our method, they do not recover complete bound-
aries with guaranteed functionality. If Rosenblum’s technique is used for disassembly to
identify code, it would lead to incomplete coverage.
Rosenblum et. al. [55] calculate the F-measureF0.5 which is a well-known accuracy
metric in the machine learning field. The F-measure is usually sed for binary classifica-
tion problems where a test is being done on a certain data set and the test has only two
possible outcomes. The F-measure is the harmonic mean of theprecision and the recall








WhereTP is the true positive results,FP is the false positives, andFN are the
false negative results. TheF0.5 gives more relevance to the precision than to the recall. It
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can be defined as follows:
F0.5 =
1.25 ∗ PR ∗RC
0.25 ∗ PR +RC (2.3)
In our test (as well as Rosenbulum et al. test), the true positive are the functions
with correct entry points. The false positives are the entrypoints we identified as being
function entry points but they are not which represents spurious functions in the context
of this dissertation. The false negatives are the entry points of functions that we missed
during our analysis. We never miss any function as per our code verage guarantees, but
we might inline a function into some parent and hence miss that entry point. We calculate
the inlined functions (which are real functions in the debuggin information of the binary)
as the false negative ones.
Rosenblum et al. [55] report anF0.5 measure of 98.8% among all recovered entry
points for stripped binaries compiled from gcc and 92.3% forvisual studio. We calculated
the same measureF0.5 for our techniques for both compilers and it is 99.4% for gcc and
95.3% for visual studio. Visual Studio binaries usually have more functions with no
default prologue patterns and hence their numbers are usually less.
It is worth mentioning that we already perform much better than the well-known
disassemblers IDA Pro [31] and DynInst. The reportedF0.5 for IDA Pro for GCC is
87.6% and for Visual Studio is 78.9%. For DynInst, the reportedF0.5 is 97.1% for GCC
and 6.7% for Visual Studio. This is as reported by Rosenblum etal. [55].
If we incorporate the dynamic information while identifying functions, the numbers
become slightly better. TheF0.5 for GCC becomes around 99.5% while for Visual Studio
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it becomes 95.5%. Dynamic information is more beneficial in reducing the size of the IR
and reducing the disassembly time by eliminating many spurious entry points.
These results show that despite solving a more difficult problem, we are able to
achieve higher quality of function entry points. This showsthat our techniques can replace
even the best machine learning techniques and get better IR with all our added features of
functionality and complete code coverage.
2.8.2 Function Boundaries Accuracy




No Dyn. Info 
Our Method 
After Improv. 
No Dyn. Info 
Our Method 
Bef. Improv. 
With Dyn. Info 
Our Method 
After Improv. 
With Dyn. Info 
Matched 93.83 % 99.32 % 95.02 % 99.34 % 
Split 5.96 % 0.12 % 4.77 % 0.12 % 
Merged 0.21 % 0.56 % 0.21 % 0.54 % 
Uncovered 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
 
Figure 2.10: Function Boundaries Accuracy
We define three metrics for every function in the original binary (read from the
debugging information) indicating its quality in the recovered code. Amatchedfunction
is when the exact function boundaries are discovered. Asplit function is when a single
function from the input binary is divided into many different recovered IR functions. A
mergedfunction is when the input binary function is recovered as being part of another
bigger function in the IR. Theoretically, an original function has to be one of these three
categories.
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Figure 2.10 shows the average matched, split and merged functions on all our bina-
ries. We initially detect 93.83% of the functions with exactboundaries and this improves
to 99.32% after doing our proposed improvements presented isection 2.4.2.
The dynamic techniques presented in section 2.6 have a very small effect on the
results presented in this section. There are two reasons of this. First, the results are
already very good from our static methods (more than 99% of the unctions are already
matched). Second, the effect of the dynamic information is usually a reduction in the
number of the entry points (binary characterization addresses). All of such addresses that
are pruned are spurious and represent no functions in the input binary. This has no effect
on real functions in the input binary. The effect of dynamic information is presented more
on the IR size and the amount of time spent in disassembly as weshow next.
We do not show detailed per benchmark result for matched, merged and split func-
tions since in most of the binaries we get 100% matched functio s comparing to the
functions in the symbol table of the original binary. Some larger binaries will have a tiny
percent of merged functions (usually less than 1%). Examples of such binaries are gcc,
xalancbmk and gromacs. The common trend in such binaries is that they have larger func-
tions in the input binary, so the binary characterization detects more spurious addresses
in the same function which requires more splits to happen in the first disassembly stage,
and more merges to happen in later stages.
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Bin. Char After Bin. Char Before
Figure 2.11: Reduction in number of binary characterizationaddresses
2.8.3 Dynamic Based Reduction in Binary Characterization Addresses
In this section, we show the quantified effect of having dynamic information present
while doing the static disassembly on the number of entry points for static disassembly.
We show how the binary characterization list of addresses (which constitute the above
entry points) change by having the dynamic information.
The average reduction in the number of binary characterization ddresses is 31.4%
in GCC binaries and 22% on Visual Studio binaries. This reduction is calculated after
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using all the discussed dynamic techniques in section 2.6.
Figure 2.11 shows the details of the number of binary characte ization addresses
before and after the pruning for some large GCC benchmarks. Wedo not show results for
smaller benchmarks because they will not appear on the graphas their number of binary
characterization addresses is negligible compared to the larg r benchmarks.
The percentage of reduction does not change much by changingthe input data set
for the SPEC benchmarks from the test input to the ref input data set. The results are
shown for the combined data sets.
Some benchmarks like dealII have a small reduction percentag (8.2%) compared
to other larger reduction percentages (gcc has 30.1% reduction). This is usually because
the dynamic runs used to calculate the dynamic traces neededfor the experiment did not
cover large parts of the binary characterization entry points in dealII and similar binaries.
This is a feature of the input data set used to conduct this experiment.
2.8.4 Spurious Functions
Binary characterization as described in section 2.3 can leadto redundant function
entry points. This is the price paid to guarantee complete cod verage and functionality.
Here we present detailed statistics regarding spurious functions.
Figure 2.12 shows the percentage of the spurious functions present in the main IR
file after every stage of our techniques for GCC binaries. We show t is for both cases
when we use the dynamic information and when we do not use it. Figure 2.13 shows the
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Figure 2.13: Percent of spurious functions - VS binaries
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For GCC binaries, after the basic disassembly algorithm described in section 2.4.1,
an average of 38.5% of all IR functions are spurious. This percentage is reduced to 32.4%
if we use dynamic information. During the function boundaries mprovements phase,
some of these spurious functions can be safely removed usingour property 2.2. This
brings down the spurious IR functions to an average of 16% of all IR functions (11.4% if
we use the dynamic information). Finally, applying the heuristics described in section 2.5
prunes away most of these remaining spurious functions fromthe main file resulting in
around 0.55% spurious functions (also the same 0.55% if we use dynamic information).
The final spurious functions percentage after applying the heuristics did not change when
we use the dynamic information since the total number of functio s is smaller and the
remaining spurious functions in the IR at this stage is negligible, so the overall percentage
does not come down that much compared to the percentage without using the dynamic
information.
The same trend happens in Visual Studio binaries as shown in figure 2.13. The only
difference is that we have higher percentages of spurious code at every stage. The reason
is that we noticed that Visual Studio binaries have much larger set of binary characteri-
zation addresses than GCC binaries. As an example, the gcc compiler binary compiled
using GCC has 8,249 binary characterization addresses whilethe corresponding Visual
Studio binary has 11,155 addresses.
Figure 2.14 shows the detailed per benchmark results for spurious functions detec-
tion in GCC binaries. Figure 2.15 shows the same result for Visual Studio binaries. The
x-axis in these figures represent the percentage of the spurious functions that remain not
detected in the main IR file. Zero percent in these graphs means no spurious functions
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Figure 2.14: Spurious Functions - GCC
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Figure 2.15: Spurious Functions - VS
remain undiscovered in the main IR file. We show only the results without using the dy-
namic information. Using the dynamic information gives thesame trend. As expected,
small binaries usually have smaller spurious code that remains after all our adjustments
and heuristics. This is because the number of binary characteriza ion addresses is usually
small in such functions resulting in a lower number of spurios functions.
As we discussed in the section 2.5, we do not remove the spurious functions from
the binary for safety reasons such that if one of our heuristics fail we still have functional
rewritten binaries. We monitored the execution of the rewritten binaries and none of the
spurious functions detected by our heuristics gets executed. This shows that the spurious
functions detection does not have any false positives. False negatives do happen; these
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are when we leave a function as a non-spurious function but itis actually spurious. False
negatives happen with a rate of 0.55% as we discuss earlier.
There are other methods that can prune out spurious code fromobfuscated binaries.
They are trying to solve a different problem which is de-obfuscation. If such methods
are applied to our code with our assumptions, they would delete valid code which is not
acceptable. As an example, one of the heuristics used in [40]to delete spurious code
from conflicting CFGs is to delete one random function such that the conflict in CFGs is
resolved. That is an unsafe approach since the IR is incomplete in this case, resulting in a
non-functional recovered IR.
2.8.5 IR Size Changes due to Adjustments
Our function boundaries adjustment techniques may result in a change of the IR
code size. The main factors that affect the IR code size are: 1) Inlining. 2) Spurious code
removal (property 2.2).
We show the effect of our adjustments to the IR compared to theoriginal IR ob-
tained using the basis disassembly techniques presented insection 2.4.1. The original
IR obtained using the basis disassembly techniques contains ma y function splits as we
showed before. We also show how the IR code size changes afterapplying our dynamic
techniques presented in section 2.6.
Figure 2.16 shows the detailed results of the increase of IR code size while doing
the adjustments for GCC binaries. Figure 2.17 shows the same results on Visual Studio
binaries. On average, the IR code size increases by 5.5% for GCC binaries due to having
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spurious functions as well as due to the function boundariesimprovements we do (like
inlining). The increase is 7.2% for Visual Studio binaries.This shows that the growth
in code size from our methods is modest and manageable. This increase requires more
memory, but on the other hand, our detection of spurious functio s makes the amount of
code a human reverse engineer has to look at significantly smaller. This is a significant
benefit in reverse engineering.




























Figure 2.16: Code Size Effect (GCC)

















Figure 2.17: Code Size Effect (VS)
The figure shows that Fortran and some larger C binaries usually have some code
increase. This happened because many of these binaries contain bigger functions which
usually causes more splits to happen. Since there will also be many binary characteriza-
tion spurious addresses in the same function, we will not be able to remove many of these
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splits as the starting address of removed functions cannot to be in the binary characteriza-
tion list. This overall behavior increases the code size.
If we apply our dynamic techniques, many binary characterization addresses get
removed as we showed before. This results in a decrease of theIR size. The average code
size reduction is about 7.4% in GCC binaries and around 3.3% for Visual Studio binaries.
Visual Studio binaries have much more binary characterization addresses than GCC bina-
ries and hence not many addresses get pruned with the same dynamic i formation. This
results in larger Visual Studio binary sizes.
2.8.6 Disassembly Time
Figure 2.18 shows a scatter plot between the time spent in SecondWrite for our
techniques (in seconds) versus the binary size for all the binaries we have in our tests.
We show two sets of points – one with dynamic information being used and the other one
without dynamic information being used.
The average runtime of our disassembly techniques was 3.1 minutes with a max-
imum of 55 minutes on the gcc binary compiled using GCC (which is 934,292 instruc-
tions).
If we add the dynamic information to aid the static disassembly techniques, the
average disassembly time reduces by 32%. The average disassembly time becomes 1.7
minutes and gcc takes around 21.7 minutes during disassembly. This is expected since the
































Without Dyn. Info With Dyn. Info
Linear (Without Dyn. Info) Linear (With Dyn. Info)
Figure 2.18: Time spent during disassembly
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2.8.7 Heuristics Effect
Figure 2.19 shows the share of every heuristic among the onesdiscussed in section
2.5 while identifying spurious functions in GCC binaries. Figure 2.20 shows the same
results for Visual Studio binaries.
The best heuristic is the one based on inlining functions to all parents. Many spuri-
ous functions have direct control transfers from other functio s and they are successfully
inlined to all of them and hence are less probable to execute at run-time and are consid-
ered spurious. Such spurious functions represent 74% of allspurious functions on average
in GCC binaries and 47% of all spurious functions in VS binaries. The Visual Studio bi-
naries have many more binary characterization addresses which makes this heuristic less
effective.
The next effective heuristics in GCC binaries is the one basedon etecting the
actual parent of inlined functions. Only one parent is usually n actual parent and all
other parents are marked as being spurious. 16% of the spurious functions on average
are detected based on this heuristic. For Visual Studio binaries, the same heuristic is
not as effective and ISA based heuristic performs better with 24% reduction in spurious
functions. For VS binaries, the detection of the actual parent h uristic has an 18% share
in the spurious functions reduction.
The remaining semantic based techniques contribute to the remaining 10% of the
spurious functions. The most effective heuristic out of allsemantic based ones is the
memory analysis based heuristic. This is true in both GCC and VS binaries. Many of the








ISA Conditionals Memory Empty Inlined Parents
Figure 2.19: Heuristics Effect - GCC binaries
Some of the spurious functions have more than one property tha qualifies them
to be spurious. For example, most inlined spurious functions can be caught using the
memory analysis techniques as well. In the results shown in figures 2.19 and 2.20, we do
not show this effect. We run the heuristics in order and stop once one heuristic identifies
a function as being spurious. We start first with the inliningheuristics and then use the
semantic based ones. We could have chosen any other order. Wenotic d that inlining is
the most effective heuristic so we run it first.
2.9 Related Work
Section 2.8 has already compared with some of the related work. In this section,
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Figure 2.20: Heuristics Effect - VS binaries
De-obfuscation techniques are orthogonal to the techniques discussed in this chapter, so
we will not discuss them here. We discuss some of these techniques in section 2.10.
Cifuentes et al. [14] propose some methods which are used by the UQBT tool [16]
to recover indirect control transfer targets from binary code based on program slicing
and pattern matching with some well-known function prologues. They do not recover
any function boundaries. Their technique does not guarantee 100% code coverage (in
fact they report an average of 74% code coverage). Their methods are not robust since
prologue patterns depend on the particular compiler, its ver ion number, and flags used.
Other work by Theiling [67] has the same problem.
Other control flow graph (CFG) construction techniques proposed in [38] use data
flow analysis to reason about indirectly reachable targets.It i used in the Jakstab [36]
tool. It does not guarantee full code coverage and do not try to ecover function bound-
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aries. A later hybrid disassembly approach was developed [35] to improve the Jakstab
tool code coverage. The technique is based on a formal description of a technique similar
to the one used in the BIRD dynamic binary rewriter [52].
Sutter et. al. [20] and Schwarz et. al. [59] also look at resolving CFGs from binaries
but they are not practical since they require relocation information.
Tallent et. al. [66] develop binary analysis techniques to aid the attribution of dy-
namic runtime costs to dynamic calling contexts. For that they ave techniques to recover
function entry and exit points in binaries, as well as recovering complete stack unwinding
information. They assume that some part of the binary has to be non-stripped and debug-
ging information exists in the binary which is not suitable for our problem. Their work is
used in the HPCToolkit suite of performance monitoring of applications [2].
Shen B. et. al. implement a binary translation system called LLBT [61] which
is ARM to LLVM based. One of their code discovery techniques isimilar to the binary
characterization technique [63]. Their disassembler is suitable for aligned instructions and
cannot be used for variable length instructions like in x86 where code conflicts problem
can arise.
Recently, machine learning techniques were introduced [56]to detect which com-
piler was used to produce a certain binary or to differentiate code from data in x86 bina-
ries [76]. Such techniques are best-effort and do not guarantee complete code coverage.
Another machine learning technique presented by Wartell eta . [76] provides meth-
ods to differentiate code from data in x86 executables. It does not recover any function
boundaries though. Their work identified the problems with IDA Pro regarding differenti-
ating code from data and build a classifier to overcome this based on training the classifier
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on 10 binaries and then testing it on one binary.
Marco et. al. introduced a static system [19] built on top of Schwarz et. al. disas-
sembler [59] to detect vulnerabilities in x86 binaries based on symbolic execution tech-
niques. Their work assumes binaries have relocation information which is not true in
stripped binaries. Another tool by Wartell et al. [74,75] enforces security by doing binary
rewriting. The rewriter relies on the IDA Pro disassembler [31] which is a best-effort
disassembler that cannot guarantee complete code coverage.
Binary rewriting has been considered by a number of researchers. There are two
main categories when talking about binary rewriters – dynamic binary rewriters and static
binary rewriters. Dynamic binary rewriters rewrite the binary during its execution. Ex-
amples are Pin [48], BIRD [52] and DynInst [34]. None of the dynamic binary rewriters
can guarantee complete code coverage. They can only cover the portion of the code
that is being executed. Examples of existing static binary rewriters include ATOM [28],
PLTO [60] Spike [18] and Diablo [70] none of which support stripped binaries as they
require relocation information.
Some binary analysis platforms like BAP [9], [64] and CodeSurfer [30] rely on the
IDA Pro [31] disassembler which cannot guarantee complete cod overage. Some other
tools like Boomerang [26] rely on specifying where the entry point of the program is
which makes it of a very limited capability. All such tools can benefit greatly from the
techniques described in this chapter.
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2.10 Limitations and Future Work
In this section, we describe some of the limitations to the work presented in this
chapter and possible directions on how to tackle them. The three main limitations to
this work are position independent code (PIC), obfuscated code and self-modifying code.
Below we describe each one of them.
2.10.1 Position Independent Code
One main assumption this work relies on is that the binary does n t have any calcu-
lated addresses. This is valid for application code we dealtwith till now, but it is not valid
in some shared library code.
Shared libraries are usually loaded at run time. There are two main techniques to
load shared libraries: 1) Load-time relocation. 2) Position Independent Code.
Load-time relocation simply uses a relocation table in the library code. Every entry
in the table is updated at load time with the correct address.The good thing about these
libraries is that the relocation table cannot be removed even if the library is stripped. This
allows accurate function boundaries to be identified withouany issues. Usually such
libraries are handled nicely in our framework. Fortunately, a l Windows DLLs and many
Unix ones fall in this category.
Position independent code is the other technique some Linuxshared libraries use
to avoid the overhead of the load-time relocation. Such codecomputes the addresses
of functions and variables at run-time. Whenever the compiler decides to calculate a
function address at a certain location in the binary, the compiler will first load the current
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program counter, and then adds the offset to that function frm the current location. This
invalidates our assumptions that addresses are not calculated at run-time.
Many instruction set architectures (ISA) will have different techniques to imple-
ment position independent code. There are two main techniques to load the program
counter at run time. The first one is to use a dedicated programcounter register that is ac-
cessible in regular move instructions in the ISA. This technique is usually found in RISC
architectures like ARM and MIPS. In x64, there is an explicit addressing mode called the
RIP-relative addressing mode which makes the program counter register visible to some
instructions. The second way of loading the program counteris used in ISAs where no
dedicated program counter is available to instructions. Inthese cases, there is usually
an instructions that pushes the return address into memory for function calls. A simple
technique to load the program counter is to call some addresswhich then pops whatever
on the stack and jumps back to the original call site.
The idea to support position independent code is to detect where t e code is trying
to access the program counter. For ISAs where the program counter is visible, this is very
easy and obviuos. For other ISAs (like x86) where the programcounter is not visible to
instructions, instruction sequences that simulate the loading of the program counter value
can be detected using pattern matching techniques. Once we dtect the binary locations
that are loading the program counter, constant propagationnd memory analysis will lead
to actual address calculations. We are currently looking atsome techniques to recover
this information efficiently. Fortunately, the sequences of instructions that can read the
program counter are not many, and simple pattern matching techniques can be effective.
One important note is that the reader might think that since we do not support po-
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sition independent code (PIC), then we do not support the binaries compiled for address
space layout randomization (ASLR). This is not exactly rightsince ASLR will not result
in a PIC binary code. For example, in Windows OS, if ASLR is turned ON for a specific
binary (achieved by turning on the (/dynamicbase option in the linker in Visual Stu-
dio), the binary will still have a preferred load address that is hard coded in the binary
image (the static binary entry point). The operating systemr locates the binary image at
load time to a different pseudo random base address (rebasing). No position independent
code is necessary for rebasing as we discussed earlier. Windows oes not use PIC code
to achieve rebasing.
The only technique that might be affected by ASLR is the dynamic based tech-
niques discussed in section 2.6. Such dynamic techniques needs to collect the executed
addresses during the original binary run-time. Such addresses are then used during the
static disassembly process. Since the static disassembly is ased on the preferred static
base address of the binary, the collected instruction addresses at run-time might be totally
different from the static image addresses and hence become usel ss.
It turns out that ASLR is not a real problem for our dynamic techniques. Instead of
collecting the executed virtual addresses at run-time, we can collect the binary file offsets.
The conversion between the executed virtual addresses and the binary file offsets is trivial
if we know what is the actual dynamic base address of the running binary. During run-
time, knowing the actual binary base address is trivial. So,as a conclusion, ASLR is
supported in our framework only if it does not result in PIC binary code which is satisfied
in most of the cases.
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2.10.2 Obfuscated Code
Obfuscated code is one challenge that we currently cannot completely handle. There
are two main techniques to obfuscations: source code obfuscations and binary obfusca-
tions.
Source code obfuscations are easier to implement and more wide spread. They
rely on making the source code very hard to read by complicating s mple operations
and adding more redundancies. As long as these techniques donot introduce calculated
addresses, we can handle them nicely in our framework since they will be compiled using
a compiler and the executable will follow a certain compilermodel.
The binary obfuscations are implemented on the low executable level, where obfus-
cation is inserted on the assembly level. The survey by Roundyet al. [57] summarizes all
such techniques and current work in handling them. The most famous research on binary
obfuscation techniques is by Linn and Debray [45]. In general, the most used obfuscation
techniques are: 1) Inserting junk code in unreachable code plac s to trick the linear sweep
disassemblers, 2) Using a return instruction to simulate a direct call. 3) Altering the return
address of call instructions and inserting junk code after calls, 4) Using interrupt handling
to make function calls [53].
There are many static de-obfuscation techniques that were dev loped recently try-
ing to handle such problems. Most of them disassemble the binary starting from every
single byte offset. Static techniques presented in [40], [71] try to resolve conflicts in the
disassembled code by removing any conflicting CFG. This cannot be safe if this technique
is applied to non-obfuscated binaries as well as obfuscatedon s. Since they do not try to
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solve the problem of having complete code coverage, this is acceptable in their case.
Some other work by Lakhotia et al. [42] try to reason about functio boundaries in
the presence of obfuscation techniques. They rely on IDA Pro[31] for the disassembly
process. IDA Pro is not accurate enough even for non-obfuscated binaries [55]. Their
technique is to build an abstract stack from the physical stack and monitor the behavior
of return instructions and calls.
Another work presented by Ma et al. [49] tries to extract contr l flow of binary
code with calls simulated by returns. They use prologue epilogue patterns as well as
tracking the stack pointer manipulation to detect the returns acting as function calls. They
present their technique only on one binary program. Other work by Boccrado et al. [8]
and Lakhotia et al. [41] achieve the same goal by precisely tracking the stack memory.
To handle the obfuscation problem in our framework, we are looking at static tech-
niques that can insert a translator function similar to the on we described in [63] at every
return instruction. If no calculated addresses exist in thebinary, the translator will be able
to redirect execution to the correct code. The translator structure has to be changed to
accommodate the normal return instruction use as well as theobfuscated use.
The interrupt handling mechanisms can be handled by developing techniques to
recover the exception tables from the binary code. We are working on techniques to
recover such information.
One promising technique to be able to use our techniques as iswithout change
is to record one execution of the obfuscated binary and builda control flow graph and
a call graph at run-time and produce a de-obfuscated binary that can be analyzed by
SecondWrite. During run-time, we can collect targets of branches, calls and returns and
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can build a deobfuscated binary this way. This is an ongoing work in our group that is
under test. The only disadvantage of such techniques is thatthe resulting recovered IR
will be only valid for this particular input data set. It willnot be generalized to any other
input data set. We are looking at some ways to overcome this problem. Some existing
dynamic techniques of malware code extraction and reuse like the Inspector Gadget [39]
and Trace Oriented Programming (TOP) [77].
2.10.3 Self Modifying Code
Like most static binary tools, we do not handle self-modifying code. Various tools
[73] statically detect the presence of self-modifying codein a program. Such a tool can
be integrated in our front-end to warn the user and to discontinue further operation.
The most common scenario where self-modifying code exists is for malware bina-
ries that are packed and unpack themselves at run-time. The good thing is that unpacker
has to emit the complete code that can be executed by the malware. To guarantee code
coverage, the dynamic technique described at the end of the previous section can be used.
It can monitor the unpacking process and tracks what instructions are emitted at run time
and emits an unpacked binary. After that, our current staticechniques can disassemble
this image and proceed.
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Chapter 3: Recovering Function APIs
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our techniques to recover functio prototypes for the re-
covered functions from the previous chapter. The recovery process is presented such that
the IR is still functional, accurate, of a high quality and the recovery process is scalable.
This chapter is composed of five parts. Section 3.2 addressesthe problem of recov-
ering a complete and precise set of register arguments and returns to internal functions
whose body is inside the binary. Section 3.3 extends the discussion to include external
functions which only have calls from within the binary. We show how to pass the correct
arguments to such functions even if their prototypes are notk wn and show under what
assumptions this is guaranteed to work. Section 3.4 shows the effect of having inaccurate
function boundaries from the techniques discussed in chapter 2 on our previously pub-
lished memory arguments recovery techniques [3] as well as to the register arguments
recovery techniques. Section 3.5 shows the results of our proposed techniques. Finally,
section 3.6 shows the related work in the literature.
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3.2 Function Prototypes Recovery
Detecting the complete and accurate set of function arguments and returns is es-
sential in producing a high quality code that can run correctly if recompiled. If some
arguments are missing, the code will not work correctly in all c ses. If more unnecessary
arguments are identified, the code will run correctly, but will be less understandable by
users.
We show how to accurately identify the register arguments and returns. Existing
techniques show how to identify the exact set of memory arguments. SecondWrite al-
ready uses a variant of the algorithm used by Balakrishnan et al. [5] to identify memory
arguments [3]. Surprisingly, we did not find any related workthat correctly and accu-
rately recognizes register arguments and returns. Not recognizing register arguments and
returns is acceptable if the goal is to help human understanding of binaries (as for exist-
ing methods), but unacceptable if the goal is to generate corr t rewritten code (as for our
method.) Typical x86 codes have less register arguments than memory arguments, but
they still have large numbers of register arguments especially for optimized executables.
A brute force algorithm for identifying register argumentsand returns is to define
the set of registers read without being initialized inside aprocedure as arguments, and
the registers modified inside a procedure and then later usedat some of the call sites as
returns. This technique will result in many spurious arguments since all registers which
are saved and then restored back in a function (such as callees ves) will be declared
as arguments and returns for this function, which is not true. Further, this algorithm
might miss some arguments if not carefully implemented. Forexample, a procedure not
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accessing any register at all might be declared as taking no register arguments, which may
not be true since it might be calling a function which is taking a register argument.
We propose below an algorithm which identifies accurately all register arguments
and returns. Our algorithm is conservative since it will notmiss any arguments. It is also
accurate since it prunes out unnecessary extra arguments inmany cases.
The main challenge in being accurate and yet conservative isto accurately track
all registers that are saved and restored (callee-saves). Such registers are usually re-used
inside functions for their local variables and temporaries. They are saved at the beginning
of a function and then restored back at the end of the function. This allows the function
to write and read from them without corrupting their original v lues. Such registers will
be considered as arguments and returns to functions by mistake using the brute force
technique described earlier if they are not identified.
The key challenge in tracking callee saved registers is thatthe stack locations used
to save such registers need to be tracked to make sure they areonly used for this purpose,
thus allowing those registers to be pruned from the arguments or returns. The stores of the
register values at the beginning of the function should dominate the loads used to restore
them back. There should not be any write to those stack locations in between. If those
stack locations are read in the middle of a function, the corresponding registers must be
declared as arguments.
Our register arguments and returns detection technique is shown in algorithm 2. It
is composed of five steps. 1) We assume all registers are arguments to every function and
there are no register returns. 2) We declare all registers written to inside a function or any
of its callees as potential return registers. 3) We run our algorithm for detecting saved
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Algorithm 2 The algorithm to detect register arguments and returns
Input: LLVM IR for a binary
Input: AllRegs : set of all available physical registers
Output: RegArgs: map between functions and their register arguments set
Output: RegRets : map between functions and their return registers set
1: for all Function Fdo
2: PotArgs(F) =AllRegs
3: end for
4: PotRets= FindPotentialReturns ()
5: (DeadStores,PotRets) = FindDeadStores (PotArgs, PotRets)
6: RegArgs= PropagateArguments (DeadStores, PotArgs)
7: RetArgs = PruneReturns (PotRets)
locations by detecting the set of stores to the memory stack which are never loaded back
except before the return from the function. We call those store instructionsDeadStores
since they will be eventually removed from the code. For eachof t e detected dead stores,
we determine the corresponding saved register and remove itfrom the potential returns
set. 4) We run our algorithm to propagate the register arguments correctly and prune
unused ones. 5) We prune the unused return registers out. Next, w describe each of
those steps in details. Step 1 is trivial. We proceed from step two.
The second step in our algorithm is to detect the initial set of potential return regis-
ters. Algorithm 3 shows the details of the detection method.The simple idea is that any
register which is being written to inside a function is a potential return register from this
function. For example, if a functionfoo is calling functionbar, andbar is modifying
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Algorithm 3 The algorithm implementing: FindPotentialReturns ()
Input: LLVM IR for a binary
Output: PotRets: map between functions and their potential return registers
1: WorkList= Functions sorted in reverse call graph order
2: while WorkListis not emptydo
3: remove a function F fromWorkList
4: mark function F as tarted
5: for all Instruction I in Fdo
6: if I writes to a register then
7: PotRets(F) = PotRets(F)∪ {r}
8: else
9: if I is a call instruction to function Xthen
10: let callee = called function
11: else ifcallee is startedthen
12: PotRets(F) = PotRets(F) ∪ PotRets(X)
13: else






eax, thenfoo andbarwill be declared as potentially returningeax despite the fact that
there is no write toeax inside offoo. We do a post-order depth-first search traversal
of the call graph (which visits child nodes before their parents) and propagate the set of
potential return registers upwards in the call graph by looking for the written-to registers.
Whenever we find a call to a function, we add its potential returns to the caller function
potential returns. We handle recursion using a work list mechanism such that whenever
we detect a call to a function which has not been analyzed yet,we add the caller function
back to the work list.
After detecting the potential returns, we add them to the IR in every return state-
ment inside every function. If more than one register is returned, we return a structure
containing all combined potential return registers.
The third step in our algorithm is to detect the callee saves registers and exclude
them from the list of potential returns. Since callee-savesvalues are saved to the memory
stack, we need a memory analysis technique to track the memory stack locations where
they are saved. Tracking memory in executables is not a trivial task. Our saved registers
detection does not need a sophisticated memory tracking algorithm because it only needs
to track stack memory. Neither heap nor global memory need tobe tracked.
We modify the Value Set Analysis (VSA) algorithm proposed byBalakrishnan et al.
[5] by removing global and heap memory tracking, keeping only stack memory tracking.
We also remove the context sensitivity from the algorithm since it is not needed in this
application. The resulting algorithm is less powerful for general memory tracking but is
sufficient for this purpose.
As a quick summary of the VSA algorithm, it derives a conservative estimate of the
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set of addresses and integer values every memory location and register can contain at any
program point. Every set of values is represented as a strided int rval with a lower and
upper bounds; and a stride. In our modified implementation ofVSA, we only keep track
of the lower and upper bounds.
In our modified version of the VSA, we assume that indirect calls will only access
stack locations up to a certain offset determined by the maxium number of memory
arguments to all functions in the binary. We also use the knowexternal function proto-
types to determine that maximum offset for external functions. Finally, we assume that
TOP VSA values do not alias with the stack offsets used to saveregisters. These TOP
values are usually input dependent values, global pointersor heap pointers that usually do
not alias with the memory stack. The only exception is for arrays allocated on the stack
with statically unbounded indexing. Those are usually not common since such arrays are
usually allocated on the heap (sometimes they are allocatedon the global memory).
Before we run the saved registers detection algorithm, we convert the registers in-
side of each function into the SSA form. This is straight forwa d; indeed in our imple-
mentation LLVM already does that. Our algorithm works on a temporary copy of the
IR.
Algorithm 4 detects the dead stores used to save registers and pru es those saved
registers from the potential return register set. Lines 6 through 12 in the algorithm collect
the addresses on the stack that are used to store register valu s. For each of those ad-
dresses, a simple memory liveness analysis is being conducted sing standard memory-
to-register promotion and dead code elimination compiler passes (both these passes are
already available in LLVM). Lines 13 through 16 create a dummy emory location in
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Algorithm 4 The callee-saves detection algorithm (FindDeadStores)
Input: A copy of the LLVM IR for a binary
Input: PotArgs: maps functions to their potential register arguments
Input: PotRets: maps functions to their potential return registers
Output: DeadStores: maps functions to the dead register stores
Output: PotRets: The input map after pruning saved registers
1: for all reg∈ PotArgsdo
2: Create a dummy registerdummy; DummyRegs(reg) = dummy
3: end for
4: ADDRS= φ
5: for all Function Fdo
6: for all Instruction I in Fdo
7: if I = storereg, Ptr AND reg∈ PotArgsthen
8: if ValueSet(Ptr) = {address} (Singleton)then




13: for all (reg,address, I) ∈ ADDRSdo
14: allocate a dummy pointerDummyPtr((reg, address)) at the beginning of F
15: storeDummyRegs(reg) to DummyPtr((reg, address))
16: end for
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17: for all Instruction I in Fdo
18: if I is UnsafeInstruction(address) where (reg,address,X) ∈ ADDRSthen
19: insert a volatile load fromDummyPtr((reg, address))
20: end if
21: if I = storevalue, Ptr AND ValueSet(Ptr) ⊇ {address} AND (reg,address,X)
∈ ADDRSthen
22: insert a storevalueto DummyPtr((reg, address))
23: end if
24: if I = loadPtr AND ValueSet(Ptr) ⊇ {address} AND (reg,address,X) ∈ AD-
DRSthen
25: insert I’ = loadDummyPtr((reg, address))
26: for every use of I insert a cloned use of I’
27: end if
28: end for
29: Run LLVM Memory to Register Promotion on AllDummyPtr
30: Run LLVM Dead Code Elimination on F
31: for all (reg,address, I) ∈ ADDRSdo
32: if DummyPtr(reg, address) is deleted ANDDummyRegs(reg) has no uses OR
only used in return instructionsthen
33: DeadStores(F) = DeadStores(F) ∪ {I}
34: end if
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35: if DummyRegs(reg) has no uses ORDummyRegs(reg) is used in all return
instructions of Fthen




the IR for each pair of address and register identified. We initially store a dummy value
we create to each one of those memory locations. Lines 17 throug 28 examine the uses
of every address using VSA. At every possible read of an address, we insert a load from
the dummy memory location we create. At every possible writeto that address, we in-
sert a store to that dummy memory location of the stored value. After that, we run the
memory-to-register promotion compiler pass again on thosememory locations. Finally,
lines 31 through 38 determine the final set of dead stores. If the dummy memory location
is promoted successfully to registers, and the only use of the dummy value is at the return
then it is saved and can safely be removed from the potential return. The corresponding
initial register stores are declared to be dead in this case.If the same previous conditions
occur and also there are other uses of the dummy value, then the register is removed from
the potential returns, but the initial store is not dead and is considered a real use of the
register; i.e. the register becomes an argument.
The UnsafeInstruction(address) functions appearing in line 18 in the algorithm is
responsible of deciding whether the instruction may have sid effects which can poten-
tially access thataddress. External calls without a known prototype where any stack
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address appears in the value sets of one of the arguments are considered unsafe as they
may do arithmetic on those addresses and potentially read from o write to ouraddress.
Some external functions are pre-identified safe and known not to do arithmetic on pointer
arguments, or do it with a bounded identified offset. For example, we parse format strings
of printf, scanf and similar functions and in some cases we can prove those functions
are safe.
After detecting the dead stores used to save registers and pru ing the callee-saves
from the potential returns, we proceed to step four which identifi s the actual register
arguments. Algorithm 5 shows the method to do so. We traversethe call graph of the
executable in post-order depth-first search traversal, which ensures child nodes are visited
before their parents. For each potential register argumentinside a function, we declare
it as an argument if and only if we see a “real” use of this regist r in the function. If a
register is used in a store instruction among the dead storesidentified by algorithm 4, the
store is not considered a real use. Uses in calls are only considered “real” if the callee
takes the register as an actual identified argument. A work list mechanism is maintained
to handle the dependencies between functions. PHI nodes that link multiple SSA versions
of the same register are not considered uses and are tracked.Returns are not considered
real uses because if the return is the only use of a register, there is no need to pass it as an
argument.
Propagating the actual return registers (step 5 in our algorithm) is done in a similar
way to the one above except that it works on functions in the forward call graph order and
looks for uses of return values at call sites.
The correctness of our register arguments and returns algorithm is guaranteed for
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Algorithm 5 The algorithm to propagate register arguments
Output: PotRets: map between functions and their potential return registers
1: WorkList= Functions sorted in reverse call graph order
2: while WorkListis not emptydo
3: remove a function F fromWorkList
4: mark function asstarted
5: for all reg∈ PotArgs(F) do
6: for all Instruction I that usesregdo
7: if I is a RealUse(reg) then
8: RegArgs(F) = RegArgs(F)∪ {reg}
9: end if
10: if (I = call X) AND (X is not started) then
11: Add F toWorkList
12: end if
13: if I = call X AND X is startedAND reg∈ RegArgs(X) then






internal functions. The reason is that we start our algorithm initially by having all registers
as arguments, and then remove those which are not really used. For returns, we start the
algorithm by adding all registers that are written to insideof a function or one of its
callees, we then remove the ones which are unused at call sites. The correctness in the
presence of indirect calls, external calls and call backs isdescribed below.
Our algorithm runs the same way on indirect calls and is corret. At every indirect
call, SecondWrite inserts a call translator function that checks the value of the function
pointer and calls the corresponding IR function accordingly. In this case, this call transla-
tor is treated the same way as any normal function in this algorithm under the assumption
that the call translator will call all possible target functions. External calls are discussed
separately in the following section.
3.3 External Calls Prototypes
In the previous part of this chapter, we proposed sound techniques to detect register
arguments and returns. We showed the correctness of our techniques when all calls in the
binary are to internal functions.
In this section, we extend our methods to support rewriting external calls correctly
and making sure all required arguments are passed correctlyunder certain assumptions.
We start first by describing why it is important to handle suchcalls. We then state our
assumptions. After that, we move forward to describe how we can detect external calls
in the original binary. We then show how we represent external functions in the IR. We
show the details of our rewriting techniques of external calls. We finally prove that our
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techniques are sound and the external functions will receivthe same arguments as in the
original binary and will therefore return the same values.
3.3.1 Overview and Problem Statement
Resolving external calls while recovering IR from executables is very important.
Almost no real-world binary is free from external calls. External calls are usually done to
libraries to perform certain tasks that are not part of the main application stream.
Functions that are external to the application are usually found in libraries. There
are two main ways to link libraries to application code: 1) Static linking. 2) Dynamic
linking.
Static linking is done when the linker decides to insert the function body inside the
application code itself. The advantage of that is fast execution time of the calls to such
functions and no overhead in loading the application, but the price paid is the increase in
the binary code size.
On the other hand, dynamic linking is when the linker decidesto keep the external
functions outside the binary application and refer to them by using their names (or loca-
tions) in the dynamic link library that contains them. During the application load time,
the libraries are loaded with the application such that whent application calls one of
these external functions, they can execute correctly. The advantage of dynamic linking
is the smaller binary code size and application modularity (by keeping the binary code
that is not related to the application main stream external). Another advantage is that
dynamic libraries are almost alwayssharedon the system. The disadvantage is usually
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slower binary load time.
In this section we only target recovering functional IR withexternal function calls
that are dynamically linked to the binary. We do not target sta ically linked external
functions in this section since they are already handled corre tly by our earlier techniques
since their code exists inside the binary itself.
For every external call site in the original binary, the problem we are solving here is
to recover some code that replaces the original call in the IRsuch that all of the following
is true when the IR is compiled to a rewritten binary:
1. The rewritten binary redirects control to the same external function when executed.
2. The external function takes the same memory and register arguments that were
passed at the original binary call site..
3. The return value(s) if any from the external function are passed back to the rewritten
binary correctly.
This problem is challenging in a static binary analyzer because of two main reasons.
1) Statically detecting an external call site in a binary is not always trivial. 2) External
function prototypes and calling conventions are usually not k wn to a static binary ana-
lyzer. This section gives an overview of the first problem anddiscusses in details how the
second problem can be solved.
3.3.2 Assumptions
As per any static binary analysis system, it is impossible tohandle all scenarios. In
this section, we discuss our main assumptions while recovering xternal calls.
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In this work, we assume that any external function has to adhere to some known
application binary interface (ABI). This means that any callsite to an external function in
the binary has to have a known calling convention from a finiteset of supported calling
conventions. More specifically, we assume all of the following is true:
1. All external functions can only take arguments either in registers or using the mem-
ory stack.
2. All external functions expect memory arguments at specific stack offsets.
3. All external functions expect register arguments only inspecific registers. These
registers are found in a set we callRegArgs
4. All external functions can only return values in specific set of registers we call
CallerSaves.
5. Any register other than theCallerSavesmust be saved and restored back if used by
an external function.
The previous assumptions are valid in almost all compiled coe. The reason is
that external functions are usually shared between multiple a plications and sometimes
between different systems. For them to be portable, they have to adhere to a certain ABI
with some specific calling convention such that it is more convenient for compilers to
interface with them. In practice, we found that almost all libraries adhere to the above
assumptions in all our tests.
In theory, external functions are not required to adhere to some certain ABI. De-
velopers writing source code usually specify a prototype for every external function they
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use, which includes the complete calling convention of the function. The compiler then
reads this calling convention and adheres to it while emitting low level binary code. One
challenge in dealing with binaries as we mentioned above is the lack of this prototype.
One example we found that does not adhere to these assumptions is very few in-
ternal compiler intrinsics. These are compiler specific functions inserted in the binary to
speed up specific tasks (or for other reasons). Very few of these intrinsics do not adhere
to the above assumptions since they are already known to the compiler. We support this
by maintaining a list of known compiler intrinsics with their custom calling conventions.
We do not support other compiler intrinsics not found in thislist and not adhering to the
above assumptions.
3.3.3 Detecting External Function Calls
At compile time, the compiler does not know the external function addresses at their
call sites. These addresses are only known when the operating system loads the binary.
Because of this, the compiler has to call such functions indirectly through some memory
location that the loader updates with the actual address of the called function.
There has to be a common language between the compiled binarya d the operating
system. The operating system has to know which memory locations o update when load-
ing the external libraries. Different systems implement different mechanisms of handling
this issue. For example, some Linux binaries use a dynamic relo ation table, Windows
binaries use an import address table and so on.
In theory, since the loader is able to update these memory locations, these memory
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locations have to be visible to any static binary analysis system. All external libraries and
functions used in a binary can be statically known from the binary image.
The challenge exactly is how to determine which indirect call le ds to which exter-
nal function. Static binary analysis and rewriting systemsusually rely on pattern matching
techniques that are mostly accurate and depend on certain compiler behaviors. Some of
these techniques include:
1. If the indirect call site uses the memory location that is visible to the loader (spec-
ified in the dynamic relocation entry or the import address table), then it is simple
to determine which function it is calling by looking up in that ble. IDA Pro [31]
uses this method.
2. Some compilers implement procedure linkage tables whichare composed of exter-
nal function stubs. Each stub has an indirect jump to the external function. Such
stubs are usually standard and can be detected accurately. The well-known Linux
disassembler toolobjdump uses this technique.
There are some other techniques compilers use to make external calls. Such tech-
niques are outside the scope of this dissertation. Static binary analyzers can fail in detect-
ing if an indirect call is calling an external function or not. In all our tests this happened
in very rare cases, but it needs to be handled for correctness. In uch cases, our IR repre-
sentation of indirect calls guarantees correct rewritten binary execution as we discuss in
the following section.
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3.3.4 External Calls IR Representation
We divide indirect call sites in a binary into two categories: 1) The call sites that
are detected to call external functions using a static binary analyzer. 2) All other indirect
call sites that may or may not call external functions.
We maintain a list of the prototypes of as many external functio s as possible (like
the standard libraries functions). This list may not be exhaustive since for custom DLLs
it is hard to ensure they are all considered.
For detected external calls, if their prototypes are known (by searching the known
prototypes list), we present them as direct calls to these external functions in the IR and
pass all required arguments with their correct data types. For unknown prototypes, we
represent them by a call to a special function we create in theIR called thetrampoline
function. We discuss the trampoline function in the next secion.
For all other indirect call sites that are not guaranteed to call external functions, we
use the call translation mechanism described in our WCRE paper [63]. The call transla-
tor function is a static function inserted in the IR that has alarge switch statement that
redirects control from constant original function addresses to their corresponding IR func-
tions. The number of cases in the switch statement is the number of all IR functions that
can be possibly reached indirectly in the original binary. We replace the assertion in the
default case of the translator function by a call to thetrampolinefunction described in the
next section. The translator function looks like the function n figure 3.1 in this case.
In order for the rewritten binary to work correctly, we mainti the same dynamic
relocation entries (or the import address table entries) attheir original locations in the
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switch (input_address) { 
case 0x400:  
 call rewritten_0x400; 
case 0x500:  




 call *input_address; 
} 
Figure 3.1: The call translator function
rewritten binary. We discuss this more after we describe thetrampoline function.
External calls get executed in the rewritten binary the following way: first, a call
to the call translator function is executed and the call transl tor function case statement
comes to the default case (since the external call address isnot any one of the original
function addresses). The trampoline function gets executed and redirects the control to
the external function as we discuss in the next section.
3.3.5 Trampoline Function
The trampoline function is a custom function only existing in the recoveredIR
without a corresponding function in the input binary. It is ued to redirect control to
external functions at external call sites in one of three cass: 1) In case the call site could
not be proven to call a specific external function. 2) In case the external function has an
unknown prototype. 3) Or, in case the external function has aknown prototype but with a
variable number of arguments.
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Thetrampolinefunction has to do all of the following tasks:
1. Redirect control to the correct external function.
2. Pass memory and register arguments correctly from the IR call site to the external
callee.
3. Pass the return value(s) correctly from the external callee to the call site.
In order for the trampoline function to work correctly, it takes the following argu-
ments:
1. The function address being called (usually a register or al ad from some memory
location).
2. Theabstract stackpointer value in the IR right before the call site.
3. The values of all registers in the setRegArgsbefore the call.
4. Pointers to place holders of the return values, one for each register in theCaller-
Savesset.
5. Pointer to a variable holding the stackbalance numberof the external call.
The first argument above is the function address. This is usually a result of some
register read or some memory load. It cannot be a direct address that is known since the
call site is for an external function. This address is used inside the trampoline function to
redirect control correctly to the destination external function.
The second argument is needed to adjust the memory argumentsand put them into
their correct offsets on the memory stack of the rewritten binary. Theabstract stackis the
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stack array in the IR resembling the original stack in the input binary. More information
about how the physical stack in the input binary is convertedto abstract stack arrays in
the recovered IR can be found in our EuroSys paper [3].
The third set of arguments are required to pass the correct register argument values
to the external function. We pass all of the possible register arguments conservatively.
The fourth set of arguments are pointers to variables declard t the call sites of the
trampoline function to pass the return values back to the call r. The trampoline function
updates each of them.
The last argument to the trampoline function is a pointer to avariable declared at
the call sites of the trampoline function to hold the stackbalance numberof the external
call. This balance number is the difference between the stack pointer before and after
executing the external function. The abstract stack pointer value in the caller has to be
adjusted to this value after returning from the trampoline function.
void trampoline ( fn_address, SPORIG, RegArgs, CallerSaves, BalNum) 
{ 
/* Assume the physical stack pointer register is: E SP */ 
(1)  Let SP CURR = ESP, SIZE = SPORIG - SP CURR 
(2)  Allocate a temporary memory at SP TEMP 
(3)  Save the contents between SP CURR and SP ORIG to the temp 
memory between: SP TEMP and SP TEMP + SIZE 
(4)  Set ESP = SP ORIG 
(5)  Copy all RegArgs values to the physical registers 
(6)  Call the function at fn_address 
(7)  BalNum = SPORIG - ESP  
(8)  Copy return register(s) to CallerSaves 
(9)  Restore back the contents between SP TEMP  SP TEMP + SIZE 
to between SP CURR  SPORIG 
(10)  Set ESP = SP CURR 
(11)  Return 
} 
 
Figure 3.2: Pseudo code of the trampoline function
Figure 3.2 shows pseudo code of the trampoline function withthe previously dis-
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cussed arguments. The memory stack layout of the rewritten binary immediately after
executing a call to the trampoline is shown in figure 3.3. Line(1) in the code saves the
current stack pointer of the rewritten binary in a local variable. Line (2) allocates a tem-
porary storage that is needed for saving some values as we shonext.
The rewritten stack layout shown in figure 3.3 contains the abstr ct stack array
where its TOP value is represented by theSPORIG variable. The abstract stack is the IR
array that represents the input binary’s physical stack of the caller. For the external call to
be executed correctly, it needs to have the same stack view aswhat was there in the input
binary, which means the stack pointer must point to the top ofthe abstract stack frame.
The problem that happens in this case is that functions usually assume that any address
that is lower than the current stack pointer at the function’s entry point is free space that
can be used by local variables of the function. In this particular case, the stack addresses
between the top of the abstract stack pointer (SPORIG) and the top of the rewritten stack
frame (SPCURR) are used by the caller function in the IR as shown in figure 3.3. This
means that we have to save this stack region such that if the external function allocates
some stack space and corrupts this region, we can restore it back.
This is exactly what line (3) in figure 3.2 does. It saves the region on top of the
abstract stack frame in the rewritten stack frame to the temporary storage.
Line (4) in figure 3.2 sets the current physical rewritten stack pointer to point to the
top of the abstract stack frame of the original caller function. Line (5) copies the register
arguments to the actual physical registers. Line (6) calls the external function.
At the point of the call at line (6), the physical registers have ll the arguments. The
memory stack view is the same as what was there in the input binary. Hence, the external
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function will produce the same result as the input binary.
After returning from the external call, line (7) stores the balance number by sub-
tracting the stack pointer before and after the call. Line (8) copies the return physical
registers into the IR return variables. Line (9) restores back the stack memory region that
was saved in line (3). Line (10) restores the physical stack pointer to its value at the entry
to the trampoline such that line (11) can return back to the corre t call site.
Because the trampoline code writes to physical registers, and reads from them, it
is usually written as a separate function in low level assembly, and then linked with the
rewritten binary when re-compiled. This way we maintain thereadability of the recovered
IR by hiding all these low level details. The user will only see a call to the trampoline
function with the first argument being the function that willbe called (or some pointer to
it).
Return Address 
Outgoing Arguments to 
Trampoline Function 
IR Variables and 
Temporaries / Saves 
External Arguments 
Other original binary 
stack variables 
IR Variables and 













Figure 3.3: The memory stack layout after executing a trampoline call
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3.3.6 Correctness of the Trampoline Function
The trampoline function in figure 3.2 achieves all the three goals stated at the be-
ginning of the previous section under the assumptions in section 3.3.2. We clarify this
here.
The first goal of the trampoline function is to redirect the contr l to the correct
external function. This is guaranteed as long as the addressof the function passed to the
trampoline is correct.
We notice that the address passed to the trampoline is the addr ss of the external
function in the input binary which might be different than the address of the same function
in the rewritten binary (because of different loader behavior). The key point here is that
the place holders of these addresses are exactly the same in th i put and the rewritten
binary as we state at the end of section 3.3.4. These place hold rs are known to any static
analyzer as they have to be visible to the loader before executing the binary. They depend
on the binary format (dynamic relocation tables in ELF or import address tables in PE).
Under the assumption that any external call has to load the function address from
these place holders, then the external function address pased to the trampoline function
is correct and the execution will be redirected to the correct external function.
The second goal of the trampoline function is that any registr or memory argu-
ments have to be passed correctly to the external function. Register arguments are passed
correctly in line (5) of the function in figure 3.2. Memory arguments are passed correctly
since the external function has the same stack view as the original binary’s stack view
which is guaranteed by changing the stack pointer value in line (4) of the function to
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point to the top of the abstract stack frame (which contains all arguments).
The third goal of passing the returns correctly is achieved by executing line (8) of
the trampoline function.
3.4 Effect of inaccurate function boundaries
In this section, we discuss the effect of having inaccurate function boundaries on
the function API recovery process described in this chapter. As per chapter 2, the IR
might have inaccurate function boundaries as well as spurious functions that have to work
correctly in all cases for guaranteed functionality of the IR as we discussed in chapter 2.
This section is divided into two parts, the first part addresses the modifications
required for the previous stack memory arguments identification techniques for Second-
Write presented in [3]. The second part talks about the registr arguments identification
techniques presented in this chapter.
3.4.1 Memory Stack
When the function boundaries are not accurate, the assumption that every function
has a return address on top of its physical stack (which is thetack memory in the orig-
inal binary) is no longer valid. This assumption is used in the EuroSys work recovering
abstract stack and arguments from physical stack accesses [3]. This assumption is not
usually valid in spurious code.
In this section, we show that modifications are needed to the previous high level
symbol promotion work [3] in case procedure boundaries are not accurate. We first intro-
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duce a summary of our previous technique and why it cannot work in case of inaccurate
procedure boundaries (spurious code), then we proceed withthe modified technique to
overcome that and prove that it will work.
Our previous symbol promotion work aims at converting the physical stack frame
in the original binary to a set of abstract stack frames (which are IR arrays representing
the physical stack) for every recovered procedure in the IR. This is an important step of
the high level IR recovery. The way we do that is that we allocate a local array in every IR
procedure with a size that is equal to the maximum allocated stack size in this procedure.
This maximum size can be a fixed constant or a non-constant expression. In case we
cannot come up with an expression, we do not convert the physical tack into abstract
stacks.
Instead of describing the details of the previous techniques, w give an example of
why they will not work in case of inaccurate procedure boundaries. Consider the code
example shown in figure 3.4-a. In this example, functionf o is split into two parts in
the IR foo andfoo split. Assume the indirect jump infoo was compiled from some case
statement whose targets were not known in the IR and one of itstargets is: foo split.
Assume the indirect call is calling the actual procedurebar. foo split is not an actual
procedure in the input binary and will not have any return address allocated at the top of
its stack in the IR as it is originally a part offoo. bar will have a return address allocated
on top of its stack by the call instruction. If we use the rulesd cribed in our previous
paper [3], and assuming the return address is four bytes long, the local variable access at
offset 5 infoo split will be translated as index: (5-4) = 1 infoo’s IR abstract stack array
to account for the return address (which does not exist in this case). This will result in a
106
wrong access since the right one is actually 5 (without subtracting 4 bytes for the return
address). On the other hand, the access to offset 9 inbar will be translated correctly to
offset (9-5-4) = zero in the recovered stack array offo becausebar has a return address
stored on top of its stack (the call instruction pushes that return address on the stack). The
recovered code which will not work correctly is shown in figure 3.4-b.
foo:  
sub $10, %esp 
… 
movb $4, 5(%esp) 
jmp *eax  
… 
//Arg moved to TOP 




//not a function 
foo_split:  





sub $5, %esp 
movb 9(%esp), %edx 
… //No calls 
 
foo  () {  
char MStack[10]; 
… 
MStack[5] = 4; 
call_translator (eax, &MStack[0]); 
… 
     MStack[0] = dl; 
 




foo_split  (char* Parent_Stack) { 




bar  (void* Parent_Stack) { 
char MStack[5]; 
char edx = Parent_Stack[0];//Arg1 
… 
} 
foo  () {  
char MStack[14]; 
… 
MStack[9] = 4; 
call_translator (eax, &MStack[4]); 
… 
MStack[4] = dl; 
MStack[0] = ret_address; 




foo_split  (char* Parent_Stack) { 




bar  (char* Parent_Stack) { 
char MStack[5]; 
char edx = Parent_Stack[4];//Arg1 
… 
} 







Figure 3.4: Stack Functionality. a) The input binary. b) Thebroken recovered IR using
previous techniques. c) The correct recovered IR.
To avoid this problem, we introduce our modified physical to abstract stack transla-
tion rules and prove they will work in all cases even for splitfunctions. Before we begin,
we introduce some notation. We assume a general case in the recove d IR of a call stack
(chain of recovered procedures reachable using calls/jumps in the original binary) with
lengthn where the entry point procedure is referred to as index zero in this chain. The IR
procedures in this chain may or may not be actual procedures in the original binary. The
following notation will be used:
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• SPx refers to the physical stack pointer value in the input binary at the entry point
of procedurex in the chain before executing its first instruction.
• ST(i,x) refers to the physical stack pointer value in the input binary after executing
instructioni inside procedurex in the chain. In casei is a call instruction,ST(i,x)
represents the stack pointer value after executing the calland pushing the return
address, but before jumping to the callee.
• MStackx1[x2] is the recovered abstract stack array in the IR indexed atx2 for pro-
cedurex1 in the chain.
• SZx is the recovered size ofMStackx array in bytes.
First, the recovered size ofMStackx is calculated as follows:SZx = max(SPx -
ST(i,x)) ∀i ∈ procedurex in the chain. This means the maximum growth in the stack in
this particular procedure. The growth of the stack pointer value includes all growth due
to any kind of stack pushes including the return address pushthat happens with a call
instruction. This is a major fix to the previous work [3] that does not consider the return
address push during a call as a stack allocation.
Next, we assume the following relation holds for any recovered proceduren in
the chain:SPn =SPn−1 − Yn−1 whereYn ∈ Z, Yn ≥ 0. Yn represents the stack offset
immediately before proceduren − 1 jumps to proceduren. This relation means that the
physical stack grows in the negative direction when procedur n − 1 calls proceduren.
This is valid in most compiled code.
For any physical stack pointer value that can be representedas: ST(i,n) = SPn -
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Xn in the input binary whereXn ∈ Z, it will be translated to IR accessMStackn′(Xn,n)





















n, Xn > 0
n′(Xn + Yn−1, n− 1), Xn ≤ 0





















Xn, Xn > 0
Tn−1(Xn + Yn−1), Xn ≤ 0
Where SPn = SPn−1 − Yn−1
In the above recursive equations,Tn(Xn) represents the offset from the end of the
recovered abstract stack of proceduren for a particular physical offsetXn in the original
binary. n′ is some ancestor procedure ofn in the call stack.Tn(Xn) is measured from
the end of the abstract stack array because the physical stack grows backwards as per our
assumption above. For every physical stack pointer valueST(i,n) there are two important
definitions: 1) The originating procedure is the IR procedurfrom which this access
originates in the chain which is proceduren. 2) The landing procedure which is the IR
procedure whose abstract stack is the one accessed by transla ing this stack pointer value.
We refer to that procedure asn′ in our notation. Ifn′ = n then the originating procedure
and the landing procedures are the same which means the stackaccess refers to a local
variable inside proceduren. On the other hand, ifn′ 6= n this means that the stack pointer
value refers to an argument obtained from the parent proceduren′.
The intuition behind the above equations is: in cases whereXn > 0 the access is
109
inside the local abstract stack frame because the stack grows in the negative direction, any
positive value subtracted from the stack pointer value at the entry point of the procedure
means a local allocation. It has to be translated to the same offs t. On the other hand,
Xn ≤ 0 represent positive offsets relative to the stack pointer atthe beginning of the
procedure which means they are previously allocated in a parent bstract frame.
To implement this correctly in the recovered IR, a call instruction in the original
binary will be translated into a store of the return address into the location in the recov-
ered abstract stack array representing the stack pointer value immediately after the call
according to the above translation rules. This stack array location is passed as a pointer to
the caller. For jump instructions, the stack array locationwill be passed without storing
any return address. This can be shown in the code example in figure 3.4-c.
In cases when the stack size is not constant, or constant stack offsets cannot be
inferred from the binary, the translation rules above are imple ented as runtime checks
in the same way described in [3] but with the new translation rules described above.
To prove this will always be correct, we prove that the recovered abstract stack
exactly resembles the original physical stack. Instead of comparing absolute values of the
physical and abstract stacks (which are runtime values), wecompare relative values on
the physical stack (stack differences) and prove they are exactly equal to the offset on the
abstract stack. The next lemma proves this.
Definition 3.1 A functional binary is a binary where there does not exist a memory
access accessing stack locations not allocated inside the binary. i.e. for any stack access
represented as:ST(i,n) =SPn −Xn, n′(Xn, n) ≥ 0 andXn ≤SZn
Preposition 3.1Any stack pointer value has to access either the same stack frme
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or an ancestor stack frame in the IR.i.e. n′(Xn, n) ≤ n
Proof Follows directly from the mathematical definition ofn′.
Lemma 3.1For anyn chain of IR procedures reachable using calls/jumps and form-
ing a call stack in the recovered IR of a functional binary, and for any instructioni in the
original binary, the physical stack pointer value ati relative to the physical stack pointer
value at the entry point of the landing procedure is exactly equal to the translated abstract
stack offset of that physical stack pointer value if the transl tion rules above are used.
This Lemma can be formulated as follows: for a particular physical stack pointer
value at instructioni represented asST(i,n) =SPn−Xn, SPn′(Xn,n)−ST(i,n) is exactly equal
to Tn(Xn).
Proof For cases wheren′(Xn, n) = n the proof is trivial by doing simple substitu-
tion in the formulas and the definitions above.
For cases wheren′(Xn, n) 6= n, we use mathematical induction. We prove the
relation atn = 1, assume it is valid atn and prove it atn + 1. In the proof, our left hand
side (LHS) isSPn′(Xn,n)−ST(i,n) and our right hand side (RHS) is:Tn(Xn).
Base Case:n = 1 In this case,n′ = 0 according to preposition (1). LHS =
SP0−SP1 +X1 =SP0 − (SP0 − Y0) +X1 = Y0 +X1 RHS =T1(X1) = T0(X1 + Y0) =
X1 + Y0 which is the same as the LHS.
Inductive Case: Assuming:SPn′(Xn,n)−ST(i,n) = Tn(Xn) we want to prove that:
SPn′(Xn+1,n+1)−ST(i′,n+1) = Tn+1(Xn+1)
LHS = SPn′(Xn+1,n+1)−SPn+1 +Xn+1 =SPn′(Xn+1+Yn,n) − (SPn − Y n) +Xn+1
AssumeXn+1+Yn = Pn, LHS =SPn′(Pn,n)− (SPn−Pn) = Tn(Pn) = Tn(Xn+1+
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Yn) = Tn+1(Xn+1) = RHS
Lemma (3.1) shows that the relative offsets between the physical stack pointer val-
ues in the original binary are exactly the same as the relativoffsets on the recovered
abstract stack arrays. This implies correct stack memory behavior in all cases under the
assumptions stated earlier in this section.
3.4.2 Register Arguments
Earlier in this chapter, we presented a sound technique thatcan be used to recover
register arguments for any function in the binary. The technique is based on tracking
memory locations on the stack used to save and restore registers. The memory tracking is
done using a simplified version of the Value Set Analysis (VSA) technique [5] that runs
on the IR before the identification process takes place.
Our previous techniques for detecting register arguments will still be correct and
sound for spurious code provided that the Value Set Analysisis run on the IR after con-
verting the physical stack into an abstract stack using the translation rules discussed in the
previous section. This is necessary to ensure that the stackmemory values flow correctly
to spurious functions (as well as other functions). If the older stack translation presented
in our previous EuroSys work [3] is used, it might lead to inaccurate flow of values to
spurious code as discussed in the previous section.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Register Arguments and Returns
In this section we show the accuracy of the detected registerarguments and returns.
We get our results only for the C and C++ benchmarks shown in figure 2.8 and present
the average number of added register arguments and returns (false positives). We never
had any false negatives in any of the binaries we tested. We could not compare Fortran
binaries since currently, we do not support reading Fortranprototypes from debugging
information.
As shown from the figure 3.5, the average number of false positive arguments is 0.2
per function. The average number of false positive returns is 0.44 registers per function.
While collecting these results, we assume that return registers are eithereax or
edx or both in x86. This is valid in all the code we know of that runson x86 systems
since this is a standard ABI feature for x86. Our main algorithm does not require this
feature to be functional.
The number of false positive return registers is higher because the return registers
identification process is usually less accurate than register arguments identification pro-
cess. To see why this is true, consider a functionf o that is called 10 times in the whole
binary in different call sites. To identify register arguments tofoo, only the entry point of
foo has to be analyzed for uses of arguments. To analyze forfo returns, all 10 callsites
have to be analyzed for real uses of the return registers. Since the number of callsites of
functions in the binary is usually larger than one, the return registers identification process
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Figure 3.5: Accuracy of register arguments and returns
In contrast to the work in [10], our method has three advantages: (i) it is guaranteed
to discover all arguments; (ii) it has been demonstrated on amuch larger programs; and
(iii) it is orders of magnitude faster. First, their method cannot guarantee full coverage of
arguments and returns because of being a dynamic analysis. Any unused argument or re-
turn during an execution trace can be missed. Missing arguments or returns is acceptable
for human understanding of binaries, but unacceptable for rew iting binaries. Second, our
method has been evaluated on far more functions (48,854 functions for our method, vs.
just 13 functions for theirs.) Third, our analysis is much faster: for example, it takes only
30 seconds to analyze a program likesoplexwhich has 116,743 instructions containing
1,523 procedures and produces prototypes for all of them. Intheir case, they need the
same 30 seconds to only extractMD5_Final which is a single function of 67 instruc-
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tions. This shows that our analysis is two to three orders of magnitude faster than their
method, at the expense of a small loss in precision.
3.5.2 Trampoline Function Overhead
In this section we show the effect of inserting the trampoline function discussed in
section 3.3 on the overall performance of the rewritten binary.
As we discussed in section 3.3, the trampoline function is inserted to guarantee
correct execution of external functions that do not have a known prototype, or for func-
tions with variable number of arguments. The trampoline functio adds some overhead
of restoring the state of the rewritten binary as it was in theoriginal binary before running
the external call.
We measure the time spent in the trampoline function relative to the whole run
time of the rewritten binary. We do not consider the time spent in the external function
itself since this time is not considered an overhead. We use the Perf Linux performance
monitoring tool to measure the overhead. All original binares were compiled using the
maximum optimization level when performing this experiment.
As shown from the figure 3.6, the overhead of the trampoline fuction is negligible
in all cases. The average overhead is 0.18% of the runtime of the rewritten binary. In
many cases, there is no overhead at all when the binary does not have any external call
with unknown prototype or a variable number of arguments. This s ows that the cost of
achieving correctness in case of rewriting external functions that do not have a known
prototype is very small.
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Figure 3.6: Overhead of the trampoline function in the rewritten binary
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We do not show the runtime of the rewritten binaries comparedto the runtime of
the original binaries here since it involves many other factors in the SecondWrite system
that are outside the scope of this dissertation. This is illutrated in our previous work [3].
Some binaries use external compiler intrinsics to achieve some tasks. Those intrin-
sics we do not have prototypes for. This behavior is shown in calculix binary which has
3% trampoline overhead. In calculix, lots of low level Fortran intrinsics are used and Sec-
ondWrite does not have their prototypes and hence it used the trampoline function. They
get called with high frequency.
The other main reason some binaries have larger trampoline function overhead is
calling the printf family functions (like printf, scanf, fprintf, ...). Some binaries like gcc,
dealII, astar and sphinx use them more often than other binaries. Those functions have
a variable number of arguments and hence SecondWrite uses thetrampoline function
while rewriting them. For such printf family functions, we have implemented some static
techniques that are now under test which can detect the format string and extract the
exact number and data types of arguments; this removes the need to insert the trampoline
function for these cases. The results above do not reflect this implementation.
3.6 Related Work
Cifuentes and Simon present techniques to recover procedureabstraction from bi-
naries [17]. They present an abstraction language that can specify machine independent
prologue patterns, epilogue patterns, stack frames, argument locations, return value regis-
ters, and other issues related to procedure calls. Their abstraction depends on specifying
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a certain ABI that the binary has to follow. This abstraction la guage is used in the
UQBT [16].
In her PhD dissertation, Cifuentes [15] presents a simple technique based on live-
ness analysis to detect register arguments and returns. Thitechnique is implemented in
the dcc decompiler.
Zhang et al. present a technique to recover function arguments and returns from
executable [78]. Their technique is similar the brute forcetechnique described in section
3.2 which leads to imprecise results.
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Chapter 4: Recovering Floating Point Stack Allocated Variables
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe our techniques to convert all the x86 floating point stack
operations into higher level code that uses floating point variables, function arguments and
function returns, instead of the low level stack layout usedin the assembly. We present
sound techniques for this process and prove that they work inall scenarios under certain
assumptions that are stated clearly in this chapter.
This section has five main parts. Section 4.2 discusses the x86 floating point stack
and how it is maintained in the x86 executables. Section 4.3 discusses the assumptions
based on which we develop our techniques. Section 4.4 describ a basic recovery tech-
nique that can work in all cases given that all indirect branches are resolved correctly from
the executable. Section 4.5 discusses essential techniques that are necessary in case some
indirect branches are unresolved in the binary. Finally in section 4.6, we prove that the
stated techniques can work under the stated assumptions. Results as well as related work
are presented at the end of the chapter.
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4.2 x86 Floating Point Stack Layout and Problem Overview
We begin by introducing the x86 floating point stack. The floating point hardware
stack has a maximum height of 8 which means there are only 8 physical floating point
registers that can be used at any time. The names of those registers, as used by the
hardware instructions, are dynamic and are relative to the current top of the floating point
stack.
If we assume the fixed physical register names are:PST0 - PST7, then the x86
assembly instructions will refer to another set of namesST0 - ST7, whereST0 always
refers to the register at the top of the stack. For example, ifthe height of the stack is one,
thenST0 refers toPST0. If the stack is full (with stack height of eight), thenST0 refers
to PST7. In general,STx is mapped toPSTy wherey = TOP(I)− 1− x whereTOP(I)
is the stack height at instructionI and0 ≤ y < TOP(I).
Whenever a function returns a floating point value in a register, it pushes the value
on the floating point stack. Whenever a function takes floatingpoint values as arguments
in registers, the caller pushes the values on the floating point stack. It is assumed that
TOP(I) cannot be negative at any instructionI.
In the recovered intermediate representation (IR), we create floating point variables
corresponding to every physical floating point register in the hardware. For simplicity,
we use the same physical stack register namesPST0 - PST7 to refer to the IR floating
point variables as well. Such variables are declared as local vari bles for every recovered
function in the IR.
Decoding the floating point stack operations means mapping every assembly operand
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amongST0 - ST7 into a corresponding IR register amongPST0 - PST7. It turns out from
the previous equations that we only need to identify for every instructionI, what is the
correspondingTOP(I) in order to decode the floating point operands successfully.Figure
4.1-c shows an example of the recovered output of the decoding process of the assembly
instructions in figure 4.1-b. TheTOP(I) values are shown in figure 4.1-a.

















fld 0x08(%ebp) //push arg1  st(0) 
fld 0x10(%ebp) //push arg2  st(0) 
fadd %st(1)    //st(0)=st(0)+st(1) 
fxchg %st(1)   //st(1)  st(0) 
fstp 0x8(%esp) //pop st(0)  Memory       
ret 
 
double foo (  
double arg1, double arg2)  
{ 
 double PST0,PST1,temp; 
 PST0 = arg1;  
  








 return PST0; 
} 
 
(a)  (b)  (c)  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Floating Point Stack Illustration: a) TOP values b) Original assembly code c)
Recovered Code
If there is no indirect or unknown control transfer instructions in the program, the
floating point stack decoding problem is trivial because we can traverse the control flow
of the program, tracking the floating point stack height at every point, and set the value of
TOP(I) at every instructionI depending on the floating point operations observed. This
analysis will not work in the presence of indirect and external control transfers because
when we hit such transfers, we will not know what code will be ex cuted next and how
the height of the stack will be affected by this control transfer. The following sections
describe how to overcome this problem.
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4.3 Floating Point Stack Assumptions
It is statically indeterminable to be able to decode the floating point operations
correctly in all cases in the presence of unknown indirect control transfer instructions.
In this work, we show that if we make some assumptions, we can atually guarantee a
correct and functional representation of the floating pointstack operations in all cases
that adhere to those assumptions. Our assumptions are:
1. At control-flow join points, the floating point stack height must be the same for
every predecessor basic block.
2. At indirect and external calls, the floating point stack heig t must be zero before
the call.
3. Every indirect or external call can return at most a singlefloating point value on the
floating point stack.
The above assumptions are correct in compiled code in every case in every compiler
we are aware of. They are also true in most hand written assembly code, but may not be
always true in theory. The justifications for the assumptions for compiled code are as
follows:
1. If the stack height is not balanced at join points, any subsequent floating point stack
access will be indeterminable as it might access different values depending on the
path taken at run time.
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2. For indirect and external calls, the behavior of their targets is usually unknown to
the compiler, and hence the compiler must assume they might use all the floating
point stack registers. As a result it has to clean the stack before such calls. We
can state this assumption by saying we assume floating point registers are scratch
registers. Theoretically, a compiler might know in some cases the behavior of the
functions being called and may not clean the floating point stack, but practically we
are not aware of such a compiler.
3. The assumption that the maximum number of floating point regist r returns equals
one comes from the fact that we are not aware of any calling convention that allows
the return of more than one floating point stack register fromindirect calls and
externals.
4.4 Basic Approach for Decoding the Floating Point Stack
In this section, we describe our basic approach to decode thefloating point stack.
In this basic approach, we assume that all targets of indirect branches in the executable
are known. This assumption is relaxed in the next section. Resolving the targets of
indirect branches in compiled executables can be done usingefficient heuristics like the
ones described in [14].
To solve the floating point stack decoding problem, we use a symbolic analysis
scheme by maintaining a symbolic valueXi for every indirect and external calli repre-
senting the difference of the floating point stack height before and after the call. Some-
times we refer to that difference asStackDiff in this chapter. After doing the symbolic
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analysis, eachTOP(I) will become a symbolic expression in terms of theXis. We build
symbolic linear equations to solve forXis. Once theXis are calculated,TOP(I) will be
known for every instruction.
We translate the above assumptions into the symbolic analysis propagation rules
present in figure 4.2, explained as follows. For internal function calls, we use helper vari-
ablesY (F ) to represent the symbolic expression representingStackDiffof every function
F . The executable is traversed in a depth first search manner starting from the entry point
function for the binary, and from functions that are never called directly in the code. The
assumptions (1) through (3) in section 4.3 above represent th symbolic equations in lines
(1) through (3) in figure 4.2. The actual values ofXis can only be zero or one because
before the indirect and external calls, the stack height is zero according to assumption (2),
and the call can return at most one value according to assumption (3). The height of the
stack cannot go negative and hence the actual value of theXis cannot be negative.
The symbolic equations represented by equations (1) throug(3) in figure 4.2 along
with the symbolic unknownsXis are transformed into a linear system of equations. To
solve these equations, we employ our custom linear solver that categorizes the equations
into disjoint groups based on the variables used in every equation, and then solves every
group only if the number of equations is equal to the number ofunknowns. We keep
propagating calculated values to other groups until no morecalculated values are present.
Most of theXis are usually solved using equation (3) in figure 4.2.
The remaining unknowns are assumed to take a value ofXi = 1 conservatively.
This will be always correct because from our third assumption in section 4.3 above, the
stack height is either zero or one after every indirect and external call. In this case, if we
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Unknown Symbolic Values :
Xi, whereXi = StackDiffof indirect/external callsitei
Helper Variables :
Y (F ) = StackDiffof functionF , whereF is an internal function
TOP(I) = top of the stack after executing instructionI
TOPb(I) = top of the stack before executing instructionI
Initial Conditions :
Root functions “not called directly anywhere” as well as the entry point function
have entryTOPb(I) = 0 whereI is the first instruction of those functions.
Data flow rules :
For every instructionI:
if I = push ...⇒ TOP(I) = TOPb(I) + 1
if I = pop ...⇒
if (TOPb(I) = Xi) Xi = 1 ——————–(3)
TOP(I) = TOPb(I)− 1
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if I = callF ⇒
if (F is an external or indirect)
TOPb(I) = zero ——————– (2)
TOP(I) = Xi
else
TOPb(A) = TOPb(I) whereA is the first instruction inF
AnalyzeF to getY (F ) = func(X1, ..., Xn)
TOP(I) = TOPb(I) + Y(F)
if I = jmpL ⇒
AssumeL points to a set of known targetsS
∀i ∈ S let instructionIi be the instruction ati
⇒ TOPb(I) = TOPb(Ii) ——————– (1)
if IR = return fromF ⇒
Y (F ) = TOPb(IR)− TOPb(A), A is the first instruction inF
∀Z = return fromF ⇒ TOPb(Z) = TOPb(IR)
∀I ∈ C whereC is the set of call sites ofF ⇒ TOP(I) = TOPb(IR)
if I = any other instruction
TOP(I) = TOPb(I)
Figure 4.2: Data flow rules used to decode the floating point stack
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declare by mistake that a particular indirect call has one elem nt on the stack top after
its return; this element will never be accessed. In this case, ev n if there are subsequent
floating point stack operations, they have to push values on the stack before reading them.
The floating point register arguments and returns are declared in the IR as follows:
a) Whenever a function hasTOPb(I) > 0 at its entry point instructionI, the function is
declared in the IR to take as many floating point values as the value ofTOPb(I). They will
be passed as arguments and copied to the correct local variables according to the mapping
we described earlier. b) WheneverXi or Y (F ) are greater than zero at a call site, this call
site will be returning as many float returns as theY (F ) or theXi values in the IR and they
will be copied to the corresponding local variables in the callers.
4.5 Decoding the Floating Point Stack in the Case of Unresolved Indirect
Jumps
We say that an indirect jump in the binary is not resolved whenthe jump table
identification heuristics used during disassembly (such asin [14]) fails and thus no target
addresses are statically identified for the indirect branch. W en this happens, portions of
the input binary can be disassembled as separate functions in the IR, but in fact they are
just some targets of unresolved branches in the original binry. This causes a problem to
our floating point analysis technique described above sincethe floating point height after
indirect jumps will not be known. We refer here to both indirect unconditional jumps
as well as indirect conditional branches but not indirect calls. Indirect calls are handled
correctly in the previous section by assuming the TOP value after them is either zero
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or one. In the rest of the section, we use the term ‘branch’ to refer to both conditional
branches and unconditional jumps.
Applying the same indirect and external calls technique described in the previous
section will not work for unresolved indirect branches. To see why, consider equation (2)
in figure 4.2 which sets the TOP variable to zero before indirect calls. If we set TOP to be
zero before unresolved indirect branches, we are implicitly assuming that the correspond-
ing case statements in the original source code cannot have register-allocated floating
point variables defined before the case statement and later used inside the case statement.
Any optimizing compiler can invalidate this assumption which leads to a problem. Since
the jumps are one way transfers, putting any kind of constraint on the TOP value after the
jump instruction is not feasible.
To clarify the issues with indirect jumps that are unresolved, consider the code
example shown in figure 4.3-b. In this code, functionf o has an indirect jump, and let us
assume that one of its targets (located at labelA in the figure) is unresolved. For a binary
analysis tool with a complete code coverage (like SecondWrite [63]), the code atA will
be recovered as part of a new function in the IR since no director indirect control transfer
instruction was detected to reachA. By looking into what the code does, the part before
the indirect jump pushes two elements on the floating point stack, and then later after the
jump these two elements are being added and the added value isbeing returned from the
function. If we assume a value of zero for TOP before the indirect jump, it will be not
true since there are two elements present on the stack at thispoint.
Before we describe our method to handle such a case, we mentionhere that current
known heuristics to resolve jump tables from binaries are very accurate. For example,
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f oo:  
 
fld 0x08(%ebp) //push arg1  st(0) 
fld 0x10(%ebp) //push arg2  st(0) 
jmp *%ecx      /* jumping to A:  




fadd %st(1)    //st(0)=st(0)+st(1) 
fxchg %st(1)   //st(1)  st(0) 
fstp 0x8(%esp) //pop st(0)  Memory       
ret 
 
double ST[8], TOP;  
void foo (double arg1,  
   double arg2) { 
 double PST0,PST1,temp; 
 PST0 = arg1;  
 
 PST1 = arg2;   
  
 TOP=2; ST[0]=PST1;  
 ST[1]=PST0; 









 temp=PST1; PST1=PST0; 
 PST0=temp; 
   
  
 return PST0; 
} 
 
(a)  (b)  (c)  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Floating Point Stack Problem with Indirect Jumps: a) TOP values b) Original
assembly code c) Recovered Code
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SecondWrite uses a modified version of the heuristics described by Cifuentes and Em-
merik [14] which leads to almost 100% accurate recovery in binaries compiled from two
compilers (GCC and Visual Studio). This shows that the technique described in the pre-
vious section handles most of the cases. The techniques described here are needed in
case such heuristics fail (may be for a compiler not known to the community, or for hand
coded assembly). Our method is important since without it, even a single unresolved
branch may result in non-functional recovered IR from the binary.
In order to solve this problem, we perform a check first to see if we need to imple-
ment this technique and not the other one described in the previous section. The check
algorithm is shown in algorithm 6. The algorithm returns false meaning that no adjust-
ments are needed if all indirect jumps are resolved. In this case, the technique in the
previous section is enough. If at least one indirect jump is not resolved, then for every
recovered function in the IR having no direct call or direct jump to it, we check to see if
there is any instruction accessing the floating point stack (by running the functionAccess-
esFPStack. If so, then this IR function is identified in theAdjustsset for later processing.
The functionAccessesFPStack(F) conservatively returns true for any functionF
which cannot be analyzed statically to determine if it uses th floating point stack. Exam-
ples of such functions include IR functions which have unresolved indirect jumps domi-
nated by the function entry. One target of the indirect branch might use the floating point
stack and we should assume that for correctness.
Once the check in algorithm 6 returns true, we proceed to apply the same data flow
rules as in figure 4.2 but with the modified unknown variables and initial conditions as
shown in figure 4.4. We only set the executable’s entry point TOP value to be zero. We do
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Algorithm 6 Algorithm to check if adjustments are needed to the floating point stack
recovery
1: Input: Funcs: a set of recovered IR functions with their complete bodies reachable
only indirectly
2: Input: Jumps: a set of unresolved indirect jumps in the IR
3: Output: adjustmentNeeded: a boolean representing the need to adjust the floating
point stack for unresolved indirect jumps
4: Output: Adjusts: A set of functions detected to have floating point accesses
5: adjustmentNeeded=false
6: if Jumps6= φ then
7: for all F ∈ Funcsdo
8: if AccesseFPStack(F) then
9: adjustmentNeeded=true





Unknown Symbolic Values :
Xi, whereXi = StackDiffof indirect/external callsitei
yi, whereyi = TOPof the floating point stack at the entry point of some IR function
i
Helper Symbolic Variables :
Y (F ) = StackDiffof functionF , whereF is an internal function
TOP(I) = top of the stack after executing instructionI
TOPb(I) = top of the stack before executing instructionI
Initial Conditions :
TOPb(I) = 0 whereI is the first instruction of the entry point function.
Data flow rules :
Same as before in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.4: Modified initial conditions for the data flow rules decoding the floating point
stack
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not do that for other functions that are not reachable directly (we call them Root functions
in the original data flow rules in figure 4.2). We set the TOP value for other functions
reachable indirectly to be new unknownsyi’s. The reason theseyi’s are not set to zeros
is that such functions reachable indirectly can be some unresolv d branch targets and
not actual functions. For branch targets, it is acceptable to have floating point variables
pushed on the stack at their entry points.
We solve the linear system of equations as before getting values for all unknown
Xis andyis. For all unknownXi’s, we set their values to ones conservatively as before.
After solving all equations and setting all unknownXis to ones, some unknowns
(yis) might remain. This is unlike when using the techniques preented in the previous
section where at every point in the binary the top of the stackbecomes known after solving
all equations and setting all unknowns to ones. If stack height is not known, we use a run
time global variable to represent the current stack height and use it to index a global array
that simulates the physical floating point stack. The challenge here is to make correct
transfers between using local variables when the stack height is known to using the global
runtime variables when the stack height is not known.
To convert floating point stack accesses into variable accesses in the IR, we follow
the rules stated in figure 4.5. The left hand side shows the original binary instruction,
and the right hand side shows the instruction that has to be emitted into the IR. Below we
discuss these rules.
For any instruction accessing a floating point register where the TOP value is known,
we do a direct translation to IR local floating point variables since we know exactly which
variable the instruction is accessing. For instructions accessing floating point registers
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# Binary instruction IR code inserted 
1 I = op (st(i)), TOPb(I) = constant I = op (PSTTOPb (I)-1-i) 
2 
I = op (st(i)), TOPb(I) ≠ constant 
Assume C(I) = StackDiff of instruction I 
I = op (GST[TOP-1-i]) 
TOP = TOP + C(I) 
3 
I = call F, F is known statically (direct call) 
U(F) = true, TOP(I) is known 
Note: If arguments are passed, they are copied to the local 
variables of the callees at their entries 
//Pass arguments only if TOPb(I) is known 
Call F (PSTTOPb(I) – 1 - i, PSTTOPb(I) - i, …, PST0) 
//Move from globals to locals 
for (i=0: TOP(I)) 
     PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 = GST[TOPb(I) – I – 1]  
4 
I = call F, F is known statically (direct call) 
U(F) = false, TOP(I) is known 
Note: If arguments are passed, they are copied to the local 
variables of the callees at their entries 
//Pass arguments only if TOPb(I) is known 
Call F (PSTTOPb(I) – 1 - i, PSTTOPb(I) - i, …, PST0, 
&retArg0, &retArg1, …, &retArgTOP(I) - 1) 
//Move from return pointers to locals 
for (i=0: TOP(I)-1) 
     PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 = retArgi  
5 I = call F, F is unknown statically (indirect call) 
TOP = zero 
Call call_translator 
//Read the return from global 
PST0 = GST[0]   //Remove if Xi is zero here 
6 
I = jmp L, L is not known and unresolved 
TOPb(I) = constant 
for (i=0: TOPb(I)-1) 
     GST[TOPb(I) – I – 1] = PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 




Before entry point instruction I of a function F only 
reachable indirectly, yI is known 
for (i=0: yI-1) 
     PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 = GST[TOPb(I) – I – 1]  
8 
Before entry point instruction I of a function F reachable 
directly, yI is known 
F (arg0, arg1, …, argyi-1) { 
for (i=0: yI-1) 




I = return, TOPb (I) is known 
returned to function is unknown OR 
there exists F where F is a returned to function, U(F) = true 
for (i=0: TOPb(I)-1) 
     GST[TOPb(I) – I – 1] = PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 
     retArgi = PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 //when applicable 
Return 
10 
I = return, TOPb (I) is known 
Any other case than above 
for (i=0: TOP(I)-1) 
     retArgi = PSTTOPb(I) – I – 1 
return 
U(F) = true if F or one if its direct callees has an indirect branch that is unresolved. 
Figure 4.5: Translation to IR rules when some indirect jumpsare unresolved
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where the TOP value is not known, we use the global floating point array as well as the
global variable representing the TOP value.
For direct calls, if the callee has unresolved indirect jumps then it will be using the
global variables to represent the floating point stack. Uponreturn from the callee, we
make sure that the global variables are updated correctly. After the return, if the TOP
value is known, we copy the contents of the global variables into the local variables such
that instructions start using the local variables correctly. If the TOP value is known before
the call, floating point local variables are passed as arguments to the callee.
For indirect calls, we have an assumption that before such calls the stack top value
should be zero. We copy this to the global TOP value in case thecall e is using the globals
to represent the floating point stack operations. Before returning from all functions that
can be called indirectly, we make sure to update the global variables contents (if locals
were used).
Before indirect jumps that are unresolved, we copy the stack vlues from local
variables to the global variables (in case the local variables were used before the jump).
The general translator function is used in the indirect branch to redirect control to the
correct IR function. The global TOP variable is updated also.
For all of this to work, if some functions that can be called inirectly have a known
TOP value on their entry point, the floating point variables are copied from the global
variables to the local ones. For functions reachable directly, if they have floating point




In this section, we prove that all the techniques presented ithis section will produce
a correct IR with respect to floating point stack operations.We show first a proof of the
simple technique when all indirect jumps are resolved, thenw proceed to proving the
general technique when some indirect jumps are not resolvedcorrectly.
Definition 4.1 an fp-functionalrewritten binary is a rewritten binary that executes
correctly with respect to floating point accesses which means that any floating point value
that is being read/written into a floating point register in the original binary results in
reading/writing the same value to some floating point variable in the rewritten binary
when executed.
When we prove the correctness of our floating point stack recovery techniques pre-
sented before, we prove that our rewritten binaries compiled from the recovered IR are
fp-functional. To prove this, we usually prove that we track the original binary’s TOP of
the floating point stack value correctly.
Lemma 4.1 Under the assumptions stated in section 4.3, if algorithm 6 returns
false, then solving the equations resulting from the propagation rules in figure 4.2 and
setting the remaining unknowns to ones will always ensure that t e rewritten binary is
fp-functional.
Proof Suppose the input binary has no direct or indirect calls. TheTOP of the stack
is tracked correctly for every program point since instructions are always known to the
static analyzer and no uncertainty happens. Since the recovered TOP is exactly equal to
the original TOP value in the input binary, the lemma holds inth s case.
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Now, if the binary have direct calls, the callee functions will always be known
to our static techniques and hence no uncertainty occurs in recoveringTOP(I) for any
instructionI. Hence the lemma also holds in this case.
The only uncertainty occurs when some indirect control transfers happen. Indirect
control transfers are either indirect calls or indirect branches.
For indirect calls, uncertainty happens when someXis are set to one conservatively.
An Xi represents the top of the stack after the return from indirect call site i. Per our
second and third assumptions in section 4.3,max (Xi) = 1. If the actual call site in the
input binary does not return any floating point value and we set Xi to one conservatively,
the lemma still holds since the input binary will never have any ccess to the additional
non-existing return value that we created in the IR. The binary h s to push some element
to the stack before reading it. In this case, the recoveredTOP(I) for any instruction
I will always be one plus the original value during both stack writes and reads which
guarantees correct behavior.
Regarding indirect branches, Since the check in algorithm 6 fails, this means either
all indirect branches are resolved, or no indirect branch target can access the floating
point stack. In case all indirect branches are resolved, their targets are known to the static
analyzer and hence the recoveredTOP(I) for any instructionI will be tracked correctly
and hence the lemma holds. If some indirect branches are unresolved, and it is known
that none of their targets can access the floating point stack, hen no problem occurs in
this case since no floating point register is accessed.
Lemma 4.2For a direct call instructionIF in the IR calling functionF . Let the
first IR instruction inF be I. If TOPb(I) is known, thenTOPb(IF ) cannot be unknown
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and vice-versa.
ProofSince the propagation rules in figure 4.4 assign the same symbolic expression
to bothTOPb(IF ) andTOPb(I), then if one of them is known, the other is automatically
known and vice versa.
Lemma 4.3For a return instructionIR in the IR returning to functionF that can
be determined statically. LetI be any call site toF . If TOP(I) is known, thenTOPb(IR)
cannot be unknown and vice versa.
Proof Can be proved in a similar way to lemma (4.2).
Lemma 4.4Under the assumptions stated in section 4.3, if algorithm 6 returns true,
then the IR recovery rules stated in figure 4.5 will always ensure that any floating point
value that is being read/written into a floating point register in the original binary results
in reading/writing the same value to some floating point variable in the rewritten binary
when executed.
Proof From the first two translation rules in figure 4.5, at any instruction I that
can access the floating point stack, the IR uses either the local variablesPSTwhen the
TOPb(I) value is known, or the global arrayGST[] if the TOPb(I) value is unknown.
If we guarantee correct flow of floating point values between local variables (PSTs) and
global variables (GSTs) in the IR, we can prove this lemma.
To make it easier to understand the proof, we introduce the following claims. If all
these claims are true, the proof can be constructed in a simple way. We assume they are
true, prove the lemma, then state the proof of each claim individually.
Claim A: For a trace of IR instructions containing no calls or returns, letI be the first
instruction in the trace, ifTOPb(I) is statically known and local variablesPSTx contain
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all live floating point values atI that are stored in order starting fromx = 0 until x =
TOP b(I)− 1, then this trace isfp-functional.
Claim B: For a trace of IR instructions containing no calls or returns, let I be
the first instruction in the trace, ifTOPb(I) is statically unknown, then this trace isfp-
functionalgiven the following two conditions: 1) The global variableTOPcontains the
valueTOPb(I) before executingI. 2) The global arrayGST[x] contains all live floating
point values atI that are stored in order starting fromx = 0 until x = TOP b(I)− 1.
Claim C: ∀F ∈ FuncsK whereFuncsKrepresents the set of IR functions with a
statically known entry pointTOPb(I) whereI is the first instruction inF , let IF be any
call site ofF , the local variablePSTx atF entry point contains one of the following values
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ TOP b(I)− 1:










PST x(before IF ), TOP b(IF ) is known
GST [x](before IF ), TOP b(IF ) is unknown
(4.1)
Claim D: ∀F ∈ FuncsU whereFuncsUrepresents the set of IR functions with a
statically unknown entry pointTOPb(I) whereI is the first instruction inF , let IF be
any call site ofF , all the following is true before executingI: 1) Global variableTOP
contains the valueTOPb(IF ). 2) Global variableGST[x] contains one of the following
values for all0 ≤ x ≤ TOP b(I)− 1:










PST x(before IF ), TOP b(IF ) is known
GST [x](before IF ), TOP b(IF ) is unknown
(4.2)
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Claim E: ∀I ∈ CallSitesK whereCallSitesKrepresents the set of all IR call sites
with a statically knownTOP(I), let F be any actual function that can be called fromI
(possibly through a call translator) and letIR represent any return instruction insideF ,
the local variablePSTx afterI has one of the following two values:










PST x(before IR), TOP b(IR) is known
GST [x](before IR), TOP b(IR) is unknown
(4.3)
Claim F: ∀I ∈ CallSitesU whereCallSitesUrepresents the set of all IR call sites
with a statically unknownTOP(I), let F be any actual function that can be called from
I (possibly through a call translator) and letIR represent any return instruction insideF ,
all the following is true after executingIR and returning toF : 1) Global variableTOP
contains the valueTOPb(IR). 2) Global variableGST[x] contains one of the following
values for all0 ≤ x ≤ TOP b(IR)− 1:










PST x(before IR), TOP b(IR) is known
GST [x](before IR), TOP b(IR) is unknown
(4.4)
Claims A and B state correct and functional execution traces with no calls or returns.
Claims C and D ensure correct floating point values flow from call instructions to the
functions being called. Claims E and F ensure correct floatingpoint values flow from
return instructions to the call sites.
Assuming claims A through F are correct. We can use mathematical induction to
prove lemma (4.4) as discussed below.
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Assuming the dynamic execution of the rewritten binary is divided inton instruc-
tion traces separated by calls/returns and ending with the program termination.n can be
arbitrary large and cannot be computed statically, but we donot seek calculatingn, rather
we will use mathematical induction onn to prove the lemma.
Base case: n = 1 Since the entry point has a zero top of the stack (according to
our assumptions), there is no live floating point values at the race entry and hence lemma
(4.4) is true as a direct result of applying claim (A).
Inductive case: Assuming tracen is fp-functional, we want to prove that tracen+1
is alsofp-functional.
There are two cases: either a call instruction separates thetwo traces, or a return
instruction separates the two traces. We discuss every caseindividually. For both cases,
we assume that the live floating point values are stored corretly in tracen since it is
fp-functional.
1) If a call instructionIF separates the two traces, let the callee beF with instruction
I the first instruction in functionF (the first instruction in tracen+1). We have four cases
depending on if we statically know the valuesTOP b(IF ) andTOP b(I). Each of the cases
is proved in table 4.1.
2) If a return instructionIR separates the two traces, let the returned to function be
F with instructionI being the call instruction that was used to reachF . We have four
cases depending on if we statically know the valuesTOP b(IR) andTOP(I). Each of
the cases can be proved in a very similar way to the previous case in table 4.1 but using
Claims (E) and (F) instead of claims (C) and (D).
Below we discuss the proofs of every claim from the above.
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TOP b(IF ) TOP b(I) Proof
X X Both tracesn andn+1 are using the global arrayGST[] as
per rule (2) in figure 4.5.
Claim (D) guarantees that the global arrayGST[] will not
change in this case across the call.




Tracen uses the global arrayGST[x] but tracen + 1 will
be using local variablesPST[x] as per rules (1) and (2) in
figure 4.5.
Claim (C) guarantees that the global arrayGST[x] will be
copied over to local variablesPST[x] in F .




X Tracen uses local variablesPST[x] but tracen+ 1 is using
the global arrayGST[x] as per rules (1) and (2) in figure 4.5.
Claim (D) guarantees that local variablesPST[x] will be
copied over to the global arrayGST[x] before callingF .
Applying Claim (B) to tracen + 1 proves lemma (4.4) in
this case.
√ √
Both tracesn andn + 1 are using the local variablesPSTx
as per rule (1) in figure 4.5.
The local variables in this case are in different functions.
Claim (C) guarantees that the local variablesPSTx in the
caller are copied to the local variablesPSTx in the callee
(F ).
Applying Claim (A) to tracen + 1 proves lemma (4.4) in
this case.
Table 4.1: Proofs of Lemma (4.4) for tracen+ 1 if reachable using a call instruction
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Claim A ProofSince the trace of instruction with no call/returns represent a binary
trace that is completely known to the static analyzer, the recov redTOP(I ′) value at any
instructionI ′ in this trace is statically determinable with respect to thetrace entry point
TOPb(I) whereI is the trace entry instruction. Given that all floating pointvariables are
stored correctly to local variablesPSTx before the trace entry, any instruction that reads
these values will get them from the samePSTx variables as per rule (1) in figure 4.5.
Claim B ProofCan be constructed using the same argument in the proof of claim
(A) but referring to the global variablesGST[x] instead of local variables and rule (2)
instead of rule (1) in figure 4.5.
Claim C ProofInstructionI in F is either reachable using a direct call, indirect call,
or an unresolved indirect jump. We discuss every case below:1) Direct calls: according
to lemma (4.2),TOPb(IF ) is known in this case and hence rules (3) and (4) in figure 4.5
govern the direct calls in this case. In both rules, the localvariables are passed directly
as arguments toF and insideF they are then copied to local variables as per rule (8) in
figure 4.5. The stack height at the call site cannot be known inthis case according to
lemma (4.2).
2) Indirect calls will always have zero TOP of the stack beforthe call site as per
our second assumption in section 4.3 and hence no transfer ofva iables is required in this
case. Rule (5) in figure 4.5 sets the global variableTOPto zero at the call site.
3) At unresolved indirect jumps, ifTOPb(IF ) is known, local variables are copied
to the corresponding globals in rule (6). IfTOPb(IF ) is not known, globals are already up
to date according to rule (2). InsideF , globals are copied back to locals insideF as per
rule (7).
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Claim D ProofCan be proved using similar argument to claim (C) proof above.
Will only write the relevant rules for each case below: 1) Direct calls: they have to have
an unknown stack height as per lemma (4.2) and hence global vari bles remain to be used.
2) Indirect calls: have to have a zero stack height on their front and hence no transfer
is required.
3) Unresolved indirect jumps: globals are updated according to rule (6). The same
argument in the claim C proof applies here.
Claim E ProofHere the stack height after call siteI is known, hence local variables
have to be updated afterI. I can only be reachable through a return instruction. We have
two cases:
1) If TOPb(IR) is known: either rule (9) or rule (10) applies in this case as follows:
• In case the return cannot be statically proven to return toI, or I ’s parent function
has one or more unresolved jumps, then the globals are updated in rule (9). The
return will come back to a call translator function in the IR which returns back to
either an indirect call site or to an unresolved indirect jump site. For indirect calls,
rule (5) will copyPST0 from the global array. For unresolved indirect jumps, they
return back to some call site as per rule (6). This call site will haveU(F ) = true
and rule (3) will copy variables from the globals back to locals.
• If the return can be proven to return to some IR function whoseindirect jumps are
all resolved, then rule (10) applies and return arguments are propagated. Rule (4)
propagates the return arguments back to local variables aftr I.
2) If TOPb(IR) is unknown, no transfers are required. The globals will be ready at
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IR as per rule (2). According to lemma (4.3),IR cannot be statically proven to return to
I since in this caseI would have an unknownTOP(I) which is not the case. For non-
statically resolvable returns, they are handled the same way as in the previous case (1)
above in this same proof.
Claim F ProofCan be proved using similar arguments to claim (E) above. We show
a summary of which rules apply here.
1) If TOPb(IR) is known: As per lemma (4.3),IR will not be statically proven to
return toI since in this caseTOP(I) would have been known which is not the case. Return
site updates globals in rule (9). Rule (2) will use these globals at the call sites.
2) If TOPb(IR) is not known: globals are already used both at the return sites and
also at the call sites per rule (2). No transfer is needed in this case.
4.7 Results
In this section, we show the effectiveness of our techniquesin identifying floating
point stack variables.
In all of our experiments, the check described in algorithm 6returns false which
means that we did not need to do any global adjustments to the floating point stack vari-
ables in any of our tests. The reason behind this is that our jump table heuristics are very
accurate and resolve most of the indirect jumps. SecondWriteimplements a modified
version of the heuristics described in [14]. Almost 100% of the indirect branches are
resolved (by knowing all their targets) statically. For theunresolved ones, the indirectly
called functions in these cases were never detected to access the floating point stack.
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We show the percentage of the symbolic values that were not solved using our linear
solver and required the conservative assumption ofXi = 1. As mentioned in chapter
4, the main challenge while decoding the floating point stackis to identify whether an
indirect or an external call is modifying the floating point stack height. According to our
assumptions, whenever we are not sure about an indirect or anexternal call site, we decide
conservatively that it is modifying the floating point stackby pushing a single value. We
show how often we took that conservative decision in different binaries.
All register allocated floating point stack variables were recovered correctly and all
the rewritten benchmarks ran correctly and produced correct answers. The conservative
decision taken does not affect correctness as we explained in chapter 4. It only adds extra
return values to some indirect and external calls and this might reflect adding more return
values to internal functions as well.














% of conservative decisions taken
Optimized
Non Optimized
Figure 4.6: Conservative floating point decisions for Windows
Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of the unknown calls for which we took the conser-
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Figure 4.7: Conservative floating point decisions for Linux
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vative decision in the subset of the benchmarks that we were able to compile on Microsoft
Visual Studio 2010. Figure 4.7 shows the results on Linux binaries. On average, we took
the conservative decision 28% of the time for non-optimizedexecutables and 25% of the
time for optimized ones. This means we are able to identify the exact floating point argu-
ments and returns for more than 72% of the indirect and external calls on average. We are
not aware of any work that identifies such information. Optimized binaries often have less
variables than non-optimized binaries which translates toless floating point stack usage
and less number of times when the conservative decision is taken. This is true in most
of the cases, but in some cases the optimized binaries are chall nging because they have
fewer control flow edges. One example of this behavior is ‘hmmer’ where the optimized
binary has much less control flow join points and hence much less number of equations
and higher conservative decision ratio. The conservative decision is usually taken more
often in C++ binaries because they have more indirect calls than C and Fortran binaries.
4.8 Related Work
We are not aware of any work done to recover floating point stack v riables except
Hex-Rays [31]. Hex-Rays produces inline assembly in case it cannot resolve the variables
which is not acceptable for our goal. There is no published work on the details of their
techniques as well as how often it fails to identify variables from low level stack accesses.
None of the static and dynamic binary rewriting tools like PIN [48], BIRD [52],
ATOM [28], PLTO [60], Boomerang [26], Jakstab [36], UQBT [16],Bitblaze (BAP) [9]
and CodeSurfer/X86 [50] decodes the x86 floating point stack into variables. None of
149
those tools employ a compiler level intermediate format, like LLVM IR or similar; rather
they define their own low-level custom intermediate format.
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Chapter 5: Recovering Memory Allocated Variables and Data Types
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present static analyses that can recovers urce level variable and
type information from x86 binaries as large as millions of instructions in a few minutes.
The produced information is as accurate as the current stateof th art x86 binary analysis
systems with much faster and scalable analysis. The recovered information is represented
in a high level compiler IR that is completely functional andproduces a correct rewritten
executable when recompiled. Our static techniques combinefunctionality, precision and
scalability; features that collectively do not exist in today’s binary analysis tools.
This chapter presents an important step towards a system that rewrites executables
into a functional high-level program representation and incorporates as much source level
information as possible in a scalable manner. This chapter has the following contributions:
• It presents a highly scalable mechanism for identifying variables and types which
is orders of magnitude faster than current analysis techniques. Our techniques do
not rely on symbol or debug information to be present in binaries.
• It presents practical techniques to emit the recovered datatypes from binaries into
a high level IR. The emitted types include scalars, pointers,arrays, structures and
151
recursive data structures.
• It is evaluated and shown to recover accurate and precise information from C, C++,
and Fortran binaries obtained from the SPEC2006 benchmarks suite; compiled us-
ing two different compilers in a reasonable amount of time.
This chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 5.2 gives an overview about the
variables and data types identification problem. Section 5.3 represents our variables re-
covery technique. Section 5.4 presents our data type recovery techniques for the variables
discovered in the binary. Section 5.5 shows how we emit data types into the recovered
IR including pointer and recursive data types. Section 5.6 discusses the correctness of
the IR recovered and the algorithms termination guarantees. S ction 5.7 shows how our
variable recovery techniques can still work for inaccuratefunction boundaries. Section
5.8 shows a detailed evaluation of the techniques presentedand section 5.9 presents a
literature review about the variables and data types recovery from binaries.
5.2 Variable and Type Recovery - Challenges and Intuitions
Variable and type recovery from executables is a hard problem cause symbol ta-
bles are absent. Every memory-allocated variable access inthe source code is represented
by a memory store or load in the executable. Those memory accesses are either direct
accesses to locations represented by constant addresses, or indirect memory accesses to
locations represented by some register value.
Direct memory accesses can be used to infer variable information by examining
the constant memory address being accessed, but indirect memory accesses are unknown
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accesses and need more advanced memory analysis to reveal the underlying memory
locations. That is why pointer analysis is important while recovering variables and data
types from executables since it reveals what are the possible memory locations an indirect
memory reference can possibly access.
Researchers in this field know this and the best known variabledentification tech-
nique from executables (DIVINE [4]) uses an advanced memoryanalysis technique called
value set analysis [5], which is a generalized form of alias analysis for binaries built on
top of the aggregate structures identification algorithm [54]. DIVINE presents accurate
variable identification that detects 88% of the memory-allocated variables in executables.
The problem with DIVINE is that it is not scalable and requires a very long time to an-
alyze even small programs. Our aim is to present techniques with the same accuracy as
DIVINE, but run orders of magnitudes faster.
Scalable source-level pointer analysis techniques (like Ste nsgaard’s analysis [65])
cannot be used on executables since executables lack variables and data types information.
A custom pointer analysis technique has to be implemented for this purpose.
Our key insight that enables scalability is that efficient variable detection and type
recovery do not require a sound pointer analysis. Unsound pointer analysis usually means
incomplete points-to sets. As an example, if variablex points toy andz, an unsound
pointer analysis might reportx points toy only. Usually unsound pointer analysis is un-
acceptable, but variable detection from executables is a bet-effort analysis and no method
claims to detect 100% of the variables. If we are going to misssome variables anyways
because of the nature of the problem we are solving, then we can sacrifice the soundness
of the analysis at the expense of losing some variable information – as losing variablez
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in the given example above, but with the gains of having a practic l analysis that scales
well for large executables.
The correctness of the recovered IR, while missing some variables due to the un-
sound pointer analysis, comes from the fact that the relativordering between variables
in the memory layout is maintained in the recovered IR. For example, if we detect two
integer local variables at offsets 0 and 20 on a stack frame ofsize 24 bytes, we will lay
out those variables in a structure which has the following three members: a) An inte-
ger in the range [0-3]. b) A generic array of bytes in the range[4-19]. c) An integer in
the range [20-23]. Preserving the layout of the variables inuch a structure maintains
the correctness of any indirect memory access to this region. The arrays inserted fill the
unknown gaps between variables and maintain the memory layout. This representation
helps understanding what variables are detected along withtheir types, and at the same
time maintains the functionality of the rewritten program.
We introduce the concept of a best-effort pointer analysis;where the identified
points-to set of each pointer may not be complete, but we terminate the analysis in a
certain amount of time nevertheless to prevent it from taking too long even before it con-
verges. This analysis is not correct given the usual criteria for correctness, but suffices
in the way we use it to identify as many discrete variables as possible. Our best-effort
pointer analysis is a flow and context insensitive data flow analysis that has the following
properties:
• It limits the cardinality of the points-to sets to a fixed number.
• It does not track interprocedural information via indirectcalls.
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• The number of analysis iterations is set to a fixed number.
Having the above relaxations makes our analysis much fastert an extremely small
loss in precision. The intuition behind this is as follows: a) A flow and context sensitive
pointer analysis is not needed since the variables usually hve the same size and type
in all flows and contexts of a program. Some exceptions to thismight happen which
is not common in the programs. b) Limiting the cardinality ofpoints-to sets does not
affect the precision that much since only few variables willhave large points-to sets. c)
Propagating interprocedural information through indirect calls will only affect functions
which are only called indirectly. Those functions are stillanalyzed, but their arguments
will have unknown points-to sets. Given that there are relatively few such functions in
executables, skipping their arguments propagation is not abig loss. d) Limiting the total
number of iterations will only affect longer chains of pointers. For example, the first
iteration will always reveal some pointers. The second willreveal two-level (double)
pointers. Subsequent iterations reveal more pointer levels. Usually most variables do not
have more than four level pointers, which means subsequent itera ions will only reveal
very little information.
5.3 Best Effort Static Variable Recovery
We show in this section how a simple best-effort pointer analysis can be used for
identifying variables. This pointer analysis should be suitable to run on executables where
no variables are identified yet. We could have modified current memory analysis schemes
on executables like [5] to fit our needs, but we show a simpler analysis with similar
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precision and much better scalability.
Before we begin the analysis, we identify all base memory regions n the executable.
An executable has the following three base memory regions.
1. The global memory region where global variables are located.
2. The stack memory region where local variables inside functio s are located. Stack
regions are allocated at the beginning of a function and deallocated at the end of the
function.
3. The heap memory region where dynamically allocated variables are usually located.
Those are identified by detecting calls to functions likemalloc andnew in the
executable.
Every detected memory-allocated variable is represented by an abstraction called
ALoc which stands for Abstract Location. The name is similar to the name used by
DIVINE [4]. An ALoccontains an offset inside a base memory region and a size repr-
senting the variable size. Variables allocated to registers are represented by IR symbols
which represent the SSA form of those registers.
Our pointer analysis conservatively assumes that every detected variable can be
a pointer. We assign points-to sets to every IR symbol and detected ALoc. When the
analysis is done, the actual pointers are identified by tracking if the corresponding points-
to sets are not empty.
We implement the points-to sets using the efficient LLVM spare bit vector data
structure. For every base memory region, we assign it a series of unique bits where the
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number of bits equals the size of the region in bytes. If the siz of the base memory region
is not known (usually in heap allocated arrays), we assume anarbitrary size. This allows
us to detect variables with offsets up to that size. Whenever an access is detected beyond
that arbitrary size, we do not track it. This is an important part of our best-effort analysis
that allows us to recover a subset of the variables on un-sized base memory regions instead
of totally giving up on them as the case in DIVINE [4]. Whenevera symbol or an ALoc
points to some variable in a certain memory region, the bit corresponding to the starting
address of the variable will be set to one. The number of bits set to one equals the number
of variables pointed to by a symbol or an ALoc.
Table 5.1 shows our detailed propagation rules for the best-effort pointer analysis
as well as for detecting the variables. We introduce the following definitions to ease the
understanding:
1. PtSet(x): takes an ALoc or an IR symbolx and retrieves its points-to set ‘bit-
vector’.
2. ALocs(x): takes a bit-vectorx and retrieves the set of ALocs starting at the ad-
dresses that correspond to the set-bits in the bit vectorx.
3. UpdateALocs(x,y): takes a bit-vectorx and a sizey and creates ALocs starting at
the addresses corresponding to the set-bits in the bit-vector x with the given sizey.
If existing ALocs overlap the new ALocs, the new and old ALocswill be split into
smaller ALocs to avoid the overlap.
4. UpdateStructure(x,y): takes a bit-vectorx and a numbery. It defines a set of struc-
tures starting at the addresses corresponding to the set-bit in the bit-vectorx. Each
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storey, x (store valuey to lo-
cationx of sizeS)
∀ z ∈ ALocs(PtSet(x)) :
PtSet(z) ∪ = PtSet(y)
Variables: UpdateALocs (PtSet(x), S)
y = loadx (load locationx of
sizeS to y)
∀ z∈ ALocs(PtSet(x)) :
PtSet(y) ∪ = PtSet(z)
Variables: UpdateScalar (PtSet(x), S)
y = x PtSet(y) = PtSet(x)
y = x + z , PtSet(x) is not
empty
if z is a constanthen
PtSet(y) = PtSet(x) >> z
Variables:
if z is a constanthen
UpdateStructure (PtSet(x), z)
else ifz has SCEV bounds and stridethen
UpdateArray (PtSet(y), stride, bounds)
Table 5.1: Points-to sets propagation and variable detection rules
158
structure has its last member at offsety. If a structure already starts at one of the
starting addresses, its last member offset will be updated with the maximum of the
existing offset and the new one (y).
5. UpdateArray(x,y,z): takes a bit-vectorx, a numbery representing a stride, and an-
other numberz representing the upper bound of the array. It defines arrays st rting
at the addresses corresponding to the set-bits in the bit-vector x. Each array has a
maximum sizez. The arrays will be declared to have an element sizey. Existing
arrays will be merged with the new declared ones and the element size will be set
to one if overlapping arrays have conflicting element sizes.
Here we describe briefly the propagation rules in table 5.1. For a store instruction,
the points-to sets of the ALocs pointed to by the pointer operand will be unioned with the
points-to set of the value stored. This is called a weak update in he domain of pointer
analysis. A load will set the loaded value points-to set to whatever is pointed to by the
pointer operand. Stores and loads will create ALocs as they are resolved using the Up-
dateALocs function described earlier. For pointer arithmetic, the points-to sets will be
shifted right according to the positive constant added. If the constant is negative, the shift
will become to the left. Adding a constant to a pointer is a hint about the existence of a
structure where the pointer address is the start address, and the constant represents one
field offset inside the structure. We use this hint and declara structure identified by the
starting address and the last member offset. The structure’s last member offset might be
updated in subsequent pointer arithmetic operations that sart from the same base. The
structure’s last member offset will eventually be the maximum observed constant that was
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added to the pointer in the program. Adding a non-constant value is an indication that an
array exists. An array will be declared in this case. We use the Scalar EVolution (SCEV)
analysis by LLVM to deduce the bounds and the stride of the arithmetic and use this in-
formation to describe the array. If such information is not present, we do not declare an
array.
The more pointer analysis rounds done, the more ALocs, structures and arrays are
identified in all base memory regions. More pointer analysisrounds help identifying
multi-level pointers since the first round will always reveal single level pointers. The
second round will propagate the points-to sets for those ALocs and identify their points-
to sets leading to the identification of two level pointers. More rounds will reveal more
levels.
After all iterations are done, collected information aboutarrays gets resolved. For
every base memory region, we fill in the gaps between ALocs using arrays. The bounds
and stride information are available from our earlier propagation. If no bounds are avail-
able, previously defined ALocs are used as bounds. If no stride information is available,
a stride of one is used which means the array is an array of bytes. Overlapping arrays are
combined into one bigger array as described earlier.
At the end of this process, a structure hierarchy is created based on the structure
information calculated for every base memory region. Usingthe starting and ending off-
sets previously calculated for every structure, we construct nested hierarchy structures.
We define inner and outer structures such that any outer structure must have its starting
address less than any starting address of any nested inner structure, and its ending ad-
dress larger than any ending address of any nested inner structure. This nested structure
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hierarchy is used to emit structure data types in the IR as we will explain later in this
chapter.
5.4 Data Type Recovery
Data type recovery aims at representing every symbol in the IR with a meaningful
type. It declares a map between every symbol in the IR and the corr sponding detected
data type. It uses this map to rewrite the complete IR such that the instructions use the
detected types instead of the generic types that are used by SecondWrite.
Without integrating type recovery with some pointer analysis, detected types will
be less accurate because of two reasons: 1) Instructions like memory loads and stores will
usually be untyped since there is no memory tracking possible. 2) Multi-level pointer
types will not be detected because there is no way to track them without having some sort
of pointer analysis.
To achieve the goal of typing memory accesses and IR symbols;and detecting
multi-level pointer types, we integrate our best-effort pointer analysis and variable recov-
ery techniques described above with our type recovery system. Any other pointer analysis
like [5] can be theoretically used, but will be orders of magnitude slower which makes it
less practical in large executables. That is the disadvantage of TIE [43] which is the state
of the art binary type recovery technique.
Integrating our variable identification system with type recovery makes the type
recovery simpler because it will need only recover scalar types like integers, floats and
doubles. Structures and arrays are detected as part of the variable identification. A pointer
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is detected if the points-to set of the corresponding ALoc orIR symbol is not empty. In
this case, we get the ALocs pointed to by that pointer and typehem according to our
rules. We keep doing this for longer pointer chains as needed.
A = call foo (arg1, ...,argn)
foo has the known prototype:
retType foo (type1, ..., typen)
∀ x ∈ [1,n]
setType(argx, typex)
setType(A, retType)
A = B opC
op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /,%, >>,<<}
op has type:opType





op1 = φ (op2, ...,opn)
op1 = typecastop2 to type
unifyType({op1, ...,opn})
Table 5.2: Typing rules
Table 5.2 shows the most important typing rules we have. There are two main type
sources. a) Known external function calls like standard C/C++library calls. For those, we
set the types of actual arguments passed to be the same as the known argument types from
the prototypes and we do the same thing for the return value. b) Arithmetic operations
with non-pointers: in this case the type is deduced from the semantics of the operation
itself – whether it is an integer or a floating point operation–. We use the functionsetType
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to update the type of the symbol or the ALoc in the type map we declar . For pointer
types, we type the ALocs represented by the points-to sets ofthe corresponding variables.
For the other operations in the table, we propagate the typesusing the functionuni-
fyType. This function attempts to set the data type of all the given symbols and ALocs
to be the same. At least one of the symbols or the ALocs given tothat function should
be typed. Whenever this function finds conflicting types, it gives up and does not update
any types. It is used for copy operations like type casts and phi nodes. It is also used to
propagate types through memory as shown in the rules for stores and loads. Interproce-
dural information is propagated by unifying the formal and actu l arguments types at a
call instruction. The return value data type at the call sitei unified with all the data types
of all return values appearing in the return statements inside the called function body.
5.5 IR Data Types Emission Algorithm
After recovering variables and data types information fromthe techniques presented
in the previous two sections, we proceed to express this information in the IR such that
end users can use this information right away.
The data type emission process we present in this section aims at producing an IR
which has the following three properties:
1. The IR is readable with as many recovered data types expressed in the IR as possi-
ble.
2. The IR is correct which means that users can take the IR, recompile it and still
produce a correct rewritten binary that produces the same answers as the input
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binary.
3. The IR contains recursive data types if applicable.
Achieving all three goals together is challenging. The readability goal usually con-
flicts with the correctness goal since our recovered types might not be 100% accurate.
Recursive data structures are hard to emit in the IR. For example, if an original binary
has a linked list, the recovered information will be a structure with two fields, the first
field is the element and the second field is a pointer to the sametructure. Before emitting
the complete structure, the type emission will need to referto the same structure that is
being emitted which might result in an infinite loop if the type emission algorithm does
not specifically account for this case. In fact, this is one reason why the state of the art
type recovery system called TIE [43] does not recover such reursive data types.
It is important to mention that we do not recover any shapes ofthe data types. We
cannot distinguish a linked list from a tree or a graph. We only recover structures and
pointers that might refer to the same structures. Other shape analysis techniques can run
on our recovered IR to detect this kind of information.
The pseudo code in figure 5.1 shows how we choose a data type to emit for a certain
point to setbitset. For an IR symbol or an ALoc, we first obtain its points-to set and then
execute the algorithm in figure 5.1. If an IR symbol or an ALoc des not have a points-to
set, we either get the recovered scalar type or return a generic type if no scalar type is
recovered. The initial execution of the functiongetEmittedTypeshown in figure 5.1 will
haveignoreStructsset to false andchainedBitSetset to an empty bit vector.
Lines (1) and (2) of the code returns the cached type of the curr nt bit vector if any.
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Type* getEmittedType (bitset, ignoreStructs = false, chainedBitSet = empty) { 
(1) if  (!ignoreStructs && cachedType(bitset))  
(2)      return  getCachedType(bitset)  
(3) if (chainedBitSet ∩ bitset is not empty) //Circular pointer 
(4)  return  getGenericPointerType () 
(5) else  
(6)  chainedBitSet = chainedBitSet ∪ bitset  
(7) if  (!ignoreStructs && isStartOfStruct(bitset)) //Structure 
(8)  returnType = getStructType(bitset, structHierarchy(bitset)) 
(9) else if  (isStartOfArray(bitset)) //Array 
(10)  returnType = ArrayType (getScalarType(bitset))  
(11) else if  (hasScalarType(bitset)) //scalar type  
(12)  returnType = getScalarType (bitset) 
(13) else if  (P2Set(bitset) is not empty) //pointer type 
(14)  returnType = PointerType (getEmittedType (P2Set(bitset),         
     ignoreStructs, chainedBitSet) 
(15) else   
(16)  return  getGenericScalarType () //non-identified type 
(17) cahcedType (bitset) = returnType //store to cache 
(18) return  returnType 
} 
 
 Figure 5.1: The type emission algorithm
We use type caching for two reasons: 1) It speeds up the type emission process. 2) It is
necessary for recovering recursive data structures as we show later in this section. The
cache is updated at line (17) in the algorithm.
Lines (3) through (6) of the code are inserted to avoid infinite loops while emitting
IR data types. Infinite loops come when a circular pointer is detected where some pointer
type is detected to point to itself, or to point to some other chain of pointer types among
which one of them points back to the first pointer type. We callthis a circular pointer
data type. We do not allow emitting circular pointer data types except for recursive data
structures where pointers point to detected structures notto scalars as we show next. If a
circular pointer is detected, we return back a generic pointer data type (we still know it is
a pointer, but lose the information about what it points to).
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The code in figure 5.1 then proceeds to emit different type catgories accordingly.
The code is showing type emission for memory locations, but avery similar technique is
used to emit types for IR symbols representing use points. Weshow every emitted data
type category below.
Scalar Data Types: Lines (11) and (12) emit a scalar data type (like int, float,
double, char, ...). The data type is already recovered from the techniques in the previous
section. We only emit a scalar data type if the bit vector is not detected to point to an
array or a structure.
The functiongetScalarTypereturns a recovered scalar type if all the ALocs pointed
to by the bit vectorbitsethave the same scalar type. If there is a conflict, a generic scalar
type is returned.
Pointer Data Types: Lines (13) and (14) emit a pointer data type if the bit vector
bitsetis detected to have a non-empty points-to set. We run the function getEmittedType
recursively for the points-to set and return a pointer to thereturned data type.
Array Data Types: Lines (9) and (10) emit an array data type if the bit vector
bitsetcorresponds to a single array ALoc, or if all set bits in the bit vectorbitsetrefer to
isomorphic array ALocs (those with the same size and stride). This information is stored
for us during the best-effort pointer analysis discussed inthe previous sections. For the
sake of simplicity, we only show scalar arrays. Arrays of pointers and arrays of structures
can be emitted by recursively applying theg tEmittedTypefunction on the array ALoc
element.
Structure Data Types: Lines (7) and (8) emit a structure data type in the array. A
bit vector refers to a structure if: 1) It has only a single setbit, and 2) There is a structure
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hierarchy defined starting at this set bit as per our discussion in the last paragraph of
section 5.3. If both conditions are true, we get the structure data type as shown in the
pseudo code in figure 5.2.
StructType* getStructType (bitset, H /*Structure Hierarchy*/) { 
(1) if  (cachedType(bitset)) return getCachedType(bitset)  
(2) returnType = createOpaqueStruct () 
(3) cachedType(bitset) = returnType 
(4) startOffset = offset = LowerBound(H); maxOffset = UpperBound(H) 
(5) while  (offset <= maxOffset) { 
(6)   if  (innerStructExist (offset, H))  
(7)     currentType = getStructType (bitset 
                          , getInnerStructHierarchy (offset, H)) 
(8)   else  
(9)     currentType = getEmittedType (bitset, (offset==startOffset)) 
(10)   addFieldToStruct (currentType, returnType) 
(11)   offset = offset  + size (currentType) 
(12)   bitset = bitset >> size (currentType) 
(13) } 





Figure 5.2: The structure data type emission algorithm
To emit a structure data type, we first check if this structuredata type has already
been cached in line (1) of figure 5.2. If not cached, we create an opaque structure and
cache it in lines (2) and (3).
An opaque structure is a structure with no body defined. Creating n opaque struc-
ture is very similar to using forward declarations in C and C++. Creating an opaque
structure and caching it is one key point in supporting recursive data structures. The
reason is that once a field of some structure is declared to point to the beginning of the
same structure, the cached opaque version will be returned instead of redefining the same
structure again and again.
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The algorithm in figure 5.2 handles the case of emitting aggregate types containing
other aggregate and non-aggregate types to any nesting depth. The aggregate hierarchy
recovery process was discussed before at the end of section 5.3. Lines (5) through (12) of
the algorithm iterate over the structure elements. If an inner structure exists in the hierar-
chy, it is declared by callingetStructTyperecursively. If not, we call thegetEmittedType
recursively to recover the non-structure data type.
The reason we add theignoreStructsargument to thegetEmittedTypefunction is
that once an opaque structure is created, its correspondingbit vector will be cached to
that structure type. The first element of that structure willhave the same bit vector (the
first iteration of the loop starting at line (5) of figure 5.2 will have the samebitsetthat was
cached to the opaque structure in line (3). If theignoreStructsflag is not set in this case,
the functiongetEmittedTypewill return the cached opaque structure, not the first element
type of the structure.
It is clear from the discussion above that the two algorithmsin figure 5.1 and 5.2
enable the emission of recursive data structures. The two key points enabling this is the
caching and the opaque structure creation mechanisms. These two algorithms do not
allow circular pointers to scalar elements on the other handas iscussed before.
5.5.1 Practical Considerations
The algorithms discussed in the previous section for type emission show the basic
idea of type emission. Some practical details are not included in the algorithms to simplify
the discussion. We discuss these practical details here.
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Emitting data types in the recovered IR works fine as long as the emitted data type
has the same size as the underlying ALoc recovered from the pointer analysis. There are
two situations where the size of the emitted data type can be different from the ALoc size.
The first situation is related to type recovery inaccuracies, and the second is related to
data structure alignment. We discuss these below.
Sometimes, the type detection is not accurate and there is norecovered type for cer-
tain ALoc(s). In this case, the algorithm in figure 5.1 returns a generic type. If we use the
same generic type for all unknown ALoc types, they might mismatch the ALoc(s) size(s)
and hence create problems in the rewritten binary execution. We make sure we choose the
correct generic type that exactly matches the size of the undrlying ALoc(s). If the points-
to setbitsetrefers to more than one ALoc, they have to have the same size orothe wise
the algorithm emits a data type that matches the semantics ofthe corresponding instruc-
tion in the IR without considering the ALocs at all. The actual algorithm implemented in
SecondWrite takes care of that with extra added checks.
Another reason why a size mismatch happens is related to structure alignment is-
sues. If the recovered types inside of a structure in the IR donot match exactly the types
in the original source code, the backend of the compiler usedto generate the rewritten bi-
nary (LLVM in this case) might introduce extra alignments inide the structure that makes
the actual size of the structure in the rewritten binary different from its size in the IR.
As an example of when this alignment issue might occur, consider the original
source code structure in figure 5.3-a and the corresponding recovered IR structure in figure
5.3-b. The structure in figure 5.3-a is compiled into the structure in figure 5.3-c after
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Figure 5.3: Structure alignment problem example
The total size of the recovered IR structure in figure 5.3-b (when adding up the individual
field sizes) exactly matches the input binary structure in figure 5.3-c. Because the type
recovery is not 100% accurate, the type recovery data flow analysis combined the two
shortsy andz into one single integerz. This can happen if the original binary initializes
bothy andz simultaneously using a single store instruction. Charactery in the recovered
IR represents the padding in the original binary structure.
The problem is when we try to compile the code in figure 5.3-b, the compiler adds
2 bytes padding between the second character and the third integer since integers have to
be aligned on 4 bytes boundary. The resulting memory layout is shown in figure 5.3-d.
This layout is different than the input binary layout shown in figure 5.3-c since only one
byte padding is required to be added. This will result in a mismatch in the sizes between
the original and the rewritten structures which causes wrong behavior in case pointer
arithmetic is used.
To solve this problem, we detect if the compiled IR structuresize can be different
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from what is emitted and in such cases we mark the IR structureas beingpacked. A
packed attribute for a structure instructs the backend not to emit any extra alignments at
all.
5.6 IR Correctness and Analysis Termination
In this section we discuss the correctness guarantees our variable and data type re-
covery as well as the type emission techniques provide for the ewritten IR. We also prove
that our type emission techniques will never go into infiniteloops (always terminate).
The correctness of the recovered IR comes from the fact that the if the memory
layout in the rewritten binary exactly resembles the memorylayout in the original bi-
nary, then every memory access either being a direct access or an indirect reference using
pointer arithmetic will always land on the correct (abstract) memory region in the rewrit-
ten binary and hence the rewritten binary memory referencesex cute correctly.
The reason a compiler can change some memory layout is if individual variables
are provided in the code that is being compiled. Compilers cannot provide any guarantees
about the order of the variables in the binary. It can allocate them in any random order.
The only case when a compiler has to respect some memory layout is when the
code instructs the compiler to do so. One way the code can do that is by having arrays
and/or structures in the IR. The array and structure fields have to remain in the same order
in memory.
We show here that for every memory region in the original binary, the corresponding
abstract memory region in the rewritten binary is always surrounded by either an array or
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a structure in the IR that keeps the same layout.
In any case when a stack location is accessed in the original bi ry, it is accessed
by adding some constant (or non-constant) offset to the stack pointer to get to the desired
stack location. Following the last rule in table 5.1, this automatically creates a structure
or an array for this particular memory region. The same argument applies for global and
heap regions.
Regarding the type emission termination, we prove below thatthe algorithm in fig-
ure 5.1 always terminates. In this proof, we use the fact thatthe ype detection techniques
along with the best effort pointer analysis techniques always terminate (either after con-
vergence, or after a certain number of iterations).
The only cases when the algorithm can go into an infinite loop is when it is calling
itself recursively. This can only happen in line (8) and line(14).
At line (8) of the algorithm, the code is recovering a structure data type. The func-
tion getStructTypemight call itself (in case an inner structure exists), or calls thegetEmit-
tedTypefor other non-structure fields. Since the pointer analysis terminates, the structure
hierarchy is finite, and hence when the functiongetStructTypecalls itself, it will keep
calling itself until the hierarchy is done (which means a finite number of times) bounded
by the number of inner structures. When the functiongetStructTypecallsgetEmittedType,
it tries to get a non-structure data type which is discussed below.
Line (14) of functiongetEmittedTypecalls itself for getting the type a certain pointer
points to. Since we prevent circular pointers using the checks in lines (3) and (4), and
since the original pointer analysis terminates, then the pointers chain has a finite length
which leads to finite number of recursive calls at line (14) bounded by the chained pointers
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length.
5.7 Effects of inaccurate function boundaries and spurious functions
This chapter presented scalable techniques to recover variables and data types from
binaries. These techniques use pointer analysis on memory locations in the binary to
reason about memory allocated variables and their data types.
These memory allocated variable and data type recovery techniques will still work
correctly for spurious functions and functions with inaccurate boundaries provided that
arguments are passed correctly to all functions including spurious ones. For register argu-
ments, they will flow correctly using the techniques presented in chapter 3. For memory
arguments, they will flow correctly if the stack translationrules in section 3.4.1 are used
to construct the IR before running the pointer analysis passre ented in this chapter. The
same discussion applies to data types since they also use theame pointer analysis.
5.8 Results
In this section, we present the results showing the effectivness of our schemes to
identify variables and data types. We first show results on the overall variable and data
type detection process and then we show specific in-depth results for floating point vari-
ables and function prototypes. We evaluate our techniques on the SPEC2006 benchmark
suite which represents C, C++ and Fortran executables using different optimization levels
and compiled using two different compilers (GCC 4.3 for Linux, and Visual Studio 2010
for Windows). We use a machine with an Intel Core i7 3.33GHz processor with 24 GB of
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RAM.
All the recovered code in all the experiments was recompiledusing LLVM 3.0,
linked using GCC (Linux) and MinGW (Windows), and then testedon the ref and test in-
puts provided by the SPEC2006 test suite. All rewritten executables worked successfully
and produced the correct answer as provided in the test suite.
For the experiments presented in this section, we compile C benchmarks from
SPEC2006 with all debugging information present and only usethem for comparison.
We currently do not support reading complete debugging information for C++ and For-
tran, yet we collected results on those benchmarks without cmparing with source code.
The first experiment shows the quality of the recovered variables using the same
metrics DIVINE [4] used for comparison purposes. DIVINE [4]compares recovered
variables in the binary to corresponding variables in the source code of those binaries to
determine how well it did. It defines four variable categories as a result: 1) a matched
variable is a recovered variable whose exact size and position matches the variable from
the source code. 2) An over refined variable is when the sourcecod variable is divided
into more recovered variables; for example, an integer ident fi d as four characters. 3)
Under refined variables which are recovered as part of a larger source code variable ; for
example, an un-identified structure member. 4) An unknown variable is a variable which
is not one of those mentioned categories.
As shown from figure 5.4, an average of 86% of the variables arematched to the
debugging information. We run this experiment on programs ranging from 2,149 instruc-
tions (mcf) to 934,292 instructions (gcc). DIVINE [4] reports an average of 88% matched
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Figure 5.4: Accuracy of variable detection
schemes has comparable precision to DIVINE [4] but on much bigger benchmarks. The
largest benchmark they report variables results on isdeltabluewith 5,371 instructions.
The scalability of the variables and type detection is shownin figure 5.7. Our anal-
ysis scales linearly with program size for larger binaries.The detailed benchmarks sizes
were previously shown in figures 2.8 and 2.9 in chapter 2. The analysis takes around 6
minutes to analyzetontowhich is a Fortran benchmark whose size is 1.3 million instruc-
tions. The average analysis speed is 1.7 seconds per 10000 instructions compared to 10
minutes per 10000 instructions in DIVINE. Thus our method is352X faster than DIVINE
on average. As mentioned before, the underlying reason for our much-faster analysis is
using an underlying best-effort pointer analysis that is not guaranteed to have complete
points-to sets. We consider that while recovering the IR to maintain correctness as we
discussed earlier in section 5.2. dealII is the only program(out of 25) that did not scale
well. dealII has very large number of procedures. The interprocedural data flow propaga-
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tion took most of the time in dealII. Still, it is finishing in around 13 minutes given that it
has 766,555 instructions.
In order to evaluate our type analysis techniques, we calculate the same metrics that
TIE [43] uses. TIE defines a type range for every variable recov red from the executable.
An ordering between basic types is specified by a type latticeshown in their paper. The
first metric they define is thedistancewhich is the difference between the lattice heights
of the upper and lower bounding types for each type range. Thesmaller thedistance,
the more accurate the identified types are. The maximum distance is 4. They also define
their detected type range to beconservativeif the actual source code type falls inside the
detected range.
In order to compare with TIE [43], we define a range of types forevery variable we
detect where the lower bound is the single detected type by our analysis and the upper
bound is the genericregx_t type they define in their lattice, wherex represents the
number of bits of the underlying ALoc or register. Based on that range, we calculate
our distances and conservativeness rates. Since the TIE paper is not clear about how to
define conservativeness for structure and array types, we set their distances to 4. We also
added floating point types to their lattice the same way the integer types are added. As an
example, floats are added in the following order:
⊤ :> reg32_t :> float :> ⊥
.
In addition to the distance and conservativeness, we define our own metric that
measures the precision of multi-level pointers detection.TIE metrics do not show how
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multi-level pointers are precisely typed since all pointertypes have the same height on
their lattice [43]. Our precision metric is defined as the ratio between the correctly re-
covered pointer levels to the source level pointer levels. For example, if a variable has a
double pointer to integer type (int**) in the source code and we identified it as a single
pointer to an integer (int*), then we identified one level only out of the three levels in
source, which arepointer to pointer to integer. Our precision in this example will be
33%.
Figure 5.5 shows the conservativeness as well as the precision of our detected types.
The conservativeness rate is 96% on average which is slightly higher than 90% that TIE
reports. Our precision metric shows that we detect 73% of thepointer levels on average.
The average distance detected for our type recovery system i1.7 which is slightly better










Figure 5.5: Accuracy of type detection
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Some of the larger binaries have lower type precision than other smaller ones. This
is expected since larger programs tend to have more higher lev l pointers than smaller
ones and those are usually hard to detect since they rely on the effectiveness of the under-
lying pointer analysis. The conservativeness and distancemeasures used by TIE do not
capture this fact as it is clear from figure 5.5.
It is worth mentioning that our variable and type recovery are integrated together
in our system. The scalability shown in figure 5.7 is capturing both the variable recovery







Figure 5.6: Distance of type detection
The recovered IR after our type analysis is usually of a higher quality than the one
before our techniques. To evaluate this, we calculate the percentage of the IR symbols that
have a non-generic type after our techniques. Results show that 91% of the IR symbols
are typed in Fortran binaries, 88% of them are typed in C and C++binaries, and 81%



























Figure 5.7: Scalability of variable and type detection
maximum compiler optimization level while conducting thisexperiment.
5.9 Related Work
Throughout this chapter, we compared our work with the most recent work done in
the areas of variable and type recovery [4,43] and function pr totypes identification [10].
In this section, we discuss other work that is relevant to ourtechniques.
Binary rewriting has been considered by a number of researchers. There are two
main categories when talking about binary rewriters, dynamic binary rewriters and static
binary rewriters. Dynamic binary rewriters rewrite the binary during its execution. Ex-
amples are PIN [48], BIRD [52] and others. None of the dynamic binary rewriters
found produce high-level compiler IR. Examples of existing static binary rewriters in-
clude ATOM [28], PLTO [60] and UQBT [16]. None of those binary rewriters employ
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a compiler level intermediate format, like LLVM IR or similar; rather they define their
own low-level custom intermediate format. They do not detect high level features such as
floating point stack variables, register arguments to functio s and data types.
Boomerang [26] is an open source decompiler. It has very limited capabilities
and cannot handle large binaries. Register arguments have tob specified manually. It
does not detect any floating point stack operations. Emmerikmentions in his PhD the-
sis [69] some type recovery techniques based on SSA which arepartially implemented in
Boomerang. They have very limited memory tracking capabilities which are very impor-
tant in recovering variables and data types as we stated earlier in this chapter.
Cifuentes et al. present techniques to recover high level C code fr m SPARC bina-
ries [13]. There is no discussion on how to detect variables along with their data types.
The paper is more towards recovering the high level construct of the C language like
conditionals, loops, etc.
Saxena et al. present an efficent binary instrumentation technique [58]. For their
technique to be effective, they perform memory analysis similar to VSA [5] but limited
only to stack memory to detect escaped local variables. Theyassume complete knowledge
of accurate function boundaries.
REWARDS [44] presents a dynamic type recovery technique; TIE [43] shows better
precision than REWARDS. We already compared to TIE [43] in our results. A technique
to automatically reconstruct data types from binaries is presented in [22]. It is used in
a tool that aims to produce C code from binaries; however no actual C code generation
is demonstrated. One main disadvantage in their work is theydo not track memory. As
we have shown, tracking memory is very important in identifying accurate types. The
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analysis they produce is intraprocedural which limits its accuracy. Their algorithm is used
by Torshina et. al. [68] in another attempt to reverse engineer data types in a tool named
TyDec for program decompilation. An early work on type construction from binaries is
by Mycroft [51]. It tries to construct C code from binaries with correct type information.
However, it does not actually show results producing C code.The algorithm does not
track memory locations and it is not clear if it can produce valid IR or C output code.
Many static custom memory analysis techniques in binaries exist. None of them
recovers variables or data types. The VSA analysis by Balakrishnan and Reps [5] is used
by them to implement various analyses. One of them is called DDA/x86 [6] which is
used to detect bugs in device drivers. Device drivers were also analyzed using the Jakstab
tool [36] using a modified version of the VSA technique [37].
A low level pointer analysis was proposed by Guo et al. [32]. It is a context sen-
sitive, flow insensitive analysis detecting accurate points-to sets of registers and memory
locations. They do not recover variables or data types in their analysis. Their technique
can be used in place of ours, but as we show in this chapter, ourtechnique is simple,
scalable and sufficient for the application we are presenting.
Alias analysis on binaries was proposed by Debray et al. [21]It detects aliases be-
tween registers using address descriptors. No real memory tracking takes place. The
same problem is present in the static slicing technique on binaries by Cifuentes and
Fraboulet [12].
Other types of alias analysis on executables were proposed.Speculative alias anal-
ysis of executables was proposed by Fernandez and Espasa [29] which increases aliasing
information precision by introducing unsafe speculationsat analysis time which might
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result in wrong analysis results in rare cases. Another probabilistic alias analysis for
executables was proposed by Lu and Chen [47] which estimates the probability of two
registers referring to the same memory address.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
In this dissertation, we presented a set of techniques that are essential for the core of
any binary analysis and rewriting system. Our techniques can disassemble the complete
executable binary code, produce accurate function interfac s, recover function APIs, re-
cover variables and data types. Our techniques guarantee the correctness of any high-level
IR recovery process based on the recovered code. Our techniques can handle stripped bi-
naries without symbolic, relocation, or debugging information.
In chapter 2, we presented function boundaries recovery techniques that achieve
100% complete code coverage for most application code. The function boundaries are
almost 100% accurate. We presented techniques to reduce theamount of disassembled
spurious functions up to 4%. Our techniques perform better than all other binary analysis
tools aiming at disassembling binaries and achieving functio s with accurate boundaries.
In chapter 3, we defined APIs for the recovered functions. We presented precise
techniques to recover accurate register arguments and returns information from binaries.
Our techniques guarantee that external function calls present in the binary without any
known prototype can still work correctly in our recovered IR.
In chapter 4, we presented techniques to recover variables that are allocated on the
x86 floating point stack. These variables are often missed inmost of the tools recovering
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variables from executables. Our techniques are sound and will al ays have a functional
recovered IR for most application binaries.
In chapter 5, we extend the variables recovery process to include all memory allo-
cated variables in executables. We also present techniquesto r cover data types for the
recovered variables. The recovered data types include scalar, pointers, aggregates and re-
cursive data types. Our techniques are 352X faster than current techniques which enables
the analysis of very large binaries (up to a million instructions).
All the techniques presented were tested on the SPEC2006 benchmarks suite. The
recovered IR was recompiled and the rewritten binaries worked correctly giving the same
output as the original binaries. We presented in the dissertation detailed metrics showing
the quality of the recovered IR.
184
Bibliography
[1] Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS
2010, San Diego, California, USA, 28th February - 3rd March 2010. The Internet
Society, 2010.
[2] L. Adhianto, S. Banerjee, M. Fagan, M. Krentel, G. Marin, J. Mellor-Crummey,
and N. R. Tallent. Hpctoolkit: Tools for performance analysis of optimized parallel
programs http://hpctoolkit.org.Concurr. Comput. : Pract. Exper., 22(6):685–701,
April 2010.
[3] Kapil Anand, Matthew Smithson, Khaled Elwazeer, AparnaKotha, Jim Gruen,
Nathan Giles, and Rajeev Barua. A compiler-level intermediatrepresentation based
binary analysis and rewriting system. InProceedings of the 8th ACM European Con-
ference on Computer Systems, EuroSys ’13, pages 295–308, New York, NY, USA,
2013. ACM.
[4] G. Balakrishnan and T. Reps. DIVINE: Discovering variables in executables. In
Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, pages 1–28. Springer,
2007.
[5] Gogul Balakrishnan and Thomas Reps. Analyzing memory accesses in x86 exe-
cutables. In Evelyn Duesterwald, editor,Compiler Construction, volume 2985 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 5–23. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.
[6] Gogul Balakrishnan and Thomas Reps. Analyzing stripped device-driver executa-
bles. InProceedings of the Theory and Practice of Software, 14th Interna ional
Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems,
TACAS’08/ETAPS’08, pages 124–140, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[7] Gogul Balakrishnan and Thomas Reps. Wysinwyx: What you see inot what you
execute.ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 32(6):23:1–23:84, August 2010.
[8] Davidson R Boccardo, Arun Lakhotia, A Manacero Jr, and Michael Venable.
Adapting call-string approach for x86 obfuscated binaries. Simṕosio Brasileiro em
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